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Research shows that trade openness and high social spending go hand in hand, at least in wealthy democracies. It is not clear, however, exactly why this is so. Many scholars and policymakers argue that generous social spending facilitates trade liberalization, but there is no direct empirical support for this claim. This paper is the first to show directly that social spending promotes freer trade. Specifically, I show that U.S. state-level unemployment insurance makes Congress members significantly more likely to vote for freer trade. Since state unemployment insurance is exogenous to individual congressional votes, my analysis shows clearly that the former affects the latter. My results imply that social spending insures not only citizens but also open trade policies against hard economic times. They also highlight the importance of subnational policy choices to national policy outcomes.

Although scholars have begun to explore the determinants of public attitudes toward trade policy, we still do not know whether these attitudes have policy consequences. This paper presents the first systematic analysis of this question. I find that higher public support for free trade leads to lower tariffs, but only in democracies. I also find that democracy leads to lower tariffs only where public support for free trade is relatively high. Hence, although both public opinion and regime type are important, neither matters independently of the other. This finding suggests a need for further research on the conditional effects of both.

A growing body of research shows that democracies have more liberal trade policies than do autocracies. I argue, in contrast, that democracy has contradictory effects on different types of trade policies because electoral competition generates more information about some than about others. It generates considerable information about policies whose effects on consumer welfare are easy to explain to voters, but less information about policies whose effects are more complex. By increasing the transparency of some policies relative to others, democracy induces politicians to reduce transparent trade barriers but also to replace them with less transparent ones. I test this hypothesis by examining the impact of democracy on tariffs, "core" nontariff barriers (NTBs) such as quotas, and "quality" NTBs such as product standards in 75 countries in the 1990s. I find that democracy leads to lower tariffs, higher core NTBs, and even higher quality NTBs. I conclude that democracy promotes "optimal obfuscation" that allows politicians to protect their markets while maintaining a veneer of liberalization.

Both policymakers and scholars have expressed concern that trade has increased inequality in advanced industrialized countries (AICs). We argue that the impact of trade on inequality depends on the availability of public goods, such as educational opportunities, that allow displaced workers to upgrade their skills and adjust to trade. The provision of public goods, in turn, depends on political institutions: institutions that unify budgetary powers promote public-good spending while institutions that separate budgetary powers discourage it. Trade should thus increase inequality more (reduce inequality less) in countries with a high separation of budgetary powers. We test and find support for these hypotheses with a cross-sectional time-series analysis of fourteen AICs. Our results imply that trade can improve aggregate welfare without worsening economic inequities, but only if governments adopt complementary policies that facilitate human capital formation and labor-market adjustment.

Climate-related foreign aid is on the rise, with signatories to the Paris Climate agreement pledging US$100 billion annually to promote mitigation and adaptation in recipient countries. While this seems like a welcome development, we have little evidence that climate aid actually encourages recipients to adopt climate legislation. In this paper, we examine the relationship between climate aid and recipient climate policy. Using multiple measures of each, we find no evidence that the former is systematically related to the latter. Although this suggests that climate aid is ineffective, this conclusion must be qualified due to the poor quality of both climate aid and climate policy data. More definitive conclusions will require more accurate coding of climate aid as well as better climate policy measures that distinguish truly consequential policies from less consequential ones.