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According to an argument commonly made by politicians, selling weapons to oppressive and aggressive regimes can sometimes be permissible because the sale renders the victims of these regimes no worse-off than they would have been had the sale not been made. We can refer to this argument as the inconsequence argument. My primary aim in this paper is to identify one reason why the inconsequence argument will often not succeed in vindicating arms sales to oppressive and aggressive regimes. The inconsequence argument will often not succeed because arms sales to oppressive and aggressive regimes often do make the victims of these regimes worse-off than they would have been had the sales not gone ahead. The victims of these regimes are often made worse-off in virtue of the fact that arms sales can generate expressed harms, which, unlike some of the material harms often engendered by such sales, are additive (rather than substitutive) in character. As I shall explain, expressed harms are similar to, but also significantly different from, expressive harms. The differences are important, for they allow us to construct a reply that can answer the inconsequence argument on its own (consequentialist) terms.

Abstract
This article begins by distinguishing between two approaches to egalitarian trade justice – the explicative approach and the applicative approach – and notes that the former has been used to defend conclusions that are less strongly egalitarian than those defended by advocates of the latter. The article then engages with the primary explicative account of trade egalitarianism – that offered by Aaron James – and argues that its egalitarian conclusions are unduly minimalistic. The aim of the article is not to criticize the explicative approach, but rather to show that the arguments and commitments of its best-known defender – James – either fail to rule out, or in fact positively support, more robustly egalitarian conclusions.

Throughout the Yemeni Civil War, western states have supplied weapons used in the indiscriminate bombing campaign conducted by the Saudis. In defence of their actions, British politicians have argued that they are exchanging weapons for influence, and using the influence obtained to encourage compliance with humanitarian law. An additional premise in the argument is that Britain is using its influence more benignly than alternative suppliers would use theirs if Britain were not on the scene. The idea is that Britain is substituting itself for other, less scrupulous, interveners. I argue that, regardless of whether British substitution intervention could be justified in this way…, it is not in fact justified, because Britain has not plausibly used its influence to secure an amount of good sufficient to offset the various harms that its actions have created (or to discharge the expanded duties of rescue that greater influence entails). In addition, the article identifies the various forms that substitution intervention can take, and shows how the concept reveals hitherto neglected reasons to both support and oppose intervention in foreign conflicts.

Throughout the Yemeni Civil War, western states have supplied weapons used in the indiscriminate bombing campaign conducted by the Saudis. In defence of their actions, British politicians have argued that they are exchanging weapons for influence, and using the influence obtained to encourage compliance with humanitarian law. An additional premise in the argument is that Britain is using its influence more benignly than alternative suppliers would use theirs if Britain were not on the scene. The idea is that Britain is substituting itself for other, less scrupulous, interveners. I argue that, regardless of whether British substitution intervention could be justified in this way, it is not in fact justified, because Britain has not plausibly used its influence to secure an amount of good sufficient to offset the various harms that its actions have created (or to discharge the expanded duties of rescue that greater influence entails). In addition, the paper identifies the various forms that substitution intervention can take, and shows how the concept reveals hitherto neglected reasons to both support and oppose intervention in foreign conflicts.

There is a general presumption against arming outlaw states. But can that presumption sometimes be overturned? The argument considered here maintains that outlaw states can have legitimate security interests and that transferring weapons to these states can be an appropriate way of promoting those interests. Weapons enable governments to engage in wrongful oppression and aggression, but they also enable them to fend off predators in a manner that can be beneficial to their citizens. It clearly does not follow from the fact that a state is oppressive or aggressive that it will never be a victim of wrongful aggression itself, and while an outlaw state's primary aim in repelling such aggression will often be the preservation of its own power, its defensive manoeuvres will sometimes also serve its citizens' interests. In short, supplying weapons to outlaw states may sometimes contribute to the protection of innocents.

In this article I explore the ethical dimensions of one controversial international trade, namely, the arms trade. The arms trade merits attention for a number of reasons. First, it has been largely neglected by political philosophers. While various aspects of international trade have recently been subjected to philosophical scrutiny, the arms trade has been virtually ignored. Second, the arms trade bears heavily on the achievement of basic needs, that is, needs which must be met if an individual is to lead a minimally decent life. More specifically, the arms trade bears on the achievement of security. All weapons have the capacity to incapacitate, injure, and kill: in short, all weapons have the capacity to cause serious physical harm. Furthermore, they are purchased because they have that capacity. Their capacity to cause serious physical harm makes trade in these commodities particularly controversial, and particularly worthy of philosophical inquiry. Third, the arms trade is politically salient. Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the US government has drastically ramped up arms sales to oppressive regimes regarded as valuable allies in the war on terror, and in the years since the Arab Spring large quantities of weapons have been transferred to rebel groups seeking to topple despotic rulers. It is thus important to question whether such transfers can be justified. Adapted from the source document.

This article examines the practice of using aid to control migration, which we refer to as 'inducement aid'. We examine two potential objections to inducement aid, each of which concerns a message that the practice communicates to two corresponding audiences: would-be migrants and other developed states. We suggest that the first objection has intuitive force but is undermined by a powerful reply. This finding seems to bolster the intuitive appeal that inducement aid might exhibit as a non-compulsory and apparently option-enhancing form of migration control. However, we argue that the second objection, which targets inducement aid in its capacity as a form of development assistance, has greater power. Developing the second objection, we argue that inducement aid threatens the establishment and maintenance of important international norms, thereby risking degrading the options of the world's poorest people and setting back the cause of cosmopolitan morality.