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AbstractRural indebtedness is a major development challenge confronting India. In 2018, scores of farmers protested rising household debt, and the popular coverage of the time asserted that farmers were under crushing debt. Combining data from the All‐India Debt and Investment Survey with other sources and using a class analysis, I interrogate this "crushing debt" narrative. Rural households, depending on the socioeconomic and contextual vulnerabilities that they experience, are indebted in different ways. The rural elite borrow more loans and have higher loan amounts, while asset‐poor households are more dependent on informal credit sources and also pay higher rates of interest. Households from the wage worker class are more likely to be over‐indebted relative to others. I further find that petty commodity producers bear less debt burden and are less likely to be over‐indebted relative to other classes. These findings underscore the fact that rural indebtedness is a nuanced problem that manifests in a multitude of ways across India.

Despite a law against sexual harassment of women at the workplace, persons holding high offices, including senior judges, seem to enjoy impunity. By critically examining the allegations made against Justice Ranjan Gogoi (retd), former Chief Justice of India, and analysing five other cases of sexual harassment, we highlight how women are routinely denied justice. In doing so, we ask: are women actually able to file complaints of sexual harassment without the fear of facing a backlash? And do they ultimately get justice when they do so? We argue that the implementation of the law against sexual harassment is mediated by caste, class and gender, both of the survivor and of the perpetrator. We point to a changing polity that makes laws, guarantees and protections for women, but stumbles in implementing them in a fair and non-arbitrary manner.

Common pool land and water resources in India play vital, but often overlooked, roles in livelihoods and ecosystem services. These resources are subject to the authority of various government departments and are often managed in ways that result in uncertain tenure for the people who depend on these resources for fodder, fuel, water, and other products. An Indian NGO, the Foundation for Ecological Security, has developed a process for "commoning"—assisting communities to secure the commons by forming inclusive local institutions to manage the resources, and to work with the different government departments to gain stronger rights to the commons. This study examines how the polycentric governance of natural resource commons shapes the ability of communities to do effective commoning, with particular reference to appropriation and provisioning rules. Using participatory network-mapping in FES sites in Andhra Pradesh and Karnataka states, we identify the constellation of actors involved in the commons, the relationships among them, and community knowledge of these arrangements. The results reveal the complex flows of resources, information, and authority related to commons, with programs and agencies across different sectors, offering different opportunities and requirements, for commons management. The Net-maps show linkages that are present, and others that are missing or not well-understood, Net-mapping helps assess the extent of community understanding of the polycentric governance of the commons, and can help identify opportunities to strengthen participatory processes for planning and implementation. ; PR ; IFPRI3; ISI; DCA; CRP2; 5 Strengthening Institutions and Governance; Capacity Strengthening ; EPTD; PIM ; CGIAR Research Program on Policies, Institutions, and Markets (PIM)

Common pool land and water resources in India play vital, but often overlooked, roles in livelihoods and ecosystem services. These resources are subject to the authority of various government departments and are often managed in ways that result in uncertain tenure for the people who depend on these resources for fodder, fuel, water, and other products. An Indian NGO, the Foundation for Ecological Security (FES), has developed a process for "commoning"—assisting communities to secure the commons by forming inclusive local institutions to manage the resources, and to work with different government departments to gain stronger rights to the commons. This paper applies polycentricity theory to examine the institutional arrangements that govern the commons in FES sites in Andhra Pradesh and Karnataka states and assesses relationships that may affect commons management. It draws on key informant interviews and village-level social network mapping exercises (Net-mapping) to show the complex flows of resources, information, and influence related to the commons among habitation-level organizations, local government, resource agencies, the rural employment guarantee program (MGNREGA), and NGOs. This paper discusses the potential of this methodology as a diagnostic tool to help understand community perceptions of the role of various stakeholders in overall governance of the commons, and can provide guidance for interventions to help communities to strengthen their tenure on the commons and management of those resources. ; Non-PR ; IFPRI1; DCA; CRP2; 5 Strengthening Institutions and Governance; Capacity Strengthening ; EPTD; PIM ; CGIAR Research Program on Policies, Institutions, and Markets (PIM)

This paper presents results from a framed field experiment in which participants make decisions about extraction of a common-pool resource, a community forest. The experiment was designed and piloted as both a research activity and an experiential learning intervention during 2017-2018 with 120 groups of resource users (split by gender) from 60 habitations in two Indian states, Andhra Pradesh and Rajasthan. We examine whether local beliefs and norms about community forest, gender of participants, within-experiment treatments (non-communication, communication, and optional election of institutional arrangements (rules)) and remuneration methods affect harvest behaviour and groups' tendency to cooperate. Furthermore, we explore whether the experiment and subsequent community debriefing had learning effects. Results reveal a "weak" Nash Equilibrium in which participants harvested substantially less than the Nash prediction even in the absence of communication, a phenomenon stronger for male than female participants in both states. For male groups in both states, both communication and optional rule election are associated with lower group harvest per round, as compared to the reference non-communication game. For female groups in both states, however, communication itself did not significantly slow down resource depletion; but the introduction of optional rule election did reduce harvest amounts. For both men and women in Andhra Pradesh and men in Rajasthan, incentivized payments to individual participants significantly lowered group harvest, relative to community flat payment, suggesting a possible "crowding-in" effect on pro-social norms. Despite the generally positive memory of the activity, reported actual changes are limited. This may be due to the lack of follow-up with the communities between the experiment and the revisit. The fact that many of the communities already have a good understanding of the importance of the relationships between (not) cutting trees and the ecosystem services from forests, with rules and strong internal norms against cutting that go beyond the felling of trees in the game, may have also meant that the game did not have as much to add. Findings have methodological and practical implications for designing behavioral intervention programs to improve common-pool resource governance. ; Non-PR ; IFPRI1; DCA; CRP2; 5 Strengthening Institutions and Governance; Capacity Strengthening ; EPTD; PIM ; CGIAR Research Program on Policies, Institutions, and Markets (PIM)