Suchergebnisse

A definition of bargaining is proposed, & a conceptual framework is developed, which attempts to view interpersonal bargaining in terms of its important soc-psychol'al properties. An exp'al bargaining game is described, in which 2 S's are presented with a problem requiring a cooperative agreement in order to maximize the amount of (imaginary) money won. S's undergo 20 repetitions of the same bargaining problems. In the 1st of 3 exp's, the effect of the availability of threat on the S's' behavior was examined, using 3 conditions of threat: (1) no threat (neither player could threaten the other); (2) unilateral threat (available to only one player); & (3) bilateral threat. Results indicate that difficulty in reaching agreement, as well as amount of money lost (individually & collectively), was greatest in condition (3) & next great in (2). Only in (1) did the players make an overall profit. In a 2nd experiment the effect of COMM on the S's' ability to reach agreements was examined. The same task was employed as in the 1st experiment except that S's were permitted to talk over an intercom system. 2 COMM conditions were run: (A) unilateral COMM (only one player allowed to talk), & (B) bilateral COMM (both players allowed to talk). The 2 COMM treatments were run in each of the 3 threat conditions described above, forming a 2-by-3 factorial exp. Results indicate that the COMM variable had no effect on the difficulty of reaching agreements, but the results of the 1st experiment on the effects of threat were replicated. Players communicated on fewer than 25% of the trials; COMM was most frequent in condition (1), & about equally frequent in conditions (2) & (3). These diff's, however, were not statistically signif. There was signif'ly more talking in the (B) than in the (A) COMM conditions, Because S's in the 2nd experiment communicated so infrequently, any conclusions based on these results would relate only to the opportunity to communicate, & note to COMM per se. In a 3rd exp, an attempt to overcome this difficulty was made by running a treatment condition in which S's were compelled to communicate on every trial (`Compulsory COMM'). Results indicate that Compulsory COMM signif'ly improves performance in threat condition (2), as compared to performance under both optional & no COMM. The above findings are discussed with respect to general psychol'al processes which operate in interpersonal bargaining. Special consideration is given to the problem of the maintenance of `face' in interpersonal encounters. Finally, the findings are used as the basis for some speculative generalizations about real-life problems. Modified AA.