Trump and the Rise of the Media-Industrial Complex in American Politics
In: Insight Turkey, Band 19, Heft 3, S. 93-120
ISSN: 2564-7717
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In: Insight Turkey, Band 19, Heft 3, S. 93-120
ISSN: 2564-7717
In: Middle East critique, Band 21, Heft 2, S. 203-223
ISSN: 1943-6157
In: Millennium: journal of international studies, Band 51, Heft 3, S. 866-891
ISSN: 1477-9021
This article posits that the Ottoman international system was built on three pillars: power projection, interconnectedness, and autonomy of frontier polities. While its military power projection dwarfed its great power rivals, cultural and organizational capacities of the Ottoman Empire extended its influence to areas out of its military reach. Occupying a central position in trade, pilgrimage, and diplomacy during the early modern period, the Ottoman Empire fostered connections throughout the wider Afro-Eurasian world. The flexible and almost independent status of the peripheral polities not only increased the survival capacity of the empire but also played a central role in the functioning of the Ottoman international system. Rather than presenting either a material or ideational perspective, the present study adopts a via-media approach, integrating both perspectives to elucidate the Ottoman international system, which persisted for nearly three centuries from the early 16th century to the late 18th century. Analyzing such a broad historical phenomenon, this article aims to enrich and contribute to the increasingly popularized historical and non-Western IR subfields. Additionally, it holds potential to deepen our comprehension of heterogeneous international systems and their modus operandi. Le système international ottoman : Projection de puissance, interconnexion et autonomie des territoires frontaliers
In: International politics: a journal of transnational issues and global problems, Band 60, Heft 1, S. 154-173
ISSN: 1740-3898
In: Cambridge review of international affairs, Band 30, Heft 2-3, S. 256-282
ISSN: 1474-449X
In: Bilig, Heft 94, S. 189-215
In: International politics: a journal of transnational issues and global problems, Band 60, Heft 1, S. 128-133
ISSN: 1740-3898
World Affairs Online
In: International politics: a journal of transnational issues and global problems
ISSN: 1740-3898
In: International politics: a journal of transnational issues and global problems, Band 60, Heft 1, S. 128-133
ISSN: 1740-3898
In: Alternatives: global, local, political, Band 47, Heft 2, S. 67-83
ISSN: 2163-3150
When does the war party win in the decision-making process? Why does the peace party lose even if war is too risky? In this article, we show that certain balancing acts of the peace party might increase the confidence of the war party. We examine how the Ottoman Empire's risky Crimean War decision and its war declaration against Russia on 4 October 1853 were shaped by internal debating through time, foreign penetration, and dynamic interplay between the Ottoman decision makers and a changing European strategic environment. The large literature on the Crimean War does not include a systematic analysis of the Ottoman origins of the Crimean War and the Ottoman war decision. We trace the Ottoman decision-making process in the fateful months of 1853 to establish the origins of the Crimean War. We empirically demonstrate the gradual formation of the Porte's war decision by showing how the peace front stumbled upon war by inadvertently changing the decision structure in favor of the war party within a year.
In: War in history, Band 27, Heft 4, S. 643-669
ISSN: 1477-0385
Why did the fracturing Ottoman Empire enter the Great War? Why did the Ottomans drag their feet for a period of three months although the alliance treaty stipulated that the Ottomans should enter the war against Russia if the latter fought with Germany? This article sets forth a neoclassical realist analysis of the war decision by the members of Ottoman foreign policy executive as the outcome of dynamic interactions between the systemic stimuli/structural modifiers and unit-level variables that occurred in a limited time frame (August to November 1914) and sequentially influenced the strategic calculus of the actors involved. It demonstrates that a changing amalgamation of systemic and unit-level factors were instrumental in the Ottoman decision to enter the Great War, the most prominent of which was the divided foreign policy executive.
"This volume investigates the nature and changing roles of the non-state armed groups in the Middle East with a special focus on Kurdish, Shia and Islamic State groups. To understand the nature of transformation in the Middle Eastern geopolitical space, it provides new empirical and analytical insights into the impact of three prominent actors, namely ISIS, YPG and Shia Militias. With its distinctive detailed and multi-faceted analyses, it offers new findings on the changing contours of sovereignty, geopolitics and ideology, particularly after the Arab Uprisings. Overall this volume contributes to the study of violent geopolitics, critical security studies and international relations particularly by exploring the ideologies and strategies of the new non state armed actors." (Publisher's description)
World Affairs Online