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Bureaucrats have considerable formal policymaking authority. Yet policymaking discussions often overlook the role that bureaucrats play in the policy process. Current theories suggest that bureaucratic policymaking outputs are shaped largely by political signals sent by elected officials. While these external influences are crucial, current theories understate the role of internal organizational dynamics. This study builds on the bureaucratic response and organizational attention literatures to differentiate internally organized attention from externally organized attention in public agencies. It then conceptualizes two ways that public managers can internally organize agency attention to influence formal bureaucratic policymaking in the context of contracting and procurement. This study adds to the public management literature by showing how internal managerial strategies and activities can influence bureaucratic outputs.

The bureaucratic response literature has focused on the quantity and timing of agency outputs in response to political signals. This focus on quantity rather than more qualitative measures such as the content and character of response has made it difficult to fully understand the causes and conditions under which response occurs in relation to a given signal. In the context of minority preference purchasing policy in the State of Florida, this study examines the relationship between political signals and the content and character of bureaucratic response—what is referred to here as the nature of bureaucratic response. A theory is developed and supported through interview and archival data to suggest that bureaucratic actors evaluate signals and policymaker intentions in determining if and how to respond. The article also provides one of the first in-depth examinations of the inner workings of minority preference purchasing.

AbstractGovernance structures such as the American system of federalism create the incentive structure and framework for collaboration between local governments. This interlocal collaboration is crucial to helping governments deal with contemporary issues such as energy efficiency and climate policy where collective action can solve problems more successfully. The goal of this study is to examine how external rules such as federal grant regulations and the current scope of interlocal collaboration affect the choice of interlocal collaboration over time. We do this in the context of energy efficiency and climate policy using the Energy Efficiency and Conservation Block Grant Program.