Was Iris Marion Young a Relational Egalitarian?
In: Polity, Band 57, Heft 1, S. 120-132
ISSN: 1744-1684
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In: Polity, Band 57, Heft 1, S. 120-132
ISSN: 1744-1684
In: Journal of human development and capabilities: a multi-disciplinary journal for people-centered development, Band 17, Heft 1, S. 125-139
ISSN: 1945-2837
In: Studies in feminist philosophy
Decolonizing Universalism develops a genuinely anti-imperialist feminism. Against relativism/universalism debates that ask feminists to either reject normativity or reduce feminism to a Western conceit, Khader's nonideal universalism rediscovers the normative core of feminism in opposition to sexist oppression and reimagines the role of moral ideals in transnational feminist praxis.
In: Studies in feminist philosophy
In: Signs: journal of women in culture and society, Band 48, Heft 2, S. 291-320
ISSN: 1545-6943
In: Journal of global ethics, Band 16, Heft 3, S. 388-403
ISSN: 1744-9634
In: Journal of global ethics, Band 16, Heft 3, S. 343-348
ISSN: 1744-9634
In: Politics & gender, Band 12, Heft 4, S. 727-753
ISSN: 1743-9248
World Affairs Online
In: Hypatia: a journal of feminist philosophy, Band 30, Heft 2, S. 352-369
ISSN: 1527-2001
Development ethicists see reducing intrahousehold gender inequality as an important policy aim. However, it is unclear that a minimalist cross‐cultural consensus can be formed around this goal. Inequality on its own may not bring women beneath a minimal welfare threshold. Further, adherents of complementarian metaphysical doctrines may view attempts to reduce intrahousehold inequality as attacks on their worldviews. Complicating the justificatory task is the fact that familiar arguments against intrahousehold inequality, including those from agency and self‐esteem, depart from premises that complementarians reject—premises about the value of independence or the moral irrelevance of gender. I propose that development ethicists should offer complementarianism‐compatible arguments against the norms and practices constitutive of intrahousehold inequality. I develop arguments against two intrahousehold inequality‐supportive practices that depart from complementarian premises. Specifically, I argue that patriarchal risk and gender schemas that devalue women's labor prevent men from discharging complementarian duties to promote women's welfare.
In: Journal of global ethics, Band 9, Heft 3, S. 311-327
ISSN: 1744-9634
In: Hypatia: a journal of feminist philosophy, Band 26, Heft 4, S. 742-761
ISSN: 1527-2001
I argue that the epistemological virtues of concrete thinking, self‐transparency, and narrative understanding developed by care ethicists can help international development practitioners combat their own temptations to engage in "unconscious unjustified paternalism" (UUP). I develop the concept of UUP—a type of paternalism in which one party unjustifiably substitutes her judgment for another's because of difficulty distinguishing her desires for the other from the other's good. I show that the temptation to UUP is endemic to development and that care ethics contains virtues for combating it. Key to my claim is a view of caregiving as a practice of negotiating conflict.
In: Journal of human development and capabilities: a multi-disciplinary journal for people-centered development, Band 10, Heft 2, S. 169-187
ISSN: 1945-2837
In: Hypatia: a journal of feminist philosophy, Band 23, Heft 4, S. 48-74
ISSN: 1527-2001
The "fathers' rights" movement represents policies that undermine women's reproductive autonomy as furthering the cause of gender equality. Khader argues that this movement exploits two general weaknesses of equality claims identified by Luce Irigaray. She shows that Irigaray criticizes equality claims for their appeal to a genderneutral universal subject and for their acceptance of our existing symbolic repertoire. This article examines how the plaintiffs' rhetoric in two contemporary "fathers' rights" court cases takes advantage of these weaknesses.
In: Social philosophy today: an annual journal from the North American Society for Social Philosophy, Band 35, S. 21-37
ISSN: 2153-9448
Global and transnational feminist praxis has long faced a seemingly inexorable dilemma. Universalism is often charged with causing feminist complicity in imperialism. In spite of this, it seems clear that feminists should not embrace relativism; feminism is, after all, a view about how certain types of treatment based on gender are wrong. This article clears the path for an anti-imperialist feminist universalism by showing how feminist complicity in imperialism is not caused by the fact of having universalist normative commitments. What I call "missionary feminism" stems more from ethnocentrism, justice monism, and idealizing and moralizing ways of seeing that associate Western culture with morality (and thus prevent Western culture and Western intervention from becoming objects of normative scrutiny) than from universalism about the value of gender justice.
In: Routledge philosophy companions