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In this book, Aileen Kavanagh offers a fresh account of how we should protect rights in a democracy. Departing from leading theoretical accounts which present the courts and legislature as rivals for constitutional supremacy, Kavanagh argues that protecting rights is a collaborative enterprise between all three branches of government - the Executive, the legislature, and the courts. On a collaborative vision of constitutionalism, protecting rights is neither the solitary task of a Herculean super-judge, nor the dignified pronouncements of an enlightened legislature. Instead, it is a complex, dynamic, and collaborative endeavour, where each branch has a distinct but complementary role to play, whilst engaging with each other in a spirit of comity and mutual respect. Connecting constitutional theory with the practice of protecting rights in a democracy, this book offers an innovative understanding of the separation of powers, grounded in the values and virtues of constitutional collaboration

Resumen: Este trabajo tiene un doble objetivo. La primera parte ofrece una visión de conjunto del sistema de derechos configurado en el Reino Unido mediante la Human Rights Act de 1998, donde se trata de mostrar que, a pesar de haber sido descrito como un ejemplo destacado de la revisión judicial "débil" de constitucionalidad, el sistema británico muestra en realidad muchos rasgos de sutil fortaleza. En la segunda parte se toma como referencia la jurisprudencia de los tribunales británicos en el marco de dicha ley, con objeto de articular una teoría de la contención judicial. La conclusión es que, a la hora de determinar la fuerza o debilidad del poder judicial en un determinado sistema de revisión constitucional, necesitamos ir más allá de los mecanismos formales contenidos en los textos para analizar las doctrinas y los recursos que usan efectivamente los jueces cuando revisan la compatibilidad de la legislación con los derechos.Palabras clave: Revisión judicial en materia de derechos humanos, revisión judicial "débil", supremacía judicial, contención judicialAbstract: The aim of this paper is twofold. First, it provides an overview of the system of the rights-based under the UK Human Rights Act 1998, trying to show that although it is often described as a leading exemplar of 'weak-form' constitutional review, in reality, the UK system displays many signs of subtle strength. Second, it adopts the decision making of the English courts under this bill of human rights to elaborate a theory of judicial restraint. The upshot is that when assessing any system of constitutional review in order to determine the strength or weakness of judicial power, we need to look beyond the formal textual mechanisms to explore the doctrines and devices judges use when reviewing legislation for compliance with rights.Keywords: Rights-based judicial review, weak-form judicial review, judicial supremacy, judicial restraint

Under the auspices of the Good Friday Agreement of 1998, the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commissionhas recently published a draft Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland. It is argued here that before deciding on the content of a Bill of Rights, serious consideration should be given to the underlying question of the value of a Bill of Rights in a divided society. In addressing this question, this article advances four main arguments: First, a Bill of Rights can empower individuals and minorities to challenge governmental policy. Second, rights litigation under a Bill of Rights can provide an added channel of political participation. Third, a Bill of Rights can operate as a useful constraint on majoritarianism. Fourth and finally, it can contribute toward the common good of a just, tolerant society.