Suchergebnisse

Part PART I: CONTENTS AND SCOPE -- chapter Universality -- chapter Economic and Social Rights -- chapter Extraterritoriality -- part PART II: APPLICATION TO URGENT SOCIAL ISSUES -- chapter Terrorism -- chapter Impunity -- chapter Health -- chapter Climate Change -- chapter Investment -- part PART III: APPLICATION TO NON-STATE ACTORS -- chapter International Organizations -- chapter Armed Opposition Groups -- chapter Corporations -- part PART IV: IMPLEMENTATION AND ENFORCEMENT -- chapter Domestic Remedies -- chapter Responsibility to Protect -- part PART V: PROPOSALS FOR NEW HUMAN RIGHTS -- chapter Development -- chapter Poverty -- chapter Environment.

AbstractThe war of aggression by a permanent member of the Security Council, combined with the availability of its assets on the territory of other states, creates an opportunity to solve one of international law's enigmas: the legality of third-party countermeasures in the general interest. Would confiscating Russia's frozen Central Bank assets and making the proceeds available to repair the war damage in Ukraine be permissible as such a countermeasure? This paper argues that state immunity cannot be relied upon to prevent the freezing or confiscation of foreign central bank assets by direct executive action; that freezing foreign state assets is permissible as a third-party countermeasure to stop a serious case of aggression; and that confiscation would not qualify as a countermeasure but may be permissible as a 'lawful measure' to repair the damage. Recent changes in Canadian legislation support the existence of such a permissive rule. On the other hand, controversial measures by the United States to control the assets of the Afghan Central Bank demonstrate the need for safeguards against abuse.

Climate philosophers conceptualize 'grandfathering' as 'emissions grandfathering': past emission levels entitle to future emissions. With the notable but controversial exception of libertarian Luc Bovens (2011), they regard grandfathering as intrinsically, even if not instrumentally, unjust. Questioning both the standard dismissal and Bovens's Lockean pro-argument, this article defends the intrinsic (albeit limited) fairness of grandfathering conceptualized as 'resources grandfathering': fossil resource creation entitles to future resources use. A threefold 'social constructivist' ethical argument for this position is developed. First, philosophers' basic aversion to grandfathering, while consistent with their emissions-based understanding, rests on an undefended, shallow 'cosmopolitan materialism'. Second, Bovens's Lockean defense of the intrinsic fairness of grandfathering emission rights falls short for assuming a dubious 'first-come first-served' within a retained cosmopolitan materialism, although it sensibly suggests to include respect for investments in our understanding of grandfathering. Third, a 'communitarian idealist' defense of grandfathering, which stresses that 'natural resources' are cultural-historical creations, succeeds by undermining cosmopolitan materialism and eliminating first-come first-served. Thus, grandfathering supports Western countries and opposes (possibly) non-Western small rich or rapidly industrializing ones, and implies a critique of the view that the West owes a massive climate debt to developing countries. Yet, grandfathering, as distributional starting-point within a pluralist framework, should arguably be complemented by 'no-harm' and 'ability to pay'.