THE POLITICAL STRUCTURE OF CONSTITUTION MAKING: THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787*
In: Political science, Band 28, Heft 3, S. 435-458
ISSN: 0112-8760, 0032-3187
THE AUTHORS CONTEND THAT OUR UNDERSTANDING OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION AND OF THE CONSTITUTION THAT IT PROCUDED HAS BEEN SUBSTANTIALLY AND UNNECESSARILY CLOUDED BY AN ANCIENT DISPUTE BETWEEN THE ADHERENTS OF TWO VERY BROAD TRADITIONS OF POLITICAL ANALYSIS. A "RATIONALIST" LINE OF INTERPRETATION HAS CONSISTENTLY URGED FOR THE CENTRELITY OF IDEAS AND POLITICAL PRINCIPLES TO THE OUTCOME OF THE CONVENTION'S DEBATES, WHILE A "MATERIALIST" TRADITION HAS CONSISTENTLY STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF PRATICAL POLITICS AND ECONOMIC INTERESTS. THE AUTHOR INTEGRATE THESE ALTERNATIVE TRADITIONS OF ANALYSIS AND EXPLANATION BY DEMONSTRATING THAT A DYNAMIC RELATIONSHIP OF MUTUAL INTERDEPENDENCE EXISTS BETWEEN PHILOSPHICAL AND MATERIAL INFLUENCES IN THE CONVENTION. THE AUTHORS DEMONSTRATE, THROUGH BOTH EMPIRICAL AND INTERPRETIVE MEANS, THAT, ALTHOUGH QUESTIONS OF BOTH PHILOSOPHICAL AND MATERIAL CONTENT AND IMPORT WERE BEFORE THE CONVENTION THROUGHOUT, QUESTIONS OF EACH GENERAL TYPE DOMINATED THE CONVENTION'S ATTENTION DURING PARTICULAR PHASES OF ITS WORK. THEREFORE, THE FOCUS OF DEBATE AND DECISION, AS WELL AS THE VOTING COALITIONS THAT CONFRONTED ONE ANOTHER OVER THE ISSUES DISCUSSION, WERE ORGANIZED AROUND SHARED PRINCIPLES AT SOME STATES, WHILE AT OTHER TIMES THEY WERE ORGANIZED AROUND CONFLICTING MATERIAL INTERESTS.