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The article seeks to explain how policies affect business groups' decisions to stay or leave a sector of activity in a liberalized economy. The article utilizes a comparative historical approach to explain how business groups in six Central American countries decided to enter, remain in or leave the banking sector. Using case studies of the main banks belonging to business groups in the region, the article seeks to identify how particular sequences of policies lead to the formation of two major strategies. A portfolio one, characterized by a short-term interest in the banking sector; and an organic one, in which the banking sector plays a more important role for the whole group. Looking at the impact of three policies (nationalization, privatization and liberalization), I show that previous nationalization had contributed to a dominant portfolio strategy in Costa Rica and El Salvador. The absence of nationalization favored the dominance of an organic strategy in Guatemala and Honduras. Additionally, the cases of Nicaragua and Panama are analyzed as examples of how other events, such as early internationalization and early liberalization, can favor a more mixed scenario.

O objetivo desse artigo é contextualizar o impeachment da presidente brasileira Dilma Rousseff na literatura mais ampla sobre interrupções de mandatos presidenciais na América Latina. Contrariando a tese linziana de instabilidade sistêmica, argumentamos que sistemas presidencialistas latino-americanos têm encontrado vias institucionais para lidar com crises entre os poderes Executivo e Legislativo. Isso não significa, porém, que as soluções para os impasses são despidas de controvérsias. Problemas de legitimidade, questionamentos legais e elevados níveis de polarização política permeiam boa parte dos casos de presidentes cujos mandatos são interrompidos por ação do poder Legislativo. Diante desse contexto, e inspirados no recente caso brasileiro, propomos a introdução de alguns mecanismos institucionais em regimes presidencialistas destinados a facilitar a resolução de impasses político-institucionais. ; The goal of this article is to set the impeachment of Brazilian president Dilma Rousseff in the context of the broader literature on presidential breakdowns in Latin America. Going against the Linzian thesis of systemic instability, we argue that presidential systems in Latin America have found institutional mechanisms to deal with crisis between the Executive and legislative branches. It does not mean, however, that the solutions for the deadlocks are uncontroversial. Issues of legitimacy and legality, as well as a highly polarized political environment, characterize the majority of cases of presidential breakdowns mobilized by the Legislative. Taking this broader context and the recent Brazilian case, we propose some institutional mechanisms in presidential systems that could facilitate solving political deadlocks between branches of government. ; publishedVersion

This book investigates Central America's political economy seen through the lens of its powerful business groups. It provides unique insight into their strategies when confronted with a globalized economy, their impact on development of the isthmus, and how they shape the political and economic institutions governing local varieties of capitalism

"Business Groups and Transnational Capitalism in Central America" investigates Central America's political economy through the lens of its powerful diversified business groups. It provides unique insight into their strategies when confronted with a globalized economy, their impact on development, and how they shape the political and economic institutions governing local varieties of capitalism. This study is based on the collection of data on sixty-nine of the largest groups from the six countries of the isthmus -- Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Costa Rica, Nicaragua and Panama -- and combines qualitative and quantitative methods. It seeks to analyze historical trajectories of individual groups and their evolution in distinct national contexts as well as their contributions to innovation and exports. The analysis shows that the business groups have formed alliances with multinational companies (MNCs), but are not in the process of being absorbed by them. Rather they shift sector focus and exploit their networks in order to face competition from MNCs

Latin America is viewed as a region that has embraced a strategy of "open-economy industrial policy" (OEIP). However, the region's transition to OEIP has been neither complete nor irreversible. In this article, we argue that economic development concepts and instruments introduced during Brazil's previous import-substitution industrialization regime still influence the country's industrial policy. By tracing the evolution of local content requirements (LCR) in the Brazilian oil and gas sector, we show that conflicts between inward-oriented and outward-oriented forms of industrial development have been the main source of recent policy changes in the country. In addition, we show how institutional structures affect the implementation of economic ideas. The country's centralized policymaking facilitated significant changes in the orientation of the LCR policy during the last twenty years ; The authors received financial support from the Research Council of Norway (Project grant: 227174) for research and authorship of this article. ; acceptedVersion

Amidst analyses of industrial policy's renaissance in Latin America, Brazil is often hailed as the paragon of this movement. The mix of old and new institutions and instruments would constitute a unique effort in promoting industrial development in the post-neoliberal period. However, this experience has been followed by middling results of industrial performance. Reviewing an emerging literature about the institutionalization and results of the Brazilian industrial policy, we argue that important aspects of path-dependency have been ignored. Organizational and ideational resistance have led to a much more traditional and conservative industrial policy than would be expected. Grounded historical analysis about intragovernment conflicts, combined with studies about policy and sectoral developments, could give us elements to better assess the failures and achievements of the Brazilian case. ; A la luz de diversos análisis sobre el renacimiento de la política industrial en América Latina, Brasil es frecuentemente alabado como el país arquetipo de la mencionada coyuntura. La combinación de instituciones e instrumentos antiguos y modernos constituiría un singular esfuerzo para promover el desarrollo industrial en el periodo post-neoliberal. Sin embargo, la consecución de dicha experiencia fueron mediocres resultados de actividad industrial. Habiendo efectuado un examen de reciente literatura sobre la institucionalización y los resultados de la política industrial brasileña, sostenemos que, en dicho material, han sido ignorados importantes aspectos de la dependencia de la trayectoria (path-dependency). Resistencia organizativa y de formación de ideas han conducido a la implementación de una política industrial mucho más tradicional y conservadora de lo que se hubiera esperado. Un profundo análisis histórico acerca de conflictos intergubernamentales, combinado con estudios sobre política y evoluciones sectoriales pueden ofrecernos instrumentos para evaluar más eficazmente los fallos y los logros del caso brasileño. ; publishedVersion

AbstractWhen do voters punish corrupt politicians? Heterogeneous views about the importance of corruption can determine whether or not increased information enhances accountability. If partisan cleavages correlate with the importance voters place on corruption, then the consequences of information may vary by candidate, even when voters identify multiple candidates as corrupt. We provide evidence of this mechanism from a field experiment in a mayoral election in Brazil where a reputable interest group declared both candidates corrupt. We distributed fliers in the runoff mayoral election in São Paulo. Informing voters about the challenger's record reduced turnout by 1.9 percentage points and increased the opponent's vote by 2.6 percentage points. Informing voters about the incumbent's record had no effect on behavior. We attribute this divergent finding to differences in how each candidate's supporters view corruption. Using survey data and a survey experiment, we show that the challenger's supporters are more willing to punish their candidate for corruption, while the incumbent's supporters lack this inclination.