Suchergebnisse

Introduction: going public in theory and practice -- How Washington has changed -- How the politicians entering Washington have changed: outsiders and divided government -- The President and the press -- The growth of going public -- President Reagan and his first three budgets: a classic case of going public in action -- Opinion leadership and foreign affairs -- Present and future prospects for going public

While much has been written about economic competition between the United States and Japan, it is easy to lose sight of the fact that their relationship is founded essentially on each sides' domestic political concerns. Many critics have concluded that to gain a new equilibrium in relations, the two counties must develop a sophisticated appreciation of each other's political dynamics. Because budgets, taxes and macroeconomic policy are so central to activities of both governments, this book, by Japanese and American experts, focuses on the role of political institutions in formulating economic policy. Despite the differences in the two counties political systems--one-party/parliamentary versus two-party/presidential--there are striking similarities in the way politics is transacted in Japan and the United States. In particular, politicians in both countries are motivated primarily by the desire to serve local constituencies, which leads to overly parochial public policies. Combining case studies and discussions, the contributors provide an overview of the Japanese and American political systems, particularly those aspects that are most relevant to economic policymaking. In addition, they offer a comparative analysis of the politics of budgeting, tax reform, and structural policies.

Political parties field heterogeneous candidates and send a variety of messages about their policy positions. Yet most voting models maintain that office-seeking parties should enforce intraparty homogeneity and cultivate clear party reputations. This article reconciles theory with reality by identifying a strategic rationale for parties to pursue heterogeneity. I develop a model in which two parties each select a distribution of potential candidates to compete in an upcoming election. The model demonstrates that well-positioned parties should indeed offer homogeneous candidate teams, but that parties with platforms distant from the median voter should cast a wide net. Extensions allow for multiple candidate signals, voters who care about party platforms and candidates' positions, and voter uncertainty.

This study examines how political party organizations shape campaign participation in advanced industrialized parliamentary democracies. In some parties, members directly nominate candidates to run for parliament. In others, selection is the sole responsibility of the party leadership. Two countervailing arguments are presented: one stating that member participation will increase incentives to get involved in campaigns; the other contending that democratic nominations expose internal party divisions and depress participation. The hypotheses are tested using cross-national election surveys and original candidate selection data. Participation is measured in two ways: campaign activity and political persuasion. The results suggest that partisans are more likely to participate when leaders, rather than members, select candidates. In addition, the article examines the role of party ideology, size, incumbency, and heterogeneity in shaping participation.

Political parties field heterogeneous candidates and send a variety of messages about their policy positions. Yet most voting models maintain that office-seeking parties should enforce intraparty homogeneity and cultivate clear party reputations. This article reconciles theory with reality by identifying a strategic rationale for parties to pursue heterogeneity. I develop a model in which two parties each select a distribution of potential candidates to compete in an upcoming election. The model demonstrates that well-positioned parties should indeed offer homogeneous candidate teams, but that parties with platforms distant from the median voter should cast a wide net. Extensions allow for multiple candidate signals, voters who care about party platforms and candidates' positions, and voter uncertainty.

Australia's conservative Liberal/National Coalition won a landslide victory in the House of Representatives on Saturday, September 7, 2013. The Coalition led by Tony Abbott was expected to win; it had been polling 10 percentage points ahead of its main rival, Labor, for more than a year. Within a half hour of the final polls closing, outgoing Prime Minister Kevin Rudd conceded the Labor Party's defeat and announced he would not stand for his party's leadership in the new parliament. In total, the Coalition secured 90 seats in Australia's 150-member House of Representatives, while Labor held only 55 seats. The Coalition won a majority of the popular vote in every state and the Northern Territory, while Labor only received a majority in the Australian Capital Territory. Although his party won with a clear majority, Abbott has never been widely popular among the Australian public. Abbott's positions are more conservative than many members of his own party, and he has a history of making offensive remarks. More people reported that Rudd would make a better Prime Minister in the polls leading up to the election (Newspoll, 2013). Yet Abbott ran a highly disciplined campaign and avoided any major gaffes. The Coalition held a clear lead throughout the campaign, and Abbott portrayed himself as a viable Prime Minister to at least half of the voting population, which was sufficient to secure victory. As important, Labor was unable to convince the public that their party could act as a unified team if reelected. [Copyright Elsevier Ltd.]