Suchergebnisse

Intro -- Contents -- Preface -- List of Abbreviations -- Part 1: Systemic Factors and Canadian Federalism -- 1 The Role of Provinces in the Global Political Economy -- 2 International Pressures and Canadian Federalism -- 3 The Federal-Provincial Committee System on International Trade -- Part 2: Considerations of Process and Outcome -- 4 The Political Executive in Provincial Foreign Trade Policy -- 5 Bureaucratic and Legislative Pressures -- 6 Issues of Implementation, Negotiation, and Consultation -- 7 Is Anybody Listening? Evaluating Societal Considerations -- 8 Dominant Ideas, Ideology, and Intrusive Neoliberalism -- Part 3: Evaluating Regimes and Change -- 9 Non-Central Governments' Cross-Border Functional Relations -- 10 Emerging Regional Environment and Labour Regimes -- Conclusion -- Notes -- Selected Bibliography -- Index -- A -- B -- C -- D -- E -- F -- G -- H -- I -- J -- K -- L -- M -- N -- O -- P -- Q -- R -- S -- T -- U -- V -- W -- Z.

The Limits of Protectionism: Building Coalitions for Free
Trade, Michael Lusztig, Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press,
2004, pp. xi, 272.As the title suggests, Michael Lusztig offers a non-apologetic
endorsement of liberal trade, coalition building, and the limitations of
protectionism and rent seeking. Specifically, he argues that
"flexible" rent seekers have a better opportunity to prosper
than "inflexible" rent seekers. The goal, therefore, is for
governments to reduce rents below a specific threshold to force sectoral
interests to successfully adjust to or exit the market. Strategies include
the big bang approach, divide and conquer, iteration, and the path of
least resistance. Catalysts for change are periods of economic crisis,
international obligations, and strategic considerations in which reform is
linked to potential electoral success. Ultimately, in Lusztig's
opinion, crisis and mandated international change offer the best
opportunities for rent reduction, at least in terms of limited political
backlash.

Abstract
In Fall 2020, all universities in Alberta went with remote delivery of classes due to COVID-19 restrictions. This provided not only teaching challenges, but also opportunities. Professors at three Canadian universities teaching similar undergraduate courses in international political economy decided to use the challenges/opportunities of COVID-19 restrictions to experiment with a World Trade Organization (WTO) simulation across three campuses through remote delivery. Simulations are frequently used for teaching in political science, but what was unusual was doing it through remote delivery. This paper assesses the effectiveness of the experiment. It traces the origins/evolution of the idea, learning objectives for the students, preparation by the professors to design the WTO simulation, and the experience of the actual simulation. It also addresses the challenges (technological, timing, assignments, grading, student anxiety, etc.). In addition, it identifies the steps that were taken to reduce and mitigate the challenges. It also acknowledges the mistakes that were made by the professors in designing and implementing the assignment. These observations and reflections are informed by the materials that the professors prepared, their thoughts on the experience, and the feedback from participating students (through official student evaluations as well as a special survey instrument). It provides lessons for future online simulations.