Suchergebnisse

AbstractA government (a global decision maker) is supposed to search for a fair strategy generating its decisions influencing a population of citizens (local decision makers). The strategy should respect the fact that each citizen has their personal preferences as well as observation and decision spaces. A non‐standard problem formulation and its solution are proposed.Specifically, each citizen (male, female, possibly child) is supposed to express his wishes and restrictions in the way that can be translated into an ideal distribution of data he observes and influences. He is recommended to select his decision strategy so that the real distribution of these data is close to his ideal distribution. This approach is called fully probabilistic design. The government is assumed to be able to influence a few data entries that have an impact on each citizen. The government optimal decision strategy is also formulated in the fully probabilistic sense with its ideal defined as a mixture of the ideal distributions of citizens. Portions of different types of citizens are taken as weights of components forming the mixture.The paper characterizes individual problem elements and information flow, provides an approximate feasible solution and specializes it to normal government model and normal ideal distributions of citizens. Qualitative consequences with respect to rational governing are drawn. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Prescriptive Bayesian decision making has reached a high level of maturity and is well-supported algorithmically. However, experimental data shows that real decision makers choose such Bayes-optimal decisions surprisingly infrequently, often making decisions that are badly sub-optimal. So prevalent is such imperfect decision-making that it should be accepted as an inherent feature of real decision makers living within interacting societies. To date such societies have been investigated from an economic and gametheoretic perspective, and even to a degree from a physics perspective. However, lit