Suchergebnisse

AbstractThe United States has ceded to the rest of the world managing the dollar's value. For a generation, the U.S. authorities have all but withdrawn from the foreign exchange market. Yet the dollar does not float freely as a result of this hands-off U.S. policy. Instead, other authorities manage the dollar exchange rates, albeit separately. These authorities make heavier purchases of dollars in its downswings than in the upswings, damping its decline. Thus, the Fed finds that accommodative monetary policy transmits less to U.S. manufacturing and traded services, and relies on still lower rates to stimulate interest-sensitive housing and auto demand. The current U.S. dollar policy of naming and shaming surplus-running countries accumulating foreign exchange reserves does not seem to work. Three alternatives warrant consideration. First, the U.S. could reinstate its withholding tax on interest income received by non-residents and even add policy criteria to bilateral tax treaties. Second, the U.S. authorities could retaliate by selling dollars against the currencies of dollar-buying jurisdictions running chronic surpluses. However, either the withholding tax or such retaliatory foreign exchange intervention pose huge practical challenges. Third, the U.S. authorities could re-enter the foreign exchange market, making large-scale asset purchases in foreign currency when the dollar rises sharply against its average value. Such a policy would encourage private investment in U.S. traded goods and service production. The challenge is to setex anteforeign exchange intervention rules to guide market participants' expectations, even positioning them to do the authorities' work.