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AbstractWarren Magnusson sees a problem endemic to political thought and practice: we see the world in ways that presume and reaffirm the necessity of a sovereign territorial state, on pain of violent disorder in its absence. The solution is to 'see like a city', shaking off the dualism of sovereignty versus anarchy and finding a richer space of political possibilities. I admire and applaud Magnusson's critical efforts to challenge dominant categories and illuminate possibilities, but these aims rest uneasily with his polemical contrast between sovereignty and cities.

G.A. Cohen argues that Rawlsian constructivism mistakenly conflates principles of justice with optimal rules of regulation, a confusion that arises out of how Rawls has us think about justice. I use the concepts/conceptions distinction to argue that while citizens may reasonably disagree about the substance and demands of justice, some principled convergence may be possible: we can agree upon regulative principles consistent with justice, as each of us understands it. Rawlian constructivism helps us find that principled convergence, and this too is a conception of justice. G.A. Cohen pense que le constructivisme confond les principes de justice avec les règles de régulation optimale, une confusion qui découle de la manière dont Rawls pense la justice. En utilisant la distinction entre les concepts et les conceptions, j'affirme que, bien que les citoyens puissent raisonnablement contester la substance et les exigences de la justice, un accord de principe est possible: nous pouvons convenir de principes régulateurs compatibles avec la justice, comme chacun de nous la comprend. Le constructivisme Rawlsien nous aide à trouver cet accord de principe, et cela aussi est une conception de la justice.

Abstract.Critics fault rational choice theory for dubious assumptions and limited explanatory power. The aims of rational choice are, however, as much normative as explanatory, and I argue that an abiding concern of political thought—the wrong of exploitation—gives moral weight to some of the more substantive assumptions underlying many rational choice prescriptions.Résumé.Les critiques reprochent à la théorie du choix rationnel d'avancer des hypothèses douteuses et d'offrir des explications restreintes. Les objectifs du choix rationnel sont, cependant, aussi bien normatifs qu'explicatifs. J'affirme qu'une préoccupation centrale de la pensée politique – le mal de l'exploitation – donne une signification morale à certains postulats du choix rationnel.

Following Rawls, many political liberals hold reasonableness in high regard. Reasonable citizens can disagree, however, and some may find their arguments routinely ignored in elections and legislatures. Should we be troubled by such failures of institutional responsiveness as a matter of justice? The author argues that the expectation of such failures would lead parties in an original position to favor certain classes of institutions over others: A Theory of Justice and Political Liberalism together suggest a particular federal structure to a republic of reasons.