Suchergebnisse

The purpose of this paper is to provide a deeper understanding of the significance and implications of being a subprime homeowner in the UK. The results indicate that subprime individuals represent a mixture of socioeconomic groups, predominantly included in the light adverse and near prime categories of subprime lending, for whom credit adversity is generally a temporary phenomenon, which is likely to represent a transitory event in their lives. These borrowers have been at the heart of the UK subprime mortgage market, actively targeted not only by specialist lenders but also, more crucially, by mainstream players. Whereas for some individuals this market has provided an opportunity to experience the emotional and financial aspects of homeownership positively; for others becoming a subprime mortgage holder has increased the difficulties in their lives, affected their financial capability, and worsened their standards of living. Thus, the impact of the risk—reward mechanisms of subprime products has proved to be a difficult reality for certain socioeconomic groups. Furthermore, given the progressive deterioration in the transparency of the financial services industry, a significant proportion of subprime individuals has, unsurprisingly, struggled to appreciate the reasons why they faced problems in obtaining credit or a mortgage.

Institutional shareholders are increasingly being urged to take a more active role in the governance of the companies in which they invest. In particular, attention has focused on the level of voting by institutions at annual general meetings, which has historically been rather low, and many commentators argue that institutions (particularly the pension funds) should have a legal duty to exercise their voting rights on behalf of their beneficiaries. This paper examines the issues regarding institutional voting and considers whether mandatory institutional voting is likely to lead to more active institutional involvement in corporate governnance at the individual firm level. In particular, it is argued that the imposition of mandatory voting is unlikely to result in informed voting, which is essential if the objective of increasing effective institutional involvement in corporate governance is to be met. This paper concludes that the imposition of mandatory voting is unlikely to result in a change in the investment and ownership ethos of the institutions.