Suchergebnisse

David Hume bridges a gap between classical and non-classical philosophy. Two major approaches in 20th century systematic philosophy - naturalism and relativism - have both basically been inspired by Hume and create the most controversy nowadays. The dethroning of the knowing agent and the spiritual substance from their privileged place opens way to ""the death of God"" (F. Nietzsche) or ""the death of the Author"" (R. Barthes). Hume's criticism of causality corresponds to the indeterminism of the

This article aims at a critical reevaluation of the trading zone concept (Galison). It starts from a case study of the Faraday–Whewell collaboration in coming to terms with electrolysis experiments. The case is supposed to be an example of a trade zone of science/philosophy interaction though it demonstrates the unequal nature of the "trade." This requires the analysis to log in some details concerning Galison's metaphor of trading zones, which reveals its market-oriented connotations. The following criticism of the market metaphor for science applies a revised version of Boris Hessen's argument ("commodity fetishism") against misinterpretation of technology by some British scientists. A closer look at the ancient trade rituals in Marcel Mauss' seminal work enables discovering another cultural pattern for describing scientific communication as opposed to trade—gift. This helps picture science as a distribution of social roles and statuses and uncovers the normative and value dimension of gift zones language.

Disputes in the field of science and technology studies (STS) demonstrate its topicality as they elucidate the prospects for a postmodern world, and William Lynch in his book, in search of a constructive solution to current controversies, employs the dialectical approach of Lakatos and Feyerabend. Lynch takes a bold step to present an apparently "degenerated scientific research program" as a competitive alternative to the established and "progressive" mainstream. The book offers not only a theoretical justification for this "minority report," but also its empirical confirmation, as well as the possibility of practical and socio-political application. We believe that Lynch's book actualizes the discussion about the nature of sociality as related to scientific cognition, as well as provokes the question of the possibility of specific ontology of scientific knowledge. However, the internal heterogeneity of the sociology of scientific knowledge seems to be slightly underestimated, which sometimes prevents Lynch recognizing his real allies and opponents in modern STS. Lynch's approach to analyzing scientific alternatives to dominant paradigms and to science communication practices helps problematize current controversies through demonstrating their incommensurability not incomparability. Hopefully this will increase their mutual understanding and collaboration.

ntroduction and purpose. The paper is a reaction to the article previously published in this journal by A. M. Orekhov, which examines the state of affairs in Russian social epistemology. The author provides responses to critical comments and proposes clari- fication of the facts and theories discussed. Methods. The author of the article uses the meth- od of conceptual analysis and historical narrative. Scientific novelty of the study. It is shown in a new way how Russian social epistemology fits into the world philosophical context; its conceptual and methodological status is clarified, the details of its formation and development over the past thirty years are revealed. Its features are indicated, mak- ing it possible to rank it as a non-classical episte- mology. Results. The author proposes arguments against a critical assessment of the current state of Russian social epistemology in terms of its dependence on Western influences. It is argued that Russian phi- losophy cannot and should not completely get rid of dependencies, since it borders on isolationism. A critical assessment of the KHM style is given, which has been proposed by A. M. Orekhov as a perspective of social epistemology.

The article proposes an understanding of science as a process of production of human­istic values and their translation in society, as well as an analysis of reflection on sci­ence from the point of view of humanistic ideals. This is one of the key topics of cultural/historical epistemology, the leading representative of which is Vladislav Alexandrovich Lektorsky. In the paper, the meaning of scientific humanism is re­vealed through answers to three questions similar to the Kant's ones: about the possi­bility of cognition, communication and normativity. These possibilities are understood as three forms of freedom: freedom of oneself, freedom with others, and freedom to transcend one's limits. The question of freedom is the problematization of science in terms of its conformity with the values of humanism, as well as of how humanism itself is consistent with the pathos of scientific inquiry. The main thesis of the article says that the humanistic nature of science consists not so much in mastering the forces of nature or discovering its secrets, not in truth or benefit. Rather, science compels man to think historically and critically about himself and his present. True humanism is not a measure of all things by the human arshin, not the exaltation of man, but the bringing him into consciousness; not an adaptation to circumstances, but going be­yond one's limits; not a concept, but a constant revision of the current state of affairs.

In the modern rankings of higher education institutions almost monopolistic American universities (Harvard, Stanford, Princeton, etc.) play the leading role promoting the idea of the "entrepreneurial university". The classic European university fails in the competition, and the idea of the Humboldt University is losing credibility. Our assumption is that this situation is in the large part due to the historical identity of civilizational missions, elites and forms of communica­tion ("trading zones") that initiated these types of universities. The comparative history of European and American universities demonstrates that in the first case philosophers played a leading role in achieving the goals of cultural policy, and in the second, there were managers who won in the economic competition. European and American universities were, in different proportions, culture-forming centers and factors of economic development. University reforms were usually initiated from outside: these are its competitors and sponsors, politi­cians, and entrepreneurs. Who exactly takes on the functions of the moderator in the trading zones is a key question for the university's fate. If a business model-oriented manager builds cooperation, then the university becomes the embodiment of academic capitalism. If a cultural policy is implemented in the interdisciplinary interaction of scientists themselves, then there is a chance to measure the university's development with humanistic values and the ethos of science.

An important element of the ethics of science is the professional code of scien­tific honesty transmitted by the scientific community. Basic research relies on the notion of gift-giving as a selfless ethical-cognitive relationship, one of the manifestations of which is scientific humility. The article establishes a link between the approach of virtue epistemology and ethical consequences from the concept of paradigm (T. Kuhn). Kuhn's normative image of science suggests that the scientist assumes paradigmatic rules and limitations without any vio­lence. That is why paradigm represents a huge advantage for a "normal scientist" allowing her to solve only those particular puzzles that really interest her. Para­digm appears as a gift of a mythical revolutionary hero to the "normal" scientist. Scientific honesty forms a normative basis for basic research because scientists do not sell results to each other, do not extract income at the expense of the sci­entific community and therefore do not expect deception in the style of "bought cheaper, sold more expensive". The primary meaning of the ethics of science is based on the selfless giving. Humility is the ability to accept the gift of knowl­edge and acknowledgement gratefully, to take on the duty of recognition and to be ready to pass on the same gift by inheritance.