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Executive Summary This research was conducted at the request of the International Catholic Migration Commission (ICMC) as part of a two-year special initiative entitled "The Future of Work, Labour After Laudato Sì." 1 This article explores the future of work, international migration, and the intersection of the two at a time of rapid change, uncertainty, and disruption for migrants, laborers, and their families and communities. It draws on human rights principles, international law, and religious values, particularly from the Catholic tradition, to chart an ethical approach to the governance of these timeless phenomena. What does the future hold? Under one dystopian scenario, the future of work will be characterized by massive job loss due to automation, robotics, and artificial intelligence. Politicians and business leaders will characterize the resulting human displacement as an unavoidable "disruption" and byproduct of change. Euphemisms, however, will poorly mask the loss of livelihood, self-esteem, and a central marker of identity for countless persons, particularly the poor and vulnerable. Technological advances will decimate families, communities, and entire ways of life. For many, stable work will become a thing of the past, and technology an instrument of marginalization and discrimination. Algorithms will be used to "perpetuate gender bias" ( ILO 2019a , 35), pit workers against each other, and squeeze the maximum productivity from them for the minimum compensation. The "inappropriate use" and "weak governance" of algorithms will lead to "biases, errors and malicious acts" ( Albinson, Krishna, and Chu 2018 ). Large swaths of the world's citizens will become (at best) the unhappy dependents of states and global elites. The future of migration seems equally daunting. Current trends suggest that the number of international migrants will continue to rise due to job displacement, violence, natural disaster, and states that cannot or will not meet their fundamental responsibilities. If the past is prologue, unscrupulous politicians and media sources will also continue to blame migrants for the economic and cultural displacement of their constituents, xenophobia will increase, and migrants will encounter hostility in host communities. Natives will criticize their governments and institutions for failing to protect their interests and needs, and migrant laborers will be caught in the middle. This article does not minimize the urgency of the challenges presented by migration and work. It documents the unacceptable living, working, and migration conditions of immense numbers of the world's citizens. It offers, however, a more optimistic vision of the future than the dystopian view, a vision characterized by international cooperation and solidarity. It recognizes the potential of technology "to render labour superfluous, ultimately alienating workers and stunting their development," but also its potential to "free workers from arduous labour; from dirt, drudgery, danger and deprivation" and "to reduce work-related stress and potential injuries" ( ILO 2019 , 43). It recognizes the way in which fear of displacement can lead to exclusionary nationalism and xenophobia, but also the possibility of unity based on the shared values embedded in the cultures of diverse persons. It recognizes the costs of migration, but also its immense contributions to host communities. The article argues for person-centered systems and policies that promote the freedom, rights, and dignity of workers, migrants, and migrant workers, and that strengthen migrant host communities. It begins by examining the challenges facing low-income and vulnerable migrants who struggle for decent work, are the most likely to lose their jobs, and are "the least equipped to seize new job opportunities" ( ILO 2019 , 18). 2 It then presents an ethical, person-centered vision of migration and work, rooted in human rights principles, international law, and Catholic social teaching. The article also draws on principles articulated in the Global Compact on Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (GCM); the Global Compact on Refugees (GCR); and the Holy See's Twenty Action Points for the Global Compacts. It ends with a series of recommendations that seek to bring this vision to fruition.

When signing into law the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA, or "the Act"), 1 President William J. Clinton asserted that the legislation strengthened "the rule of law by cracking down on illegal immigration at the border, in the workplace, and in the criminal justice system — without punishing those living in the United States legally" ( Clinton 1996 ). In fact, the Act has severely punished US citizens and noncitizens of all statuses. It has also eroded the rule of law by eliminating due process from the overwhelming majority of removal cases, curtailing equitable relief from removal, mandating detention (without individualized custody determinations) for broad swaths of those facing deportation, and erecting insurmountable, technical roadblocks to asylum. In addition, it created new immigration-related crimes and established "the concept of 'criminal alienhood,'" which has "slowly, but purposefully" conflated criminality and lack of immigration status ( Abrego et al. 2017 , 695). It also conditioned family reunification on income, divided mixed-status families, and consigned other families to marginal and insecure lives in the United States ( Lopez 2017 , 246). Finally, it created the 287(g) program that enlists state and local law enforcement agencies in immigration enforcement and drives a wedge between police and immigrant communities. The trend of "cracking down" on immigrants did not begin with IIRIRA. The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, and the 1990 Immigration Act, for example, expanded deportable offenses ( Abrego et al. 2017 , 697; Macías-Rojas 2018 , 3–4). IIRIRA, however, significantly "ratchet[ed] up" the "punitive aspects of US immigration law already in place" ( Abrego et al. 2017 , 702), and erected much of the legal and operational infrastructure that underlies the Trump administration's plan to remove millions of undocumented residents and their families, to terrify others into leaving "voluntarily," and to slash legal immigration. In 2016, the Center for Migration Studies of New York (CMS) issued a call for papers to examine IIRIRA's multifaceted consequences. 2 Between March 2017 and January 2018, CMS published eight papers from this collection in its Journal on Migration and Human Security ( JMHS). The papers cover the political conditions that gave rise to IIRIRA, and the Act's impact on immigrants, families, communities, and the US immigration system. This article draws on these papers — as well as sources closer to IIRIRA's passage and implementation — to describe how the Act transformed US immigration policies and laid the groundwork for the Trump administration's policies. 3 After a brief discussion of IIRIRA's origins, the article discusses the law's effects and subsequent policies related to the growth of the US immigration enforcement apparatus, removal, asylum, detention, the criminal prosecution of immigrants, the treatment of immigrant families, and joint federal-state enforcement activities.

This paper introduces a special collection of 15 papers that chart a course for long-term reform of the US immigration system. The papers look beyond recent legislative debates and the current era of rising nationalism and restrictionism to outline the elements of a forward-looking immigration policy that would serve the nation's interests, honor its liberal democratic ideals, promote the full participation of immigrants in the nation's life, and exploit the opportunities offered by the increasingly interdependent world. This paper highlights several overarching themes from the collection, as well as dozens of proposals for reform. Together, the papers in the collection make the case that: • Immigration policymaking should be embedded in a larger set of partnerships, processes, and commitments that respond to the conditions that force persons to migrate. • The US immigration system should reflect liberal democratic values and an inclusive vision of national identity. • It is incumbent on policy and opinion makers to publicize the broad national interests served by US immigration policies. • Policymakers should, in turn, evaluate and adjust US immigration policies based on their success in furthering the nation's interests. • The United States should prioritize the gathering and dissemination of the best available evidence on migration and on the nation's migration-related needs and programs, and should use this information to respond flexibly to changing migration patterns and new economic developments. • Immigrant integration strengthens communities and represents an important, overarching metric for US immigration policies. • The successful integration of the United States' 43 million foreign-born residents and their progeny should be a national priority. • An immigration federalism agenda should prioritize cooperation on shared federal, state, and local priorities. • An immigration federalism agenda should recognize the federal government's enforcement obligations; the interests of local communities in the safety, well-being and participation of their residents; the importance of federal leadership in resolving the challenges posed by the US undocumented population; and the need for civil society institutions to serve as mediators of immigrant integration. • Immigration reform should be coupled with strong, well-enforced labor standards in order to promote fair wages and safe and healthy working conditions for all US workers. • Fairness and due process should characterize US admission, custody, and removal decisions. • Family unity should remain a central goal of US immigration policy and a pillar of the US immigration system. • The United States should seek to craft "win-win" immigration policies that serve its own interests and that benefit migrant-sending states. • US immigration law and policy should be coherent and consistent, and the United States should create legal migration opportunities for persons uprooted by US foreign interventions, trade policies, and immigration laws. • The United States should reduce the size of its undocumented population through a substantial legalization program and seek to ensure that this population never again approximates its current size.

This paper makes the case that refugee protection and national security should be viewed as complementary, not conflicting state goals. It argues that refugee protection can further the security of refugees, affected states, and the international community. Refugees and international migrants can also advance national security by contributing to a state's economic vitality, military strength, diplomatic standing, and civic values. The paper identifies several strategies that would, if implemented, promote both security and refugee protection. It also outlines additional steps that the US Congress should take to enhance US refugee protection policies and security. Finally, it argues for the efficacy of political engagement in support of pro-protection, pro-security policies, and against the assumption that political populism will invariably impede support for refugee protection.

Temporary protection programs can provide haven to endangered persons while states and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) work to create durable solutions in sending, host and third countries.1 They have the potential to further the interests of forced migrants in protection, states in effective and coordinated migration management, and the international community in solidarity. US temporary protection programs rest primarily on executive discretion and have not been substantially revisited for nearly 25 years. "Parole" represents the primary vehicle for temporarily admitting noncitizens for emergency and humanitarian reasons.2 Prior to 1980, the United States used parole to admit large refugee and refugee-like populations to whom (in most cases) it later extended lawful permanent resident (LPR) status. The 1980 Refugee Act made the US refugee resettlement program the primary vehicle for refugee admissions, limited the use of parole to individuals (not groups), and created a presumption against granting parole to refugees. The United States provides immigrant (permanent) visas to abused, neglected and abandoned children, as well as to certain Iraqis and Afghanis who worked for the US military or for military contractors. It can also award up to 5,000 nonimmigrant (temporary) "T" visas each year to victims of human trafficking and up to 10,000 nonimmigrant "U" visas to survivors of crime who assist law enforcement officials in investigating and prosecuting crimes. However, since 1980, the United States has lacked a dedicated legal vehicle for admitting other refugee-like populations. Temporary protected status (TPS) applies to noncitizens from states experiencing armed conflict, the aftermath of natural disaster, or other extraordinary, temporary conditions that make it unsafe to return. The TPS statute allows the secretary of the US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to designate states or regions within states for TPS, although the United States has never limited TPS to substate groups. TPS does not cover persons from designated states who arrive following the effective date of the designation, even those who fled great peril. TPS recipients cannot petition for the admission of close family members. In addition, TPS cannot be granted to persons in substantial need of protection from undesignated states. Like refugees and asylees, TPS recipients receive work authorization. Unlike refugees or asylees, they are not eligible for resettlement benefits or deemed "qualified" for most federal public benefit programs. They can apply for political asylum and immigration benefits. However, TPS does not, in itself, lead to permanent status or other durable solutions. Beyond TPS, the executive branch can exercise its discretion not to remove persons who fall outside its law enforcement priorities, including persons who might otherwise suffer violence, extraordinary hardship, or death at home. This paper outlines international standards for the design and operation of temporary protection programs, describes the US refugee protection program writ large, and identifies gaps in protection. It recommends that Congress create a nonimmigrant "protection" visa for noncitizens who are at substantial risk of persecution, danger, or harm in their home or host countries, and that DHS expand its use of parole for de facto refugees and individuals in refugee-like situations. It also argues that the United States should prioritize the reconstruction and development of TPS-designated states and work to establish regional migration and development agreements covering North America, Central America and the Caribbean. Congress should also pass legislation to extend LPR status to long-term recipients of temporary protection. In particular, it should advance the "registry" date to January 1, 1999 (which would provide LPR status to most noncitizens in the country since that date) and it should automatically move up the registry cut-off date each year thereafter by one year. It should also pass broad immigration reform legislation, including a legalization program that would credit years in receipt of temporary protection toward the time required to "earn" legalization. And it should allow temporary protection recipients to apply affirmatively for "cancellation of removal" (which brings LPR status) after 10 years. DHS should also create a more inclusive TPS determination process by hosting quarterly public hearings on conditions in TPS-designated and TPS-eligible nations. It should also re-designate more states for TPS in order to allow persons from designated states who have fled dangerous conditions and entered the United States between the initial designation and re-designation periods to qualify for TPS.