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ABSTRACTAn individual's reluctance to report bad news about a troubled information technology (IT) project has been suggested as an important contributor to project failure and has been linked to IT project escalation as well. To date, information systems researchers have drawn from the mum effect and whistle‐blowing literature to gain a better understanding of the factors that influence bad news reporting. More recent theoretical work in the area of organizational silence offers a promising new conceptual lens, but remains empirically untested. In this research note, we integrate key elements of Morrison and Milliken's (2000) model of organizational silence, which has never been empirically tested, with the basic whistle‐blowing model adapted from Dozier and Miceli (1985). Using a role‐playing experiment, we investigate how organizational structures/policies, managerial practices, and degree of demographic dissimilarity between employees and top managers create a climate of silence and how this climate, in turn, affects an individual's willingness to report. Our results show that all three types of factors contribute to a climate of silence, exerting both direct and indirect influence on willingness to report, as hypothesized. The implications of these findings and directions for future research are discussed.

ABSTRACTInformation technology (IT) a common and costly problem. While much is known about the factors that promote escalation behavior, little is known about the actual escalation process. This article uses an in‐depth case study to construct a process model of escalation, consisting of three phases: drift, unsuccessful incremental adaptation, and rationalized continuation. Each phase encompasses several within‐phase escalation catalysts and the model also identifies triggering conditions that promote transition from one phase to the next: project framing (antecedent condition), problem emergence, increased problem visibility, and imminent threat to project continuation (triggering the outcome deescalation). The results show that escalation is not necessarily the result of collective belief in the infallibility of a project. Rather, escalation results from continued unsuccessful coping with problems that arise during a project. Furthermore, the results suggest that the seeds of escalation are sown early: the very manner in which a project is framed contributes to whether or not the project will become prone to escalation. As problems ensue, repeated mismatches between attempted remedies and underlying problems contribute to fueling the escalation process. Implications for research and practice are discussed.

ABSTRACTEscalation of commitment to a failing course of action is an enduring problem that remains central to the study of managerial behavior. Prior research suggests that escalation behavior results when decision makers choose to ignore negative feedback concerning the viability of a previously chosen course of action. Previous work has also suggested that certain cognitive biases might promote escalation behavior, but there has been little attempt to explore how biases other than framing affect escalation. In this article, we explore the extent to which decision makers actually perceive negative feedback as indicative of a problem and how this influences their decision to escalate. Although problem recognition and cognitive biases have been intensively studied individually, little is known about their effect on escalation behavior. In this research, we construct and test an escalation decision model that incorporates both problem recognition and two cognitive biases: selective perception and illusion of control. Our results revealed a significant inverse relationship between problem recognition and escalation. Furthermore, selective perception and illusion of control were found to significantly affect both problem recognition and escalation. The implications of these findings for research and practice are discussed. To improve problem recognition and reduce the incidence of escalation, practicing managers should implement modern project management practices that can help to identify and highlight potential problems while guarding against these two key cognitive biases that promote the behavior.

ABSTRACTTo reduce the high failure rate of software projects, managers need better tools to assess and manage software project risk. In order to create such tools, however, information systems researchers must first develop a better understanding of the dimensions of software project risk and how they can affect project performance. Progress in this area has been hindered by: (1) a lack of validated instruments for measuring software project risk that tap into the dimensions of risk that are seen as important by software project managers, and (2) a lack of theory to explain the linkages between various dimensions of software project risk and project performance. In this study, six dimensions of software project risk were identified and reliable and valid measures were developed for each. Guided by sociotechnical systems theory, an exploratory model was developed and tested. The results show that social subsystem risk influences technical subsystem risk, which, in turn, influences the level of project management risk, and ultimately, project performance. The implications of these findings for research and practice are discussed.

ABSTRACTSoftware project escalation has been shown to be a widespread phenomenon. With few exceptions, prior research has portrayed escalation as an irrational decision‐making process whereby additional resources are plowed into a failing project. In this article, we examine the possibility that in some cases managers escalate their commitment not because they are acting irrationally, but rather as a rational response to real options that may be embedded in a project. A project embeds real options when managers have the opportunity but not the obligation to adjust the future direction of the project in response to external or internal events. Examples include deferring the project, switching the project to serve a different purpose, changing the scale of the project, implementing it in incremental stages, abandoning the project, or using the project as a platform for future growth opportunities. Although real options can represent a substantial portion of a project's value, they rarely enter into a project's formal justification process in the traditional quantitative discounted cash‐flow‐based project valuation techniques. Using experimental data collected from managers in 123 firms, we demonstrate that managers recognize and value the presence of real options. We also assess the relative importance that managers ascribe to each type of real option, showing that growth options are more highly valued than operational options. Finally, we demonstrate that the influence of the options on project continuation decisions is largely mediated by the perceived value that they add. Implications for both theory and practice are discussed.

ABSTRACTIn order to rescue information technology (IT) projects when they go awry, it is critical to understand the factors that affect bad news reporting. Whistleblowing theory holds promise in this regard and a number of salient factors that may influence whistleblowing intentions have been identified. However, an integrative theory that explains how they influence whistleblowing intentions has been conspicuously absent. In this research, we introduce and test a middle‐range theory of whistleblowing that can explain how and why a variety of factors may influence an individual's whistleblowing intentions. Drawing on the social information processing perspective, we propose that individuals holistically weigh the perceived "benefit‐to‐cost differential" and that this mediates the relationship between whistleblowing factors and whistleblowing intentions. Tests using data collected from 159 experienced IT project managers largely support our theoretical perspective, in which the central explanatory variable (benefit‐to‐cost differential) significantly mediates a majority of the proposed relationships. Implications of these findings for research and practice are discussed.

ABSTRACTAlthough real options theory normatively suggests that managers should associate real options with project value, little field research has been conducted to test whether they suffer from systematic biases in doing so. We draw on the notion of bounded rationality in managerial decision making to explore this understudied phenomenon. Using data collected from managers in 88 firms, we show that managers exhibit what we label the bounded rationality bias in their assessments: They associate real options with value only when a project's easily quantifiable benefits are low, but fail to do so when they are high. The study also contributes the first set of empirical measures for all six types of real options. The study contributes to managerial practice by identifying the conditions under which managers must be vigilant about inadvertently neglecting real options and by providing a simple approach for assessing real options in technology development projects.