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In times of the coronavirus, complying with public health policies is essential to save lives. Understanding the factors that influence compliance with social distancing measures is therefore an urgent issue. The present research investigated the role of political and social trust for social distancing using a variety of methods. In Study 1 ( N = 301), conducted with a sample from the United Kingdom in the midst of the virus outbreak (i.e., the first wave), neither political nor social trust had main associations with self-reported social distancing tendencies. However, both factors interacted such that social trust was associated with lower social distancing tendencies among participants with low levels of political trust. In Study 2, using an experimental longitudinal design and again conducted with a sample collected from the UK ( N = 268) during the first wave of the pandemic, social distancing practices increased over time, independent of an experimental manipulation of political trust. Moreover, while the interaction between political and social trust from the first study could not be conceptually replicated, social trust was positively related to social distancing intentions. Moving from the individual to the country level and assessing actual behavior at both the first and second wave of the pandemic, in Study 3 ( N = 65 countries), country-level political trust was related to less social distancing during the first wave. Social trust was related to a higher growth rate of infections. Against the background of these inconsistent findings, we discuss the potential positive and unexpected negative effects of social trust for social distancing.

In times of the coronavirus, complying with public health policies is essential to save lives. Understanding the factors that influence compliance with social distancing measures is therefore an urgent issue. The present research investigated the role of political and social trust for social distancing using a variety of methods. In Study 1 (N = 301), conducted with a sample from the United Kingdom in the midst of the virus outbreak (i.e., the first wave), neither political nor social trust had main associations with self-reported social distancing tendencies. However, both factors interacted such that social trust was associated with lower social distancing tendencies among participants with low levels of political trust. In Study 2, using an experimental longitudinal design and again conducted with a sample collected from the UK (N = 268) during the first wave of the pandemic, social distancing practices increased over time, independent of an experimental manipulation of political trust. Moreover, while the interaction between political and social trust from the first study could not be conceptually replicated, social trust was positively related to social distancing intentions. Moving from the individual to the country level and assessing actual behavior at both the first and second wave of the pandemic, in Study 3 (N = 65 countries), country-level political trust was related to less social distancing during the first wave. Social trust was related to a higher growth rate of infections. Against the background of these inconsistent findings, we discuss the potential positive and unexpected negative effects of social trust for social distancing.

Background: Conspiracy theories about the origins of COVID-19 are widespread and have even been propagated by highly ranked state officials and politicians in the US. Health authorities have cautioned that such theories, although not questioning the existence of the pandemic, may increase the spread of the virus by reducing people's efforts to socially distance. Methods: We test this proposition empirically using longitudinal survey data collected at five timepoints during the early outbreak of the virus in the US (N = 403). Results: Multivariate growth curve analyses showed that, although conspiracy beliefs decreased and social distancing increased over time, people holding more conspiracy beliefs at the beginning of the pandemic showed the lowest increase in social distancing. Moreover, cross-lagged analyses demonstrated that people who reported more conspiracy beliefs at any wave tended to report less social distancing at the following wave. Conclusions: Our findings show that COVID-19 conspiracy theories pose a significant threat to public health as they may reduce adherence to social distancing measures.

Physical cues influence social judgments of others. For example, shorter individuals are evaluated less positively than taller individuals. Here, we demonstrate that height also impacts one of the most consequential intergroup judgments - attributions of humanity - and explore whether this effect is modulated by the tendency to value hierarchy maintenance. In Study 1, the shorter participants perceived a range of out-groups to be, the more they dehumanized them, and this tended to be particularly pronounced among those scoring high on social dominance orientation (SDO). In Study 2, participants dehumanized an out-group more when they were led to believe that it was relatively short. Finally, Study 3 applied a reverse correlation approach, demonstrating that participants in general, and especially those scoring high on SDO, represented shorter groups in ways less consistent with full humanity than they represented taller groups. Together, this research demonstrates that basic physical height cues shape the perceived humanity of out-groups.

Background Conspiracy theories about the origins of COVID‐19 are widespread and have even been propagated by highly ranked state officials and politicians in the US. Health authorities have cautioned that such theories, although not questioning the existence of the pandemic, may increase the spread of the virus by reducing people's efforts to socially distance. Methods We test this proposition empirically using longitudinal survey data collected at five timepoints during the early outbreak of the virus in the US (N = 403). Results Multivariate growth curve analyses showed that, although conspiracy beliefs decreased and social distancing increased over time, people holding more conspiracy beliefs at the beginning of the pandemic showed the lowest increase in social distancing. Moreover, cross‐lagged analyses demonstrated that people who reported more conspiracy beliefs at any wave tended to report less social distancing at the following wave. Conclusions Our findings show that COVID‐19 conspiracy theories pose a significant threat to public health as they may reduce adherence to social distancing measures.

In many Western countries, the public has extensively debated factors potentially leading Muslim minority-group members to support violence by foreign extremist states or to commit violence themselves. Here, one central question has been whether their acculturation orientations may play a role. Combining perspectives from intergroup threat theory and acculturation psychology, the present study investigated whether one reason for why threat perceptions lead to higher violent behavioral intentions among Muslims, as evidence by previous research, may be that they are related to distinct acculturation orientations. It tested this proposition in two samples comprising of Norwegian (N = 253) and British Muslims (N = 194). The more Norwegian Muslims perceived realistic threat, the more violent behavioral intentions they showed, but this relation was not mediated by acculturation. Among British Muslims, mainstream acculturation orientation was related to more violent intentions, while threat was not. In both samples, symbolic threat was associated with more support for Muslim military violence and this relationship was mediated by religious acculturation in the U.K. In contrast to previous research, symbolic threat was linked with less personal intentions to commit violence in the U.K., mediated by religious acculturation. Complementary analyses calculating acculturation strategies indicated that assimilated, and to some extend integrated, Muslims in both countries tended to show the highest violent behavioral intentions. By contrast, separated individuals showed the highest level of support for Muslim military violence. Ways in which these findings can be used to counter violence and improve intergroup relations in Western ethnically diverse societies are discussed. ; publishedVersion

In many Western countries, the public has extensively debated factors potentially leading Muslim minority-group members to support violence by foreign extremist states or to commit violence themselves. Here, one central question has been whether their acculturation orientations may play a role. Combining perspectives from intergroup threat theory and acculturation psychology, the present study investigated whether one reason for why threat perceptions lead to higher violent behavioral intentions among Muslims, as evidence by previous research, may be that they are related to distinct acculturation orientations. It tested this proposition in two samples comprising of Norwegian (N = 253) and British Muslims (N = 194). The more Norwegian Muslims perceived realistic threat, the more violent behavioral intentions they showed, but this relation was not mediated by acculturation. Among British Muslims, mainstream acculturation orientation was related to more violent intentions, while threat was not. In both samples, symbolic threat was associated with more support for Muslim military violence and this relationship was mediated by religious acculturation in the U.K. In contrast to previous research, symbolic threat was linked with less personal intentions to commit violence in the U.K., mediated by religious acculturation. Complementary analyses calculating acculturation strategies indicated that assimilated, and to some extend integrated, Muslims in both countries tended to show the highest violent behavioral intentions. By contrast, separated individuals showed the highest level of support for Muslim military violence. Ways in which these findings can be used to counter violence and improve intergroup relations in Western ethnically diverse societies are discussed.

Majority-group members often hold negative attitudes toward minority-group members who identify with both the majority and their minority group. Integrating perspectives from social identity theory and acculturation research with a coalitional psychology framework, we show that an underlying mechanism for such bias is the perception that dual identifiers are disloyal to the majority group. In Study 1, majority-group participants in the U.S. questioned the loyalty of a dually identified Arab immigrant more than one who identified solely with the (American) majority group, especially under intergroup threat, which in turn predicted less favorable feelings toward the immigrant. Study 2 conceptually replicated the effect of the identity manipulation and the mediating influence of perceived loyalty on judgments about an immigrant being allowed to enlist in the U.S. military. Study 3, partially replicated the findings in Poland, focusing on Russian immigrants as targets. In Study 4, which independently manipulated both the identity expressed by immigrants and their loyalty, a dually identified immigrant whose loyalty to the majority group was portrayed as high was not judged as less qualified than an immigrant who identified only with the majority group for jobs with the potential to inflict damage on the majority group. Study 5, replicated and extended the previous studies in the context of fans of allied or rival soccer teams in Germany, revealing the moderating role of existing group relations on the hypothesized loyalty processes. In summary, coalitionally driven perceptions of (dis)loyalty appear to undergird bias toward minority-group members who hold dual identifications.

White Americans generally equate "being American" with "being White." In six studies, we demonstrate that White Americans perceive immigrants who adopt American mainstream culture as racially White and, reciprocally, perceive White-looking immigrants as assimilating more. In Studies 1 and 2, participants visually represented immigrants who adopted U.S. culture by acculturating to mainstream American culture or by holding a common or dual identity as more phenotypically White and less stereotypic in appearance. In Studies 3 and 4, these processes explained why participants were less likely to racially profile immigrants but also regarded them as less qualified for integration support. In Study 5, participants perceived light skin to fit to high U.S. culture adoption and dark skin to low U.S. culture adoption. Finally, in Study 6, light-skinned immigrants were seen as less threatening because they were perceived as assimilating more. Immigrants' acculturation orientation and appearance interact and shape how they are evaluated.

Whether and how societal structures shape individual psychology is a foundational question of the social sciences. Combining insights from evolutionary biology, economy, and the political and psychological sciences, we identify a central psychological process that functions to sustain group-based hierarchies in human societies. In study 1, we demonstrate that macrolevel structural inequality, impaired population outcomes, socio-political instability, and the risk of violence are reflected in the endorsement of group hegemony at the aggregate population level across 27 countries (n = 41,824): The greater the national inequality, the greater is the endorsement of between-group hierarchy within the population. Using multilevel analyses in study 2, we demonstrate that these psychological group-dominance motives mediate the effects of macrolevel functioning on individual-level attitudes and behaviors. Specifically, across 30 US states (n = 4,613), macrolevel inequality and violence were associated with greater individuallevel support of group hegemony. Crucially, this individual-level support, rather than cultural-societal norms, was in turn uniquely associated with greater racism, sexism, welfare opposition, and even willingness to enforce group hegemony violently by participating in ethnic persecution of subordinate out-groups. These findings suggest that societal inequality is reflected in people's minds as dominance motives that underpin ideologies and actions that ultimately sustain group-based hierarchy.

Increased immigration and demographic changes have not only resulted in political pushback, but also in violent attacks against immigrants. Several recent terrorist attacks committed by White supremacists invoke rhetoric around a deliberate attempt to make Whites extinct and replace them with non-Western immigrants. Yet, while it is widely acknowledged among extremism researchers that this perception of orchestrated extinction or replacement has tremendous potential to lead to violent extremism, its consequences have not yet been directly examined. Using the Scandinavian context (e.g., Denmark and Norway), in two correlational studies and one experiment, we provide evidence that this perception is associated with the persecution of Muslims, violent intentions, and Islamophobia. Further, we demonstrate that these associations are mediated by symbolic threats. Conspiracy beliefs that one's group is being replaced seem to drive hostile intergroup attitudes. We discuss the societal implications of this finding (i.e., generating fear, polarization, and hostile public opinion towards immigrants).

How do English majority members' national culture maintenance and immigrant culture adoption (i.e., globalisation-based proximal-acculturation) predict their acculturation expectations (i.e., how they think immigrants should acculturate) and intergroup ideologies (i.e., how they think society should manage diversity)? Cross-sectional results ( N = 220) supported hypothesised relationships using a variable- and person-centred approach: welcoming expectations/ideologies related positively to immigrant culture adoption (or an integration/assimilation strategy) and negatively to national culture maintenance (or a separation strategy), whilst the reverse was true for unwelcoming expectations/ideologies. Notably, colourblindness showed only weak correlations with/differences across acculturation orientations/strategies. In longitudinal analyses, adopting immigrants' cultures increased the intergroup ideologies polyculturalism and multiculturalism whilst reducing support for assimilation over time, whereas national culture maintenance had the opposite effect. Meanwhile, the expectation integration-transformation was especially related to higher odds of following an integration rather than separation strategy over time. Overall, results advance the psychological study of multiculturalism, providing first longitudinal insights on majority members' acculturation.