The Urban World, Eleventh Edition, provides a comprehensive, balanced, up-to-date, and cross-cultural look at cities and suburbs around the world. Offering a twenty-first-century view of the changing urban scene, the text covers evolving urban patterns and the changing nature of urban life. Combining expert scholarship with an accessible style, J. John Palen is one of America's leading urban sociologists. He adds fresh data and insights to each edition of his text.
The concept of human dignity lies at the heart of many national and international conventions of human rights. This idea, based on man's rationality, can be found already in Greco-Roman Antiquity, was fully developed in Christianity, in its synthesis with the Biblical conception of man as image of God. With the secularization of the European mind from the 18th century onwards, the justification of human dignity becomes problematic. This most influential attempt to justify it by secular rationality came from Kant, who saw man's dignity as deriving from his capacity for moral reasoning and from it came the notions of autonomy and equality. However, during the last two centuries, secularized cultures produced skeptical attitudes toward both the Judeo-Christian and Kantian concepts of the intrinsic dignity of man, which eventually paved the way for twentieth-century totalitarian-isms. After the horrors of Nazism, concerns about putting human rights in the centre of culture, politics and law compelled a search ―largely impossible― for a common idea of human dignity, shared by different philosophical traditions, both religious and secular. During the years after World War II, especially after the Second Vatican Council, there was a renewed discovery of human rights as based on human dignity by Catholicism, which, in view of the different reduc-tionist or destructive tendencies found in the secularized culture, perhaps is the most satisfactory approach. Finally, the problem of religious freedom is examined as a case study for further reflections on human dignity.
Permítanme empezar parafraseando el inicio de un artículo de Janan Ganesh publicado en Financial Times el 21 de abril de 2015, la víspera de la inauguración del congreso internacional Building Universities' Reputation organizado en Pamplona por la Universidad de Navarra: En el mundo de las universidades la palabra "marca" tiene mala imagen. En el mejor de los casos parece poco profunda. En el peor evoca una argucia de marketing. Pero si cambiamos la palabra marca por "reputación", de repente es más fácil hablar de esta variable educativa decisiva. Ya que nadie pone en duda que la reputación de una universidad –su imagen y sus valores percibidos, la reacción visceral que se produce ante la mención de su nombre– es muy importante para determinar sus perspectivas. La pertinencia del comentario es evidente a pesar de que Ganesh no estaba hablando de las universidades sino de los partidos políticos –donde digo "el mundo de las universidades" léase "la política", donde digo "educativa" léase "electoral", y donde digo "de una universidad" léase "de un partido"–. Ganesh escribía en medio de la campaña electoral previa a las elecciones generales de 2015 en el Reino Unido y su reflexión concernía, concretamente, a la reputación del Partido Conservador. Su argumento general era que las decisiones de voto de los votantes dependen tanto en la impresión general que tienen sobre el carácter de un partido político como de sus opiniones acerca de las políticas y el manifiesto concreto de dicho partido. Lo mismo sucede con muchas personas, entre ellas los estudiantes de grado potenciales y sus padres, cuando se trata de decidir en qué universidades van a solicitar ser admitidos: las elecciones se basan en el carácter general aparente de las universidades tanto o más, que en cuestiones específicas de los cursos o prospectos. Aquí quiero explorar estas cuestiones no desde la perspectiva de la sociología o de la economía, sino desde la óptica de la filosofía educativa. ; Let me begin by quoting the opening paragraph of a commentary article by Janan Ganesh published in the Financial Times on 21 April 2015, the day prior to the opening of the international conference on Building Universities' Reputation hosted in Pamplona by the University of Navarra: In the world of universities, the word "brand" itself has a bad brand. At best, it sounds shallow. At worst, it evokes a marketing spiv. Swap the B-word for "reputation" and suddenly it is easier to talk about this decisive educational variable. For nobody doubts that a university's reputation – its image and perceived values, the gut reaction created by a mention of its name – goes a long way to determining its prospects. The relevance of the points is evident notwithstanding that Ganesh was not speaking about universities but about political parties - for "the world of universities" read "politics", for "educational" read "electoral", and for "a university's" read "a party's". Ganesh was writing in the midst of electoral campaigning prior to the UK 2015 General Election and reflecting in particular on the reputation of the Conservative party. His general point was that voter's ballot decisions are as much dependent on their general impression of the character of a political party as they are on their views of that party's particular policies and manifesto. Likewise for many people including prospective undergraduates and their parents, choices in applications to universities are based on apparent general character as much if not more than on specifics of courses or prospectuses. Here I wish to explore these issues not from the perspective of sociology or economics but from that of educational philosophy.
Las teorías procedimentalistas se equivocan al suponer que se puede explicar ia validez dei derecho sin reconocer la centralidad, para ei pensamiento y la práctica jurídica, de criterios de contenido. Conviene abordar las tesis de la razón práctica desde la perspectiva epistemológica, y la relación de esta última con los deseos, las emociones y los fines. El autor utiliza como referencia algunas propuestas del Aquinate, la crítica de Hume, pero también algunas posturas críticas con respecto a este último.
This study presents a preliminary evaluation of the impact of the Seguro Popular (SP) on state and households health financing inequalities. There exist in Mexico extreme inequalities in health financing, which are explained by the high proportion of out-of-pocket spending in total health financing, as well as the unequal incidence of public health spending. The study is divided in two parts. The first evaluates the inequalities in public health financing between states, considering three principal aspects: a) the distribution of federal health spending on the uninsured, b) the capacity of state governments to absorb the financial burden implied by the rules of SP, and c) the incentives which these rules imply for state efforts in health financing. The second part evaluates the impact of SP in total health financial resources (public and private) available to households in Mexico. ; Este trabajo presenta una evaluación preliminar del impacto del Seguro Popular (SP) sobre las desigualdades en el financiamiento de la salud entre los estados y los hogares. Existen en México desigualdades extremas en el financiamiento de la salud, explicadas por la alta proporción que representa el gasto de bolsillo de los hogares en el financiamiento total de la salud, como de la incidencia desigual del gasto público en salud. El trabajo se divide en dos partes. La primera evalúa las desigualdades estatales en el financiamiento público de la salud, considerando tres temas principales: a) la distribución del gasto federal en salud en beneficio de la población no asegurada, b) la capacidad financiera que tienen los estados para asumir la carga que les correspondería bajo las actuales reglas de operación del SP y c) los incentivos que implican estas reglas para el esfuerzo financiero de los estados en salud. En la segunda parte se evalúa el impacto del SP en el conjunto de recursos financieros para la salud (públicos y privados) disponibles a los hogares en México.