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Papers presented at a conference devoted to the applications of game theory to negotiations, held under the auspices of the Institute for defense analyses, at Princeton university, Princeton, N.J., Oct. 7, 1961.

Equilibrium points in n-person games ; The bargaining problem / John F. Nash, Jr. -- Non-cooperative games / John Nash -- An iterative method of solving a game / Julia Robinson -- Equivalence of games in extensive form / F.B. Thompson -- Extensive games and the problem of information / H.W. Kuhn -- A value for n-person games ; Stochastic games / L.S. Shapley -- Recursive games / H. Everett -- Von Neumann-Morgenstern solutions to cooperative games without side payments / R.J. Aumann and B. Peleg -- A limit theorem on the core of an economy / Gerard Debreu and Herbert Scarf -- The bargaining set for cooperative games / Robert J. Aumann and Michael Maschler -- Existence of competitive equilibria in markets with a continuum of traders / Robert J. Aumann -- The core of an n-person game / Herbert E. Scarf -- Games with incomplete information played by "Bayesian" players. Pt. 1. The basic model ; Pt. 2. Bayesian equilibrium points ; Pt. 3. The basic probability distribution of the game / John C. Harsanyi -- The big match / David Blackwell and T.S. Ferguson -- On market games / Lloyd S. Shapley and Martin Shubik -- Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games / R. Selten

AbstractA computationally simple method for approximating the optimal solution to transportation problems is described. Also, a method to deal with fixed charges is proposed. The computational algorithms have been designed primarily to handle very large numbers of transportation problems each involving a small number of origins and destinations as is frequently the situation in the Navy supply system. The results of empirical tests of the effectiveness of the methods are summarized.