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This CSIS report argues that Russian leaders are committed to a reconstitution of the Russian military--especially the Russian army--over the next several years, though achieving this goal will be challenging. In addition, Russia views the United States as its main enemy for the foreseeable future.

The U.S. defense industrial base is not prepared for the international security environment that now exists, including to deal with China. The United States should take several steps now to strengthen the industrial base to improve deterrence and warfighting.

The people's man -- The general -- The spymaster -- Covert actors -- Dutch -- The Gdansk Agreement -- Polish abyss -- The case for covert action -- The birth of Qrhelpful -- Struggling to survive -- Getting off the ground -- Ratlines -- The underground -- Hardball -- Cracks in the foundation -- Holy alliance? -- An emotional visit -- A global campaign -- The tide turns -- The return of solidarity -- The Trump card -- Round table talks -- Finishing the job -- The white eagle

Chapter 1: Introduction. - Chapter 2: Starting Insurgencies. - Chapter 3: Strategies. - Chapter 4: Tactics. - Chapter 5: Organizational Structures. - Chapter 6: Information Campaigns and Propaganda. - Chapter 7: Outside Support. - Chapter 8: Ending Insurgencies. - Chapter 9: Conclusion

Cover -- Title Page -- Copyright -- Contents -- Preface -- Box, Figures, and Tables -- Summary -- Acknowledgments -- Abbreviations -- CHAPTER ONE: Introduction -- Research Design -- Outline of the Report -- CHAPTER TWO: The Evolution of al Shabaab -- Phase One: Ideological and Historical Origins, 1960s-2005 -- Phase Two: Proto-Insurgency, 2005-2007 -- Phase Three: Rebirth and the Rise of the Islamists, 2007-2009 -- Phase Four: The Heyday of al Shabaab, 2009-2011 -- Phase Five: Retreat and Adaptation, 2011-2016 -- Conclusion -- CHAPTER THREE: The Weakening of al Shabaab -- Strategic Options -- The Decline of al Shabaab -- Conclusion -- CHAPTER FOUR: Recommendations -- APPENDIX -- Data Collection Sources and Notes -- About the Authors -- References -- Index

This report examines the status and evolution of al Qa'ida and other Salafi-jihadist groups, and uses qualitative and quantitative data to assess whether this movement has strengthened. The author uses this analysis to examine U.S. strategic options to counter al Qa'ida and other terrorist groups based on the threat level and the capacity of local governments

Following the recent endorsement of the U.S.-Afghanistan bilateral security agreement by Afghanistan's Loya Jirga, a new CFR report outlines the composition, role, and rationale for the roughly ten thousand U.S. troops that will possibly remain in the country after the 2014 drawdown. The authors explain how the United States should manage the complex political, security, and economic challenges that will accompany the reduction in U.S. and allied forces. They argue for a force of eight to twelve thousand troops to assist Afghan national security forces and prevent a resurgence of al-Qaeda

Descent into violence -- The mujahideen era -- Uncivil war -- The rise of the Taliban -- Al Qa'ida's strategic alliance -- Operation Enduring Freedom -- Light footprint -- Early successes -- The logic of insurgency -- Collapse of law and order -- A growing cancer -- The perfect storm -- A three-front war -- National caveats -- The water must boil -- Al Qa'ida : a force multiplier -- In the eye of the storm -- Back to the future

Security in Afghanistan has historically required a combination of top-down efforts from the central government and bottom-up efforts from local communities. Since 2001, U.S. and broader international efforts have focused on establishing security solely from the top down through Afghan national security forces and other central government institutions. But local security forces are a critical complement to these efforts, especially in rural areas of the country. The Afghan government and NATO forces need to move quickly to establish a more-effective bottom-up strategy to complement top-down efforts by better leveraging local communities. The Afghan government can work with existing community structures that oppose insurgents to establish village-level policing entities, such as arbakai and chalweshtai, with support from NATO. Effectively leveraging local communities should significantly improve counterinsurgency prospects and can facilitate mobilization of the population against insurgents. This analysis documents lessons about the viability of establishing local security in Afghanistan and addresses concerns about the wisdom of such policies