Suchergebnisse

In the 1998 article 'The Shortage in Market‐Inalienable Human Organs: A Consideration of 'Nonmarket' Failures' in this journal, Emanuel D. Thorne advocates increased exhortation and advises against the adoption of markets in cadaveric organ procurement. In support of this view, Thorne offers analysis in which he purports to show that, with more effective exhortation, a donative system is capable of procuring more organs at lower costs than market procurement. We argue that Thorne's analysis is seriously flawed and that his conclusions are suspect, if not entirely illogical. The flaws in his analysis include both logical errors and empirical fallacies. Importantly, the issues we, and Professor Thorne, address are not mere matters of academic quibbling—human lives are at stake. Simply put, we argue that Thorne uses faulty analysis to support a policy that is so ill‐conceived that it needlessly allows people to die. In this comment, we discuss some of the errors in Thorne's article and explain why we believe that his policy recommendation is ill‐conceived.

My lament is that this battle on market definitions … has received virtually no attention from us economists. Except for a casual flirtation with cross elasticities of demand and supply, the determination of markets has remained an undeveloped area of economic research at either the theoretical or empirical level.

Front Cover; Law and Economics of Vertical Integration and Control; Copyright Page; Table of Contents; Acknowledgments; Chapter 1. Introduction; Background; Purpose of Present Study; Standard for Analysis; PART I: Economics of Vertical Control; Chapter 2. Transaction Costs; The Incentive to Integrate; The Welfare Effects; Transaction Cost Determinants; Advantages and Limitations of Internal Transfers; Contractual Alternatives; Chapter 3. Fixed Proportions and Contractual Alternatives; No Incentive for Vertical Control; Successive Monopoly; Important Product-Specific Services; Entry Barriers.