Our study extends research on the feminization of poverty by analyzing the variation in women's, men's and feminized poverty across affluent democracies from 1969 to 2000. Specifically, we address three issues. First, we provide more recent estimates of adult women's and men's poverty and the ratio of women's to men's poverty with two different poverty measures. We suggest that by incorporating the elderly, the feminization of poverty may be greater than previously estimated. The feminization of poverty is nearly universal across affluent Western democracies 1969-2000. Second, we show that women's, men's and overall poverty are highly correlated, but the feminization of poverty diverges as a distinct social problem. Third, we find that women's, men's and overall poverty share several correlates, particularly the welfare state, though some differences exist. At the same time, several of our findings differ with past research. The feminization of poverty is only influenced by social security transfers, single motherhood, and the sex ratios of the elderly and labor force participation. While power resources theory probably best explains women's, men's and overall poverty, structural theory may best explain the feminization of poverty. We conclude by discussing how analyses of the feminization of poverty contribute to debates on poverty and gender inequality.
This article provides a framework and offers strategies for theorizing and generalizing about risk assessment and regulation developed in the context of an on‐going comparative study of regulatory behavior. Construction of a universe of nearly 3,000 risks and study of a random sample of 100 of these risks allowed us to estimate relative U.S. and European regulatory precaution over a thirty‐five‐year period. Comparative nested analysis of cases selected from this universe of ecological, health, safety, and other risks or its eighteen categories or ninety‐two subcategories of risk sources or causes will allow theory‐testing and ‐building and many further descriptive and causal comparative generalizations.
Much attention has been addressed to the question of whether Europe or the United States adopts a more precautionary stance to the regulation of potential environmental, health, and safety risks. Some commentators suggest that Europe is more risk‐averse and precautionary, whereas the United States is seen as more risk‐taking and optimistic about the prospects for new technology. Others suggest that the United States is more precautionary because its regulatory process is more legalistic and adversarial, while Europe is more lax and corporatist in its regulations. The flip‐flop hypothesis claims that the United States was more precautionary than Europe in the 1970s and early 1980s, and that Europe has become more precautionary since then. We examine the levels and trends in regulation of environmental, health, and safety risks since 1970. Unlike previous research, which has studied only a small set of prominent cases selected nonrandomly, we develop a comprehensive list of almost 3,000 risks and code the relative stringency of regulation in Europe and the United States for each of 100 risks randomly selected from that list for each year from 1970 through 2004. Our results suggest that: (a) averaging over risks, there is no significant difference in relative precaution over the period, (b) weakly consistent with the flip‐flop hypothesis, there is some evidence of a modest shift toward greater relative precaution of European regulation since about 1990, although (c) there is a diversity of trends across risks, of which the most common is no change in relative precaution (including cases where Europe and the United States are equally precautionary and where Europe or the United States has been consistently more precautionary). The overall finding is of a mixed and diverse pattern of relative transatlantic precaution over the period.