Suchergebnisse

Personal interactions between clients and street‐level bureaucrats are significant in explaining why street‐level bureaucrats behave as they do. Not all bureaucracies that apply program rules to individuals, however, engage face‐to‐face with their clientele. As more intake procedures are automated, such "one‐on‐one" encounters decrease. The author generates and tests hypotheses about frontline bureaucratic decision making in the Social Security Disability program, by applying bounded rationality theory. The findings show that eligibility decisions by street‐level bureaucrats are affected by their adherence to subsets of agency goals and perceptions of others in the governance system. How quickly they make decisions also has an impact. There is no evidence that the way in which bureaucrats evaluate clients explains their decisions when they lack face‐to‐face contact.

The implementation of federal programs provides an opportunity for state officials to impose their own interests on the policy process. The federal government delegates administrative power to the states to implement federal programs. Because elected state officials serve as one of the principals to street-level bureaucrats, these officials should be able to influence these street-level agents to implement policy to further state needs. However, very little research has examined whether street-level bureaucrats act strategically to benefit state interests as they implement policy. In this article, I use Seemingly Unrelated Regression analysis to examine variation in award rates across the 50 states in two federal disability programs, SSI & SSDI. My findings reveal that program incentives lead state street-level bureaucrats to act strategically in implementing these programs. State bureaucrats reduce access to federal programs when state governments incur costs associated with those programs, especially under conditions of fiscal stress. 1 Table, 1 Figure, 1 Appendix, 61 References. Adapted from the source document.

AbstractThe implementation of federal programs provides an opportunity for state officials to impose their own interests on the policy process. The federal government delegates administrative power to the states to implement federal programs. Because elected state officials serve as one of the principals to street-level bureaucrats, these officials should be able to influence these street-level agents to implement policy to further state needs. However, very little research has examined whether street-level bureaucrats act strategically to benefit state interests as they implement policy. In this article, I use Seemingly Unrelated Regression analysis to examine variation in award rates across the 50 states in two federal disability programs, SSI and SSDI. My findings reveal that program incentives lead state street-level bureaucrats to act strategically in implementing these programs. State bureaucrats reduce access to federal programs when state governments incur costs associated with those programs, especially under conditions of fiscal stress.

Variation in the implementation of the Social Security Disability program in the 50 US states is explored to assess the impact of state-level environmental characteristics on the use of discretion. Specifically tested is whether street-level bureaucracies respond to local economic, political, & task factors. Results indicate that variation in the implementation of the Social Security Disability program is a function of levels of need for benefits, the health of the economy, & state partisan politics. Taken together, findings suggest that professional norms play a large role in directing the ways that street-level bureaucrats use their discretion. The implementation of the Social Security program is not, however, apolitical. While the bureaucracy is professional, it is also responsive to local political concerns. Although street-level bureaucracies seem open to influence from political officials, they do not respond to fiscal stress on state governments nor to high levels of social commitments. This indicates that state governments do not use the disability program strategically, but play a more indirect role by creating an environment that is ideologically more or less generous with regard to social welfare programs. 1 Exhibit, 1 Appendix, 65 References. Adapted from the source document.

Abstract
Government agencies often encounter problems in service delivery when implementing public programs. This undermines effectiveness and raise questions about accountability. A central component of responsiveness and performance management is that agencies correct course when problems are identified. However, public agencies have an uneven record in responding to problems. In this article, we investigate whether, and to what extent, capacity both within the agency and within institutions performing oversight improves agency responsiveness to poor-performance indicators. Using panel data on eligibility determinations in the Social Security Disability program from US state agencies from 1991 to 2015 and fixed effects regression, we find that indicators of agency and oversight capacity moderate the relationship between poor performance and improvement. Our results suggest that investments in building capacity not only within agencies, but also within elected institutions, are important for successful policy implementation. However, we find evidence that while agency capacity alone can improve responsiveness to poor performance, the effect of oversight capacity on improving performance requires high agency capacity.

Who gets what from government is partly determined by who applies for government programs. Despite the importance of the claiming process, political scientists have said little about the factors that influence citizen demands on government programs. We explore the hypothesis that state environments systematically shape aggregate rates of welfare demand making by testing a model of welfare claiming in the Social Security Disability Insurance and the Supplemental Security Income programs. Our findings show that in addition to economic need for benefits, the density of civil society organizations, the political ideology of state officials, and the generosity of state-run public assistance programs shape the amount and direction of citizen demands on the welfare system. Although commonalities exist in which variables explain welfare claiming, relationships vary in interesting ways across programs and stages of the claiming process, highlighting the need for a theoretical model of claiming behavior that takes into account such differences.

Examines implementation of federal welfare policy by state agencies; focus on use of local discretion in enforcing regulations requiring mothers to identify the fathers of their children to qualify for income support; US.