Suchergebnisse

In this paper we analyze the bureaucratic negotiation process that is implied by the budgeting system applied in Dutch hospital care. This system is based on centralized price setting while simultaneously allowing for decentralized negotiations on volumes. We apply a variant of the bureaucracy theory, according to which the bureaucratic agency (in our case the joint hospitals) are not allowed to price discriminate, but will receive a flat price per unit of output. We find that central price setting, where the insurer cannot exploit its information on hospital costs, leads to a suboptimal supply of hospital care. 4 Figures, 9 References. Adapted from the source document.

AbstractDue to processes of financialisation, financial parties increasingly penetrate the healthcare domain and determine under which conditions care is delivered. Their influence becomes especially visible when healthcare organisations face financial distress. By zooming‐in on two of such cases, we come to know more about the considerations, motives and actions of financial parties in healthcare. In this research, we were able to examine the social dynamics between healthcare executives, banks and health insurers involved in a Dutch hospital and mental healthcare organisation on the verge of bankruptcy. Informed by interviews, document analysis and translation theory, we reconstructed the motives and strategies of executives, banks and health insurers and show how they play a crucial role in decision‐making processes surrounding the survival or downfall of healthcare organisations. While parties are bound by legislation and company procedures, the outcome of financial distress can still be influenced. Much depends on how executives are perceived by financial stakeholders and how they deal with threats of destabilisation of the network. We further draw attention to the consequences of financialisation processes on the practices of healthcare organisations in financial distress.