This paper explores how two relatively new methods, which may be categorized loosely as "artificial mtelligence" (AI) approaches, might be used in analyzing the relationship between socioeconomic data and democracy. The ID3 algorithm is used as a preprocessor in the construction of neural networks which are used to predict the potential level of democracy of communist countries on the basis of socioeconomic variables for 147 countries.
This paper attempts to provide a modern, universal, conceptualisation of democracy. J. D. May's 'responsive rule' approach is analysed. It is argued that his approach, although on the right lines, is not satisfactory as it stands. Democracy should be seen as referring to the principles which underlie the political process for a given regime, and is logically independent of the detailed institutional practices. Following Easton's analysis of a regime in terms of authority structure, values, and norms, democracy is analysed in terms of three principles of upward control, political equality, and norms defining acceptable polices. procedures, and behaviour. Democracy is not a dichotomous concept: given regimes differ in the extent to which they embody the principles of democracy in the operation of their institutions. In practice it will be hard, perhaps impossible, to find any regime anywhere which does not embody some elements of democracy to some degree. This vitiates the almost universal practice of using democracy and non‐democracy as underlying concepts in a system of categorisation of regimes. Such categories become wholly arbitrary. Because of the subtle ways in which the democratic principles may work in different contexts. and because measures of these various manifestations of democracy can only be combined on a purely arbitrary basis, statistical measures of 'democracy' also become arbitrary. It is concluded that, although facets of the political process may be investigated using statistical techniques. ultimately the main thrust of empirical studies of democracy must be qualitative rather than quantitative.Democracy is the theory that the common people know what they want, and deserve to get it good and hard. (H. L. Mencken. Sententiae. A Book of Burlesquer, 1920)
The problem of whether the rational, self-interested individual will voluntarily subscribe to a large group providing collective benefits is examined, using the perspectives of Hardin's application of game theory and Olson's application of economic theory. The arguments in each case are held to be unsatisfactory, and the same analysis cannot automatically be applied to all problems involving collective action. The subscription to large groups normally represents a distinct sub-class of problems, the solution to which, contrary to the established wisdom, is that the rational, self-interested individual with a net benefit (together, perhaps, with the irrational one with a net loss) will voluntarily subscribe to a group providing a collective good.
Abstract. The utility of comparative politics has been questioned from time to time in two ways. Doubts have been cast upon its ability to offer genuine and useful generalisations, and these doubts have been reinforced by the appearance of studies which, while statistically adventurous, are not grounded upon a sufficiently sound theoretical base. In this paper we consider Alasdair MacIntyre's objections to the idea of a science of comparative politics, and discuss the nature of law‐like generalisations. We explore the extent to which MacIntyre's objections may be overcome, and indicate the form that generalisations about political stability could take. We also argue that studies of stability need a clear explanatory linkage between the empirical data they utilise and the hypotheses of a theory about political stability. This is often lacking in such studies, which seem to substitute a sophisticated statistical technique for genuine political theory.
ABSTRACTFew extended analyses of the concept of political stability have been published, much of the literature concentrating on an analysis of its causes. This article discusses the main approaches to stability and examines two recent conceptualizations by Ake and by Sanders. It is argued that both are unsatisfactory, and an alternative definition is developed, starting from first principles. The problems of identity and change are examined, and what counts as the survival of a political object is specified. A stable political object is defined as one that possesses the capacity to prevent its own forced non‐survival. It is argued that stability cannot be quantified and that there are thus no degrees of stability.
FEW EXTENDED ANALYSIS OF THE CONCEPT OF POLITICAL STABILITY HAVE BEEN PUBLISHED, MUCH OF THE LITERATURE CONCENTRATING ON AN ANALYSIS OF ITS CAUSES. THIS ARTICLE DISCUSSES THE MAIN APPROACHES TO STABILITY AND EXAMINES TWO RECENT CONCEPTUALIZATIONS BY AKE AND BY SANDERS. IT IS ARGUED THAT BOTH ARE UNSATISFACTORY, AND AN ALTERNATIVE DEFINITION IS DEVELOPED, STARTING FROM FIRST PRINCIPLES. THE PROBLEMS OF IDENTITY AND CHANGE ARE EXAMINED, AND WHAT COUNTS AS THE SURVIVAL OF A POLITICAL OBJECT IS SPECIFIED. A STABLE POLITICAL OBJECT IN DEFINED AS ONE THAT POSSESSES THE CAPACITY TO PREVENT ITS OWN FORCED NON-SURVIVAL. IT IS ARGUED THAT STABILITY CANNOT BE QUANTIFIED AND THAT THERE ARE THUS NO DEGREES OF STABILITY.
