Suchergebnisse

Faced with the rising threat of social instability, the central government in China has launched the rebuilding of social security system since 2002. Local governments, especially city- and county-level governments, are the principal agents implementing this ambitious policy initiative. However, the achievements in establishing social security system vary significantly, even among locales in the same province. In order to identify the factors causing divergence of outcomes, this article compares two similar county-level cities with different social security system performances. Through extensive interviews with key actors, the authors found that the development of local social security system is highly related to the nature of the relationship between local governments and local businesses which is shaped by specific economic development paths. This finding sheds light on the rationale of local governments' selective implementation of central policies, and why social security systems in some localities but not others may "race to the bottom" in the competition for capital. (China/GIGA)

The political roles of Taiwanese business people (taishang) in cross-strait relations have been increasingly noteworthy under Hu Jintao's policy of "counting on the Taiwanese people." But contrary to widely accepted allegations, this paper argues that attempts by China to use Taiwanese business people as a means to gain political leverage over Taiwan will probably not pan out as a successful strategy.

Despite soaring social costs, opposed professional opinions, and divergent foreign experiences, China still persisted with its Zero-COVID policy. Preexisting theories of policy change are unable to explain the continuation of China's COVID policy. Corresponding to the three stages of policy making, implementation and adjustment, the authors propose a framework of three decision-making constraints: (1) decision urgency, (2) regime type, and (3) political opportunity structures, which are believed to jointly shape China's policy against Omicron and obstruct Chinese decision-makers from adjusting it. This intensive case study enriches understanding of China's COVID policy specifically and the policy process in China more generally. (J Contemp China / GIGA)

How can China develop so quickly and yet maintain stability? Most scholars pinpoint the efforts of China's local government leaders as a primary factor. Regarding what motivates these leaders, however, scholars display wide disagreement. The widely accepted "promotion tournament" hypothesis stresses competition among local leaders as the driving force, but empirical test results vary considerably and create controversy. We argue that tests of promotion competition should target leadership behaviour rather than institutional inducements; the latter are, at best, a necessary condition of the former. Informed by extensive fieldwork, this study proposes an alternative and more direct approach to verifying the promotion tournament hypothesis by examining the impacts of promotion competition on leaders' performance efforts. Our test results show, however, that competition for promotion has no significant impact on local leaders' behaviour, thereby indicating that the promotion tournament hypothesis cannot be the primary explanation for China's economic achievements and regime resilience. In so doing, our study illuminates the oversimplified assumptions behind a prevailing proposition in Chinese politics and offers empirically informed insights into the tensions between political institutions and leadership behaviour. (China Q / GIGA)

In recent years, Party leaders have expressed concern about "bureaucratic slack," or shirking, by local government officials. This article investigates the reasons for the emergence of bureaucratic slack in China's political system. It verifies two popular hypotheses, namely, reduced material inducements and increased risk. Using a unique national survey of 1,789 local cadres, we confirm both hypotheses. Our survey also reveals differences across groups of local cadres. We find bureaucratic slack among lower-ranked cadres to be caused mainly by the lack of material inducements, while higher-ranked officials are more discouraged by increased risks. We conducted follow-up fieldwork to examine in greater depth why each cohort responded differently to the Xi administration's administrative reforms and anticorruption drives. (China J/GIGA)

In the past two decades, a new pattern of cadre promotion has quietly emerged and reshaped Chinese politics. It has been observed that officials who have held a series of key positions briefly are more likely to rise higher in their careers than other officials, a pattern that is sometimes referred to as "sprinting with small steps." This article examines this pattern using prefecture-level leadership data to test first an institution-based explanation and then a more encompassing political interpretation. Going deeper, our interviews with local cadres further reveal there is a dual-track system of cadre management: some cadres are preferred, cultivated, and promoted through a fast track that breaks Party regulations, while others have to earn their promotions through the regular track. The article then argues that the dual-track system, part of the Party's broader pattern of what we call "selective institutionalization," enables the regime to balance between legitimacy and domination and thus contributes to the resilience of the Chinese Communist regime. (China J/GIGA)