Suchergebnisse

The article studies internal and external sovereignty of unrecognized or partially recognized post-Soviet states through the use of empirical analysis of quantitative data and critical analysis of subjective factors. It analyzes statistical and other information that reflects the demographic and socio-economic situation, foreign economic relations of such entities, and their impact on neighboring countries and regions. This is combined with the critical study of public opinions and popular identities based on surveys and 13 focus groups conducted in the fall of 2020 in Transnistria and Abkhazia. In all post-Soviet de facto states, the population has noticeably decreased (except for Nagorno-Karabakh before the 2020 war). The reason for the outflow of residents was the inability of such entities to provide citizens with decent incomes and their poor performance in economic competition with neighboring countries and regions, reflected in the dynamics of the key indicators per capita in terms of purchasing power parity. However, the economic and demographic situation cannot explain the sustainability of such entities. Strong political identity of citizens and their loyalty to the ruling regimes serve as the main basis for, and essential elements of, internal sovereignty. Participants of surveys highly value independence. They believe that it presumes economic independence, improved well-being, and the development of full-fledged international relations that helps to strengthen external sovereignty. Some respondents expressed disappointment with the fact that these goals have not been achieved in the course of 30 years. The geopolitical vision of the world by residents of post-Soviet de facto states is "Russia-centric", although Russia is far from being idealized. In conclusion, the risks that Russia faces in connection with post-Soviet de facto states and with Moscow's involvement in the respective conflicts are assessed.

For more than 30 years, Transnistria and Abkhazia separated from their parent states and proclaimed independence. Generations born and raised in unrecognized states have already entered an active age. In this regard, the question of how citizens of the Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic and the Republic of Abkhazia understand independence, how important it is for them, how do they see the prospects of their states and what life strategies do they choose, becomes especially relevant. In the article, the authors compare the results of 13 focus groups conducted in Transnistria and Abkhazia in the fall of 2020 with the main socio-economic indicators of de facto states and their neighbors. This approach made it possible to connect the perception of the problems of everyday life with changes in the identity of citizens and the internal sovereignty of unrecognized states, to highlight the factors uniting and dividing various social groups, to assess their attitude to the current results and prospects of state building. The different composition of the groups made it possible to compare the opinions, firstly, of citizens who were socialized after the collapse of the Soviet Union and in Soviet times, secondly, different ethnic groups, men and women, and, thirdly, residents of different districts of de-facto states. It was revealed that the main economic indicators of Abkhazia and Transnistria lag behind the average values of neighboring countries. The lack of significant economic progress can potentially affect the loyalty of citizens to the political regime and negatively change the viability of the republics. In this context, signs of fatigue from the inconveniences of life in the unrecognized republic and low-income levels compared to neighboring countries and the mother state were revealed in the Abkhaz and Transnistrian societies.

This work juxtaposes the analysis of the federal discourse on the exclave position of the Kaliningrad region in 1994-2012 based on the screening by the Nezavisimaya gazeta and the results of surveys of students at the Immanuel Kant Baltic Federal University and the Universities of Gdansk and Klaipeda using a similar questionnaire. Students of all three universities show latent dissatisfaction with employment prospects, which is manifested in the declared intention to emigrate. The orientation of young residents of Kaliningrad and their peers from Gdansk and Klaipeda towards prevailing connections with Europe is complicated by the uncertainty of the EU-Russia relations. Young residents of Gdansk and Klaipeda reproduce dated stereotypes, and their interest in the Kaliningrad region is limited. However, as the experience of the other countries suggests, local border traffic between the Kaliningrad region and the neighbouring Polish voivodeships can contribute to the improvement of mutual images. Long-lasting eforts to diversify cooperation and promote a positive image of Kaliningrad in the neighbouring Polish regions can prove worthwhile. Apart from the measures aimed at strengthening the region's economic base, it is necessary to increase the symbolic capital of Kaliningrad to achieve harmonious development of Kaliningrad identity.