Suchergebnisse

When private incentives are insufficient, a big push by government may lead to industrialization. This article uses mobilization for WWII to test the big push hypothesis in the context of postwar industrialization in the American South. Specifically, I investigate the role of capital deepening at the county level using newly assembled data on the location and value of wartime investment. Despite a boom in manufacturing activity during the war, the evidence is not consistent with differential postwar growth in counties that received more investment. This does not rule out positive effects of mobilization on firms or sectors, but a decisive role for wartime capital deepening in the South's postwar industrial development should be viewed more skeptically.

World War II temporarily halted the rise in high school and college graduation rates. This article shows that manpower mobilization for World War II decreased educational attainment among high school-age females during the early 1940s, reduced employment and earnings, and altered decisions regarding family formation. I then provide evidence that women in this cohort returned to school in later life and relate these findings to the "quiet revolution" taking place as women learned about the benefits of school and work over the second half of the twentieth century."Education has been ever in the nation's service. But in these days of total war that service has a new significance. 'You're in the Army now' is no cliché–it is an expression of national necessity."1

Abstract
Can strengthening intellectual property protection for producers of one good affect innovation in other related goods? To answer this question, we exploit a unique policy experiment in the interwar military aircraft industry. Airframe designs had little intellectual property protection before 1926, but changes passed by Congress in 1926 provided airframe manufacturers with enhanced property rights over new designs. We show that granting property rights to airframe producers increased innovation in airframes, but slowed innovation in aero-engines, a complementary good where there was no change in the availability of intellectual property protection. We propose and test a simple theory that explains these patterns.

AbstractThe commercial airframe industry in the US experienced a shakeout from the early 1930s into the post‐Second World War period. Unlike shakeouts in automobiles, tyres, or televisions, the commercial airframe industry's early life cycle was affected by external factors, particularly government demand. Using newly digitized data on all planes introduced in the commercial market between 1926 and 1965, we find that commercial airframe manufacturers with bomber contracts during the Second World War were more likely to have postwar market share than firms without such contracts, controlling for plane characteristics and other forms of government contracting. We attribute the effect of bomber contracts to advantages in R&D learning capacity acquired by firms with military airframe contracts. Despite low (or zero) initial presence in the commercial market, these learning capacity advantages allowed such firms to survive the early period of the shakeout, and later to thrive.