Suchergebnisse

AbstractThis paper investigates how institutional environments, especially the contractual hazard and the political hazard, affect foreign investors' share ratios in joint‐venture enterprises in China. We build a model combining Transaction Cost Economics and Property Rights Theory to describe the tradeoff that foreign investors face between choosing a larger share ratio and a smaller one. We argue that when the contractual hazard increases, foreign investors request larger shares to avoid being held up by their domestic partners, and when the political hazard increases, they hold smaller shares to circumvent the local government's grabbing hand. Moreover, the effect of the contractual hazard is channeled through enterprises' asset specificity. These theoretical predictions are verified by studying the relationship between the ownership structure of Chinese manufacturing joint‐venture enterprises and the provincial‐level institutions they are embedded in.

This interdisciplinary collection of essays provides a broad, multifaceted examination of urbanization in China. The contributors also analyze the ways in which the Chinese Communist Party and the government have adapted and survived politically throughout the urbanization process.

Ethnic China examines the ongoing minority protests in China from the perspective of Chinese-American scholars in fields ranging from economics to anthropology.The contributors introduce and explore policy patterns, political systems, and social institutions by identifying key issues in Chinese government, society, and ethnic community contained within the larger framework of the international sphere.