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Solidarity has emerged as a main reference concept in the COVID-19 crisis. Since the escalation of the COVID-19 crisis the notion of solidarity occupies a central place in the communication of national and state governments in Germany but also in the highest level of the European Union. The Union is once again in a crossroads. Are we ready for transnational solidarity? And more precisely, are Germans ready for transnational solidarity? ; Solidarität hat sich in der COVID-19-Krise zu einem wichtigen Referenzkonzept entwickelt. Seit der Eskalation der COVID-19-Krise nimmt der Begriff der Solidarität einen zentralen Platz in der Kommunikation von Regierungen auf Länder- sowie nationaler Ebene in Deutschland, aber auch auf der höchsten Ebene der Europäischen Union ein. Die Union steht wieder einmal an einem Scheideweg. Sind wir bereit für transnationale Solidarität? Und genauer gesagt: Sind die Deutschen bereit für transnationale Solidarität?

Special thanks to Alexander Trechsel, Quinton Mayne, Armen Hakhverdian, Autumn Lockwood Payton, Laurie Anderson for their invaluable comments and insights, without which the paper would not have been completed. ; Voting behaviour criteria can be categorized according to their level of ideologization and their time depth. In modern politics we expect people to use short-term factors to make their final voting decisions, such as valence politics and issue voting. These seem to be more efficient when opposed to long term predictors, such as party identification and left-right ideology. Retrospective and prospective party performance evaluations become the most decisive criteria for voting choices and overshadow ideological and loyalty considerations. However, the population is not homogenous in terms of political socialization experiences. Older generations still perceive party competition in terms of loyalty, while younger generations seem politically disillusioned. Social characteristics influence older voters' stable predispositions in a more consistent and decisive way, while they have a weaker influence on younger generations. In this paper, I compare the impact of social characteristics on the major vote choice criteria, both short and long term. This is done using comparative data from the 2009 European Election Study on the so-called EU 15 countries. The electorate is divided into four cohorts in order to establish variations among generations. The findings show a clear distinction among generations in their vote choice criteria, as a result of their different political socialization experiences.

Existing research mainly analyzes mass attitudes towards the European Union (EU) from the national and individual-level perspective. This paper adds to this literature by focusing on the relationship between EU support and subnational economic conditions, using harmonized survey data covering 40 years and 1.1 million respondents in 197 European regions. We first describe Europe's changing subnational conditions in terms of catch-up, wealthy, declining and glass-ceiling regions. The paper then develops and tests a set of hypotheses regarding the temporally dynamic relationship between EU attitudes and regions' long- and short-term economic conditions. Our analyses reveal important longitudinal variations in this relationship with low levels of geographic differentiation in public opinion giving way to clear spatial differences in recent years. Our findings are consistent with the idea that the Great Recession and Brexit have generated a new geography of both Euroscepticism in Europe's declining regions and EU support in its wealthy and catch-up regions.

AbstractExisting research mainly analyzes mass attitudes towards the European Union (EU) from the national and individual‐level perspective. This paper adds to this literature by focusing on the relationship between EU support and subnational economic conditions, using harmonized survey data covering 40 years and 1.1 million respondents in 197 European regions. We first describe Europe's changing subnational conditions in terms of catch‐up, wealthy, declining and glass‐ceiling regions. The paper then develops and tests a set of hypotheses regarding the temporally dynamic relationship between EU attitudes and regions' long‐ and short‐term economic conditions. Our analyses reveal important longitudinal variations in this relationship with low levels of geographic differentiation in public opinion giving way to clear spatial differences in recent years. Our findings are consistent with the idea that the Great Recession and Brexit have generated a new geography of both Euroscepticism in Europe's declining regions and EU support in its wealthy and catch‐up regions.

The concurrent strong waves of anti‐EU integration and anti‐immigration preferences sweeping across Europe, capitalized on by populist discourses, reflect citizens' economic anxieties brought about by the financial crisis, dormant cultural fears, widespread suspicion towards international institutions, and frustration with "politics as usual." Extant electoral and public opinion research provide fragmented and conflicted accounts about the psychological origins of these anti preferences. In this article, (1) we articulate a novel overarching theoretical framework that focuses on reaction as a political orientation, and (2) we provide an empirical test of the propose theory using data from the 2004 and 2014 European Social Survey. Explication of political reaction as a driver of political preferences can move forward research on challenges to democratic representation, particularly political disengagement, violent protests, and populist and antiestablishment party vote in the context of the financial crisis.

AbstractAt this stage of European integration and given the high degree of Europe's politicization and salience caused by the recent global financial crisis, representative democracy in the EU can only function if parties mobilize beyond borders. We examine whether European Party Groups (EPG) in the European Parliament (EP) offer distinct policy alternatives and how coherent these are. We use party position data collected by two Voting Advice Applications designed for the 2009 and 2014 EP elections, respectively (EUProfiler and Euandi). We find evidence of competition between EPGs groups on both left right issues and European integration; on the latter issue, there is greater differentiation within the anti‐EU camp. Coherence within EPG exists, though it varies across issues, EPGs and between election years examined: it is greater on European integration than on left–right issues and it is particularly high for right wing eurosceptics though for most parties it deteriorates between 2009 and 2014.

At this stage of European integration and given the high degree of Europe's politicization and salience caused by the recent global financial crisis, representative democracy in the EU can only function if parties mobilize beyond borders. We examine whether European Party Groups (EPG) in the European Parliament (EP) offer distinct policy alternatives and how coherent these are. We use party position data collected by two Voting Advice Applications designed for the 2009 and 2014 EP elections, respectively (EUProfiler and Euandi). We find evidence of competition between EPGs groups on both left right issues and European integration; on the latter issue, there is greater differentiation within the antiEU camp. Coherence within EPG exists, though it varies across issues, EPGs and between election years examined: it is greater on European integration than on leftright issues and it is particularly high for right wing eurosceptics though for most parties it deteriorates between 2009 and 2014. ; (VLID)2837014

First published: 31 July 2018 ; At this stage of European integration and given the high degree of Europe's politicization and salience caused by the recent global financial crisis, representative democracy in the EU can only function if parties mobilize beyond borders. We examine whether European Party Groups (EPG) in the European Parliament (EP) offer distinct policy alternatives and how coherent these are. We use party position data collected by two Voting Advice Applications designed for the 2009 and 2014 EP elections, respectively (EUProfiler and Euandi). We find evidence of competition between EPGs groups on both left right issues and European integration on the latter issue, there is greater differentiation within the anti-EU camp. Coherence within EPG exists, though it varies across issues, EPGs and between election years examined: it is greater on European integration than on left-right issues and it is particularly high for right wing eurosceptics though for most parties it deteriorates between 2009 and 2014.

The concurrent strong waves of anti-EU integration and anti-immigration preferences sweeping across Europe, capitalized on by populist discourses, reflect citizens' economic anxieties brought about by the financial crisis, dormant cultural fears, widespread suspicion towards international institutions, and frustration with politics as usual. Extant electoral and public opinion research provide fragmented and conflicted accounts about the psychological origins of these anti preferences. In this article, (1) we articulate a novel overarching theoretical framework that focuses on reaction as a political orientation, and (2) we provide an empirical test of the propose theory using data from the 2004 and 2014 European Social Survey. Explication of political reaction as a driver of political preferences can move forward research on challenges to democratic representation, particularly political disengagement, violent protests, and populist and antiestablishment party vote in the context of the financial crisis.

At this stage of European integration and given the high degree of Europe's politicization and salience caused by the recent global financial crisis, representative democracy in the EU can only function if parties mobilize beyond borders. We examine whether European Party Groups (EPG) in the European Parliament (EP) offer distinct policy alternatives and how coherent these are. We use party position data collected by two Voting Advice Applications designed for the 2009 and 2014 EP elections, respectively (EUProfiler and Euandi). We find evidence of competition between EPGs groups on both left right issues and European integration; on the latter issue, there is greater differentiation within the anti-EU camp. Coherence within EPG exists, though it varies across issues, EPGs and between election years examined: it is greater on European integration than on left-right issues and it is particularly high for right wing eurosceptics though for most parties it deteriorates between 2009 and 2014.

Where some researchers have seen only a limited impact of Europeanisation on national party politics, others have added a separate European Union dimension to the pre-existing economic left-right dimension to model the national political space. This article examines the effects of the European crisis on the national political space across the EU utilising data from the 2014 European Election Survey. It analyses the effect of a country's economic development on the coherence between attitudes towards the EU and economic issues using multilevel regression. Strong evidence is found that in the Southern European debtor states economic and European issues are merging as a result of strong European interference in their economic policy. In the Northern European creditor states a second relevant dimension focuses on cultural issues. These results offer the next step in theorising Europeanisation.

AbstractWhere some researchers have seen only a limited impact of Europeanisation on national party politics, others have added a separate European Union dimension to the pre‐existing economic left‐right dimension to model the national political space. This article examines the effects of the European crisis on the national political space across the EU utilising data from the 2014 European Election Survey. It analyses the effect of a country's economic development on the coherence between attitudes towards the EU and economic issues using multilevel regression. Strong evidence is found that in the Southern European debtor states economic and European issues are merging as a result of strong European interference in their economic policy. In the Northern European creditor states a second relevant dimension focuses on cultural issues. These results offer the next step in theorising Europeanisation.