Suchergebnisse

AbstractResearch Question/IssueWe theorize tensions between the dual purposes of financial gains and social impact and examine how varieties of controlling owner type and state capitalism influence corporate social responsibility (CSR) practices in weak institutional settings. Specifically, we investigate the impact of the state as a majority investor (via state‐owned enterprises) and as a strategic investor (via government‐owned vehicles such as sovereign wealth funds) on CSR.Research Findings/InsightsUsing 512 firm‐year observations from 2007 to 2015, we find that similar to a widely held corporation, state‐owned enterprises are negatively associated with social and environmental practices. Yet, when the state serves as a strategic supporter and investor (i.e., sovereign wealth funds), a firm tends to exhibit greater CSR practices. Our findings are robust to random‐effect models and the two‐stage least squares instrumental variable approach.Theoretical/Academic ImplicationsWe examine the influence of controlling shareholders on CSR with a focus on state capitalism in Africa, highlighting the role of controlling owners that may fill institutional voids especially when sovereign wealth funds are the largest shareholders. By focusing on Africa, this study broadens the understanding of CSR and controlling ownership by eliminating assumptions and preconditions stemming from developed‐country contexts.Practitioner/Policy ImplicationsThis study offers insights to policy makers interested in promoting social and environmental practices. As such, we disentangle the mechanisms behind social and environmental engagements by government, state investor (i.e., sovereign wealth funds), and widely held corporate investors, contributing to the understanding of underresearched domains and guiding not only managers but also policy makers. Our results encourage policy makers to pay attention to specific characteristics of state capitalism.