Suchergebnisse

Casi 20 millones de taiwaneses están llamados a votar en las elecciones legislativas y presidenciales del 13 de enero de 2024. Debido a la importancia de Taipéi en la creciente competición entre Beijing y Washington, las cuestiones geopolíticas y, en concreto, el papel de China como factor y actor en estas elecciones, han acaparado gran parte de los análisis políticos y mediáticos. No obstante, para entender el contexto y los resultados de los comicios, es necesario ampliar el foco a cuestiones domésticas y dinámicas internas que van más allá de Beijing, y centrarnos también en qué preocupa a los taiwaneses. Taiwán acude a las urnas para elegir a su presidente y al parlamento de los próximos cuatro años. Si bien la actualidad política doméstica de este territorio tiende a pasar bajo el radar de la atención mediática en Europa, estos comicios han atraído la atención de muchos debido a su carga geopolítica e importancia económica y su trascendencia para el futuro, no solo de la isla, sino de toda la región. Las tensiones entre China y Estados Unidos han situado a Taiwán como uno de los puntos más sensibles en la competición geopolítica entre ambos, donde el riesgo de conflicto es más notable.Entre las cuestiones preminentes de estos comicios está el mantenimiento del statu quo, lagestión de las relaciones con China y la preservación de la autonomía de Taiwán. A ello se suma el hecho de que la actual presidenta, Tsai Ing-Wen, del Partido Democrático Progresista (PDP) con orientación soberanista, ha cumplido ya el límite constitucional de dos mandatos, lo que deja el camino de la sucesión libre para nuevos aspirantes. El favorito en las encuestas y nuevo candidato de su partido, Lai Ching-te, se enfrenta a una oposición dividida entre el conservador y más cercano a Beijing, Kuomintang (KMT) de Hou Yu-ih, y el pragmático y emergente Partido Popular Taiwanés (PPT), liderado por el exalcalde de Taipéi, Ko Wen-je. En la mayoría de los análisis sobre estas elecciones, China ocupa una posición distinguida – y con razón. El factor China ha acaparado gran parte de la campaña electoral en los últimos meses, con los principales candidatos enmarcando las relaciones con el continente como el elemento central de estos comicios. No obstante, no se trata de una novedad: las relaciones entre Taipéi y Beijing han definido y decidido los últimos ciclos electorales. En 2012, la integración económica con el continente marcó el debate político, y fue determinante para la reelección de Ma Ying-jeou (KMT) en un momento de mayor optimismo. Lo fue también en 2016, con la victoria de la oposición bajo Tsai Ing-wen, tras las protestas juveniles del Movimiento de los Girasoles en contra de un nuevo acuerdo económico con China. En 2020, la preocupación por la situación de Hong Kong decantó la balanza a favor de Tsai frente al populista Han Kuo-yu. Este año, dicha relación ha sido presentada bajo la inquietante posibilidad de una invasión o de un recrudecimiento del conflicto en el estrecho con el trasfondo de las guerras en Ucrania y Gaza, pero también como una elección sobre el futuro democrático del territorio. Beijing tampoco ha ayudado a suavizar este discurso: en noviembre de 2023, la Oficina de Asuntos de Taiwán del Consejo de Estado de la República Popular de China instaba a la población taiwanesa a «elegir correctamente entre la paz y la guerra, la prosperidad o el declive».Y es que, aunque en menor medida, China también aparece como un actor más en la campaña electoral. Estas declaraciones, definidas por las autoridades taiwanesas como una «guerra cognitiva», han ido acompañadas de campañas de desinformación, presiones económicas y nuevas formas de coerción – como los numerosos globos que han cruzado el espacio aéreo de la isla, similares a los que causaron la última crisis entre Washington y Beijing en febrero de 2023. Organizaciones de la sociedad civil, como Cofacts o el Taiwan Information Environment Research Center, destacan formas más sofisticadas de desinformación que en años anteriores. Estas nuevas estrategias, como la amplificación de voces locales favorables a China, en lugar de nuevos contenidos, y su difusión en un mayor número de plataformas – desde Facebook, TikTok o Line a foros autóctonos taiwaneses – tienen, sin embargo, objetivos ya conocidos: aumentar la polarización social, reducir la credibilidad de Estados Unidos como aliado y, especialmente, erosionar y dañar la imagen del candidato menos favorito en Beijing, el soberanista PDP. Como en otras ocasiones, su impacto parece ser mínimo.No obstante, pese al componente existencial de las relaciones a través del estrecho para el futuro de Taiwán, reducir estas elecciones a consideraciones geopolíticas nos puede llevar a ignorar injustamente la agencia y las preocupaciones genuinas y ampliamente diversas de los más de 23 millones de habitantes. Es más, cuando focalizamos nuestra atención en qué les preocupa a los votantes, a diferencia de otros años, detectamos que este (f)actor China parece tener menos gancho en estos comicios, pese a su importancia en múltiples áreas de la política. Mientras los propios políticos, así como analistas y principales medios de comunicación, resaltan en primera instancia las relaciones entre Beijing y Taipéi (y sus diferencias en cómo gestionarlas), los jóvenes taiwaneses declaran su hastío frente al monopolio de la geopolítica y el poco espacio para la política doméstica, convirtiéndose según el New York Times, en el principal joker de estas elecciones. Lev Nachman, profesor de la Universidad Nacional de Chengchi, compartía el «curioso» resultado de una de las múltiples encuestas que está llevando a cabo en las últimas semanas: un 57% de los participantes declaraban estar más preocupados por resultar heridos debido a accidentes de tráfico que por un ataque de Beijing.Eclipsadas por múltiples escándalos y escenarios dramáticos – desde el inicio del #MeToo taiwanés y su impacto en los diferentes partidos, hasta la efímera candidatura de solo dos meses de Terry Gou, fundador de Foxconn, pasando por la ruptura televisada de la alianza entre los principales partidos de la oposición tras apenas 72 horas –, las preocupaciones domésticas han ocupado un espacio relativamente marginal dentro de los discursos de los candidatos, para frustración de muchos. A pesar de esta ausencia, según una encuesta realizada a más de 15.000 participantes por la revista Tianxia zazhi, las cuestiones económicas son consideradas la prioridad para la mayoría de los votantes, seguidas por la seguridad nacional y las relaciones con China. En concreto, los bajos salarios, la ralentización de la economía taiwanesa, el impacto de la inflación en el coste de vida y los altos precios de la vivencia en las principales ciudades son algunos de los elementos que más preocupan a los votantes. Otros temas, como la energía nuclear – que esconde otros debates como la autonomía energética o la transición ecológica de la isla – también han sido altamente controvertidos. Todo esto sin olvidar las cuestiones sociales, desde los derechos del colectivo LGBTI y los trabajadores migrantes hasta la pena de muerte o las decisiones reproductivas de las mujeres.Además, tras ocho años de mandato, el PDP también debe hacer frente al desgaste. El actual partido en el poder ha instrumentalizado las relaciones entre Beijing y Taipéi para zafarse de las críticas a su política doméstica, perdiendo parte del atractivo para muchos votantes. Pero, no es el único; el bipartidismo que ha marcado las tres décadas de democracia de Taiwán también empieza a mostrar signos de agotamiento. La emergencia del Partido Popular Taiwanés es justamente resultado de esta desilusión y frustración con los dos partidos tradicionales, siendo percibido como una alternativa capaz de traer un cambio político – al menos, aparentemente. En una de las elecciones más ajustadas de los últimos años, parece imposible predecir el resultado final. Pero, debido al poco margen entre los candidatos, esta fragmentación del voto también esconde otra incógnita: la (im)posibilidad de lograr una mayoría en el Yuan legislativo – el parlamento encargado de pasar las leyes y aceptar las nominaciones del presidente a otros cargos políticos-. Si bien se trata de un aspecto menos popular en los análisis publicados, su importancia será clave para definir el tono de las relaciones con Beijing, y dar respuesta a cuestiones fundamentales como el presupuesto de defensa y la compra de armamento, o a los principales problemas domésticos, como el precio de la vivienda. Es aquí donde el papel de esta tercera fuerza parlamentaria y las posibles coaliciones con los dos partidos tradicionales será más visible. Sea cual sea el resultado electoral, estos comicios nos dejarán una certeza: los taiwaneses expresarán claramente a sus políticos, a Beijing, a Washington y al resto del mundo qué futuro quieren, con las consecuentes reverberaciones regionales e internacionales, demostrando la resiliencia y dinamismo de su democracia.Palabras clave: Taiwán, elecciones, China, Beijing, geopolítica, Partido Democrático Progresista (PDP), Kuomintang (KMT), Partido Popular Taiwanés (PPT), desinformación, conflicto, estrecho Todas las publicaciones expresan las opiniones de sus autores/as y no reflejan necesariamente los puntos de vista de CIDOB como institución.

Casi 20 millones de taiwaneses están llamados a votar en las elecciones legislativas y presidenciales del 13 de enero de 2024. Debido a la importancia de Taipéi en la creciente competición entre Beijing y Washington, las cuestiones geopolíticas y, en concreto, el papel de China como factor y actor en estas elecciones, han acaparado gran parte de los análisis políticos y mediáticos. No obstante, para entender el contexto y los resultados de los comicios, es necesario ampliar el foco a cuestiones domésticas y dinámicas internas que van más allá de Beijing, y centrarnos también en qué preocupa a los taiwaneses. Taiwán acude a las urnas para elegir a su presidente y al parlamento de los próximos cuatro años. Si bien la actualidad política doméstica de este territorio tiende a pasar bajo el radar de la atención mediática en Europa, estos comicios han atraído la atención de muchos debido a su carga geopolítica e importancia económica y su trascendencia para el futuro, no solo de la isla, sino de toda la región. Las tensiones entre China y Estados Unidos han situado a Taiwán como uno de los puntos más sensibles en la competición geopolítica entre ambos, donde el riesgo de conflicto es más notable.Entre las cuestiones preminentes de estos comicios está el mantenimiento del statu quo, lagestión de las relaciones con China y la preservación de la autonomía de Taiwán. A ello se suma el hecho de que la actual presidenta, Tsai Ing-Wen, del Partido Democrático Progresista (PDP) con orientación soberanista, ha cumplido ya el límite constitucional de dos mandatos, lo que deja el camino de la sucesión libre para nuevos aspirantes. El favorito en las encuestas y nuevo candidato de su partido, Lai Ching-te, se enfrenta a una oposición dividida entre el conservador y más cercano a Beijing, Kuomintang (KMT) de Hou Yu-ih, y el pragmático y emergente Partido Popular Taiwanés (PPT), liderado por el exalcalde de Taipéi, Ko Wen-je. En la mayoría de los análisis sobre estas elecciones, China ocupa una posición distinguida – y con razón. El factor China ha acaparado gran parte de la campaña electoral en los últimos meses, con los principales candidatos enmarcando las relaciones con el continente como el elemento central de estos comicios. No obstante, no se trata de una novedad: las relaciones entre Taipéi y Beijing han definido y decidido los últimos ciclos electorales. En 2012, la integración económica con el continente marcó el debate político, y fue determinante para la reelección de Ma Ying-jeou (KMT) en un momento de mayor optimismo. Lo fue también en 2016, con la victoria de la oposición bajo Tsai Ing-wen, tras las protestas juveniles del Movimiento de los Girasoles en contra de un nuevo acuerdo económico con China. En 2020, la preocupación por la situación de Hong Kong decantó la balanza a favor de Tsai frente al populista Han Kuo-yu. Este año, dicha relación ha sido presentada bajo la inquietante posibilidad de una invasión o de un recrudecimiento del conflicto en el estrecho con el trasfondo de las guerras en Ucrania y Gaza, pero también como una elección sobre el futuro democrático del territorio. Beijing tampoco ha ayudado a suavizar este discurso: en noviembre de 2023, la Oficina de Asuntos de Taiwán del Consejo de Estado de la República Popular de China instaba a la población taiwanesa a «elegir correctamente entre la paz y la guerra, la prosperidad o el declive».Y es que, aunque en menor medida, China también aparece como un actor más en la campaña electoral. Estas declaraciones, definidas por las autoridades taiwanesas como una «guerra cognitiva», han ido acompañadas de campañas de desinformación, presiones económicas y nuevas formas de coerción – como los numerosos globos que han cruzado el espacio aéreo de la isla, similares a los que causaron la última crisis entre Washington y Beijing en febrero de 2023. Organizaciones de la sociedad civil, como Cofacts o el Taiwan Information Environment Research Center, destacan formas más sofisticadas de desinformación que en años anteriores. Estas nuevas estrategias, como la amplificación de voces locales favorables a China, en lugar de nuevos contenidos, y su difusión en un mayor número de plataformas – desde Facebook, TikTok o Line a foros autóctonos taiwaneses – tienen, sin embargo, objetivos ya conocidos: aumentar la polarización social, reducir la credibilidad de Estados Unidos como aliado y, especialmente, erosionar y dañar la imagen del candidato menos favorito en Beijing, el soberanista PDP. Como en otras ocasiones, su impacto parece ser mínimo.No obstante, pese al componente existencial de las relaciones a través del estrecho para el futuro de Taiwán, reducir estas elecciones a consideraciones geopolíticas nos puede llevar a ignorar injustamente la agencia y las preocupaciones genuinas y ampliamente diversas de los más de 23 millones de habitantes. Es más, cuando focalizamos nuestra atención en qué les preocupa a los votantes, a diferencia de otros años, detectamos que este (f)actor China parece tener menos gancho en estos comicios, pese a su importancia en múltiples áreas de la política. Mientras los propios políticos, así como analistas y principales medios de comunicación, resaltan en primera instancia las relaciones entre Beijing y Taipéi (y sus diferencias en cómo gestionarlas), los jóvenes taiwaneses declaran su hastío frente al monopolio de la geopolítica y el poco espacio para la política doméstica, convirtiéndose según el New York Times, en el principal joker de estas elecciones. Lev Nachman, profesor de la Universidad Nacional de Chengchi, compartía el «curioso» resultado de una de las múltiples encuestas que está llevando a cabo en las últimas semanas: un 57% de los participantes declaraban estar más preocupados por resultar heridos debido a accidentes de tráfico que por un ataque de Beijing.Eclipsadas por múltiples escándalos y escenarios dramáticos – desde el inicio del #MeToo taiwanés y su impacto en los diferentes partidos, hasta la efímera candidatura de solo dos meses de Terry Gou, fundador de Foxconn, pasando por la ruptura televisada de la alianza entre los principales partidos de la oposición tras apenas 72 horas –, las preocupaciones domésticas han ocupado un espacio relativamente marginal dentro de los discursos de los candidatos, para frustración de muchos. A pesar de esta ausencia, según una encuesta realizada a más de 15.000 participantes por la revista Tianxia zazhi, las cuestiones económicas son consideradas la prioridad para la mayoría de los votantes, seguidas por la seguridad nacional y las relaciones con China. En concreto, los bajos salarios, la ralentización de la economía taiwanesa, el impacto de la inflación en el coste de vida y los altos precios de la vivencia en las principales ciudades son algunos de los elementos que más preocupan a los votantes. Otros temas, como la energía nuclear – que esconde otros debates como la autonomía energética o la transición ecológica de la isla – también han sido altamente controvertidos. Todo esto sin olvidar las cuestiones sociales, desde los derechos del colectivo LGBTI y los trabajadores migrantes hasta la pena de muerte o las decisiones reproductivas de las mujeres.Además, tras ocho años de mandato, el PDP también debe hacer frente al desgaste. El actual partido en el poder ha instrumentalizado las relaciones entre Beijing y Taipéi para zafarse de las críticas a su política doméstica, perdiendo parte del atractivo para muchos votantes. Pero, no es el único; el bipartidismo que ha marcado las tres décadas de democracia de Taiwán también empieza a mostrar signos de agotamiento. La emergencia del Partido Popular Taiwanés es justamente resultado de esta desilusión y frustración con los dos partidos tradicionales, siendo percibido como una alternativa capaz de traer un cambio político – al menos, aparentemente. En una de las elecciones más ajustadas de los últimos años, parece imposible predecir el resultado final. Pero, debido al poco margen entre los candidatos, esta fragmentación del voto también esconde otra incógnita: la (im)posibilidad de lograr una mayoría en el Yuan legislativo – el parlamento encargado de pasar las leyes y aceptar las nominaciones del presidente a otros cargos políticos-. Si bien se trata de un aspecto menos popular en los análisis publicados, su importancia será clave para definir el tono de las relaciones con Beijing, y dar respuesta a cuestiones fundamentales como el presupuesto de defensa y la compra de armamento, o a los principales problemas domésticos, como el precio de la vivienda. Es aquí donde el papel de esta tercera fuerza parlamentaria y las posibles coaliciones con los dos partidos tradicionales será más visible. Sea cual sea el resultado electoral, estos comicios nos dejarán una certeza: los taiwaneses expresarán claramente a sus políticos, a Beijing, a Washington y al resto del mundo qué futuro quieren, con las consecuentes reverberaciones regionales e internacionales, demostrando la resiliencia y dinamismo de su democracia.Palabras clave: Taiwán, elecciones, China, Beijing, geopolítica, Partido Democrático Progresista (PDP), Kuomintang (KMT), Partido Popular Taiwanés (PPT), desinformación, conflicto, estrechoTodas las publicaciones expresan las opiniones de sus autores/as y no reflejan necesariamente los puntos de vista de CIDOB como institución.

This document is based on the debates of the Santander-CIDOB Future Leaders Forum online session titled "Bridging the digital global governance gap: international cooperation and the regulation of emerging technologies" that took place on November 21st, 2023; and the video interviews with the selected young leaders from the Santander-CIDOB 35 under 35 List. The document is structured in two blocs: first, it introduces the current landscape of international digital cooperation and the key challenges to achieve a global framework to regulate technology; and second, it highlights three proposals for international digital cooperation identified by the participants. The text was finalized on December 21st, 2023.The rapid development of emerging technologies is driving unprecedented changes with profound implications for our societies. On the one hand, innovations such as artificial intelligence, including its generative capabilities, are welcomed by administrations, businesses, and citizens because of their promises of enormous opportunities, the potential solution to global challenges and the positive transformation of our societies. These technological innovations are already being used by governments and businesses alike. AI is increasingly considered as a common good, with the potential to help us in decision-making processes, improving efficiency and service delivery and addressing some of the global challenges, such as climate change or pandemic prevention. On the other hand, the swift progress is also filled with risks, including challenges to fundamental rights, which need to be prevented if possible and mitigated if not. While some of these risks are still unknown, it has become evident that societies cannot afford the cost of not regulating these technologies. The potential disruption of established social structures, rising inequality, the concentration of power in digital companies, the material and social costs linked to new technologies, threats to fundamental rights – such as privacy or freedom of expression – and the increase of cyber threats are some of the reasons why regulation is imperative. This situation has become evident in the past years, with renewed enthusiasm and hyperactivity in the governance of digital technologies alongside the development of multiple initiatives to promote international cooperation in digital and technological issues. However, the ever-changing landscape of emerging and disruptive technologies has evidenced the lack of global governance and international cooperation frameworks capable of responding to the challenges arising from these developments, with many of these initiatives only finding traction in a reactive – rather than proactive – manner. Additionally, as the United Nations highlights, there are still many gaps in global digital cooperation, with multiple areas of digital governance and new technologies still unregulated. Moreover, in those areas where some progress has been achieved, it has been at the cost of fragmentation and voluntary frameworks. Thus, a new push towards global digital cooperation is more needed than ever, especially in a complex context characterised by permacrises, security instability and growing conflict, changing globalisation patterns, and the erosion of democratic governance.1. What is global digital cooperation?In May 2020, as the world was grappling with the impact of the coronavirus pandemic, the United Nations Secretary-General published a report aimed at establishing a Roadmap for Digital Cooperation. This effort, which signals the relevance of digital technologies for rethinking the role of effective multilateralism, aimed to identify a set of five areas – such as the digital economy or the protection of human rights in cyberspace – where the international community should collaborate and cooperate with regards to the use of digital technologies while, at the same time, reducing and mitigating potential risks. One of these five key areas is fostering global digital cooperation, which is defined as a multi-stakeholder effort in which governmental actors and other stakeholders, including the private sector, technology companies, civil society, or academia, among others, jointly work to achieve an interoperable framework for digital technologies. This approach aims to guarantee the adoption of effective, inclusive, and practical solutions and policies in the digital and technological domains (UN, 2020, p. 22).The prioritisation of global digital cooperation within the UN framework was further emphasised under the Secretary-General report in 2021, titled Our Common Agenda. This document invoked the adoption of a Global Digital Compact based on shared principles for an "open, free and secure digital future for all" for the first time (p. 63). Between 2022 and 2023, negotiations between member states and consultations with relevant stakeholders have advanced within the UN with the ambition to avoid the fragmentation of the internet, increase digital connectivity, build trust within cyberspace and promote the regulation of artificial intelligence. The culmination of this process will be the adoption of the Global Digital Compact during the 2024 Summit of the Future. However, the UN hasn't been the sole institution promoting new initiatives of global digital cooperation. Indeed, the unprecedented irruption of generative AI at the end of 2022 set off a global – but also uncoordinated – push towards regulation, with significant advances in technical and standard-setting procedures and around social and ethical aspects of AI. Initiatives by other international organisations, like the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD); plurilateral agreements such as the Bletchley Declaration on security risks of AI adopted by 30 countries – including China – during the United Kingdom's AI Safety Summit in 2023; as well as regulations at national level and guidelines by private actors are rapidly proliferating. The most recent example is the G-7 adoption of the Hiroshima AI Process Comprehensive Policy Framework in December 2023, which includes guiding principles for the development of AI systems (keeping a whole life-cycle approach, from design to deployment and use), and a code of conduct with multiple recommendations for developers and users, with an explicit focus on disinformation, as well as project-based cooperation. The European Union (EU) has been at the forefront of many of these efforts, aiming to provide the world's first comprehensive legislation with solid standards in AI. The AI Act represents an act of "courage", which will establish a series of technical standards, but it will also create moral ones. Through a de-risking approach to regulation, this initiative aims to identify some no-go zones in dthe development, deployment, and use of AI technologies – especially for those considered high-risk. In December 2023, the European Parliament and the European Council reached a provisional agreement on the AI Act, which will be ratified in early 2024.The EU's AI Act is the latest addition to Brussels' arsenal of digital regulations, including the Digital Services Act (DSA) and Digital Markets Act (DMA). In 2022, the EU also adopted the Declaration on European Digital Rights, proposing a digital transition defined by European values and six principles, including a people-centric approach, solidarity and inclusion, freedom of choice, sustainability, safety and security, and participation. Moreover, the EU has also adopted further legislation in highly specialised domains, such as the management of crypto assets, with the adoption of the Markets in Crypto-Assets Regulation (MICA) in 2023. Concurrently, the EU and the United States have strengthened cooperation on standards and technical underpinnings of regulation through the Trade and Technology Council. These elements are setting the framework for the future development of the data economy, the European industry, and the digital future of Europe – but with potential expansion beyond European borders, reminiscing the 'Brussels Effect' after the adoption of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). Cities are another actor of utmost relevance. While local governance is embedded and affected by national regulations, cities are also key players in experimentation, cross-border collaboration, and regulation. Trying to close the global governance gap, local governments are also adopting their own regulation – such as AI strategies or public procurement clauses sensitive to elements such as human rights – and even implementing bans on specific applications, including facial recognition technologies. One of the successful examples of good practices on AI governance at this level is the adoption of AI registries by cities such as Helsinki or Amsterdam to ensure transparency and accountability.However, no actor – country, organisation or forum - has become the centre for digital cooperation and technology regulation. While no single approach can address the multiple global challenges of emerging technologies given the transnational nature of the digital and cyber domains, as well as growing digital interdependence, what these examples show is how the current governance landscape is fragmented, nationally and internationally (Fay, 2022). Furthermore, there is a considerable overlap between the different initiatives, regulations and mechanisms addressing digital issues. This creates a highly complex architecture for coordination and cooperation without the certainty of its effectiveness (UN, 2019).2. What are the challenges to adopt an effective global governance framework to regulate emerging technologies?While there have been increasing calls from different stakeholders to adopt a global approach in the regulations of these technologies, especially AI, it is important to ask why we have failed to do so until now.Firstly, given the transnational nature of digital issues alongside the velocity of technological change and development, it is difficult to rely on traditional forms of governance based on sovereignty and territoriality to regulate technology. Our current tools and structures for regulation are insufficiently agile and lack the flexibility to ensure adaptation to future challenges, needs and unknown risks (Wheeler, 2023). Indeed, in the regulation of technologies, deep, continuous international collaboration will be fundamental to adapt to groundbreaking developments and ensure that adopted regulations do not foreclose the opportunity for civil society and latecomer countries to get their perspectives on the table. Moreover, the multidimensional impact of digital technologies cuts across different policy issues which are managed by different governmental structures or international organisations. The lack of a global institution with a substantive mandate to develop a policy model or regulation of technology that is truly universal further complicates the efforts to adopt a global framework for cooperation.Secondly, there has been a lack of consensus on critical and baseline issues. Taking the example of artificial intelligence, the first of these barriers has been the lack of consensus in such fundamental issues such as its definition, the venue or process that is desirable for the governance of disrupting technologies, the authority and responsibility of actors involved in regulation – including the role of the private sector and big tech – or the digital future (a more utopian or a dystopian one?) that we imagine (Colomina, 2023). This lack of consensus is also visible in the lack of a shared understanding of how basic foundations and principles of international law apply to the use of technologies by different actors. As such, there is a lack of focus and agreement on what we are regulating, which tools we have or should create or which areas we should prioritise in global cooperation.Thirdly, past efforts to adopt a global framework have failed given the diversity of interests, values, or approaches to risks. Regulation faces an inherent tension between the promotion and defence of national interests and values, the balance of ethical issues and human rights and fundamental freedoms protection for every citizen. In other words, it is a tension between protecting rights and promoting innovation. A clear example is the more consumer-oriented approach of EU regulation of technologies, which contrasts with the security and control-focused Chinese model or the US' laissez-faire. According to Tiberghien, Luo and Pourmalek (2022) digital governance is fragmenting around the US, European, Chinese and Indian models – marked by multiple splits on the role of state, data ownership, industrial innovation and competitiveness, and protection and fundamental rights. In contrast, there is a significant disparity between the actors involved in global digital cooperation. Developing countries, for example, are still facing significant digital divides and may lack the resources for a successful participation in some of these debates and initiatives, being then forced to follow systems that do not fit their realities, concerns or needs. A similar trend is also visible in a more individual perspective, where non-experts, indigenous communities, women, youth and elderly, and people with disabilities are not able to join the discussions or may lack the capacity to participate in a meaningful way. Fourthly, the most evident challenge is the growing trend of politicization and securitization of digital technologies and its intersection with growing geopolitical rivalries between the United States and China. Together with the European Union and India, these actors are bidding to achieve technological supremacy and dominate the standard setting of these technologies in order to harvest the benefits of their development and use. In parallel, each jurisdiction is becoming wary over the risks from data and digital technologies, prompting the adoption of more protectionist measures to achieve data sovereignty. The centrality of technology in their competition heavily influences the capability to reach consensus on international standards while promoting contrasting approaches to regulate digital issues.The lack of a coherent, global approach is unsettling the international order in digital governance and negatively impacting the delivery of effective and innovative solutions for the governance of digital and technological issues. This situation has consequential risks, such as the splintering of the Internet or the incapacity of successfully responding to critical problems, given the failure to conduct a comprehensive and in-depth assessment of multiple risks, vulnerabilities, and outcomes of digital and technological developments. The different rules and regulations – as well as the existing gaps, for example, the military use of these technologies – can have deep impacts on governance and, as a result, on citizens' lives. And, while paradoxically, guidelines and regulations are more needed than ever in the current context.3. Towards an effective global digital cooperationTaking into consideration the challenges of establishing a set of shared values to guide technology development and deployment, global digital cooperation should be people-centered, transparent, open, ethical, inclusive, and equitable while keeping in mind the multi-level, multi-issue and multi-stakeholder nature of digital and tech governance.Considering the current challenges and developments, the international community should focus on making progress in three different areas: Meaningful multi-stakeholderism The recent hyperactivity in digital advances shows the tension and interplay between two different cultures of governance: a bottom-up multistakeholder approach, for example in the open consultation processes adopted by the UN for the Global Digital Compact, as well as a top-down multilateral approach that still gives primacy to the role of states. However, even in these multistakeholder initiatives, the current objective is a multilateral solution for a better tomorrow – which implies the subordination of multistakeholder processes to multilateral solutions.As a result, the emphasis must be placed on achieving meaningful multi-stakeholderism while upholding inclusivity and effective participation. Current efforts at regulating these technologies are being led and dominated by traditional technological powerhouses – such as the US, the EU or China–, creating a highly specialized conversation with a small pool of countries alongside a small pool of big tech companies. Countries from the Global South are mostly absent or overlooked in ongoing processes. As such, adopted international agreements may not be fit for purpose for non-Western realities.Besides more representative global cooperation in terms of geography, the different actors involved – governmental representatives, civil society actors, academia and the private sector – should have the opportunity to participate and influence the conversations on an equal footing. Diversity of genders, generations, and underrepresented communities – including most vulnerable populations, indigenous communities, and people with disabilities – must also see their participation ensured. This is also especially relevant when addressing and ensuring youth participation – as the decisions taken today will ultimately define their future. Each of these groups can bring a unique perspective to the table and, through communication and trust-building measures, these initiatives can help build consensus and common understandings, and identify shared challenges and risks. In sum, democratic and participatory elements must be incorporated into the governance of technology on national and international levels.Ensuring interoperability across regulatory frameworks and enforcementThe current hyperactivity in the international landscape risks creating a patchwork approach with too many loopholes that allow easy forum shopping. As a result, the most urgent task at hand is the need for coordination. Feedback loops should be established between ad hoc, regional and international initiatives to avoid duplication, overlapping – and contradicting – efforts. As Internet governance is a cross-cutting issue, the current siloed governance should be connected to accurately address and respond to related issues around digital technologies that cross borders, topics, rights, and regulations. As such, for a truly comprehensive and harmonised regulatory framework, intergovernmental processes and global multilateral forums should be aligned, with a clear division of labour and consistency when it comes to the rules that apply to the work of these forums. One of the main concerns and challenges of the current efforts is the need to ensure policy coordination, the interoperability of regulations and the consequent protection of citizens who could be subjected to different jurisprudential criteria depending on applicable legislation. By building international frameworks grounded in consensus-adopted shared values, different jurisdictions should be committed to following this leadership by the international community while retaining enough flexibility to develop regimes tailored to their domestic environments. This can be further encouraged through capacity-building initiatives in the digital and cyber domains at a global level, using cooperation to assist countries with practical insights on regulation and implementation. Moreover, further collaboration through bringing legal expertise and knowledge will be necessary to support other countries in transposing international agreements and standards in their own legislations as well as its implementation and enforcement.Finally, a further challenge will be how to fulfil the promises made in regulations to safeguard rights effectively. Enforcement and sanctioning will be a requirement for the international community and, as such, these international agreements need to become binding. The development of global, joint enforcement mechanisms and a sanctions framework for those who fail to comply should also be part of global digital cooperation debates and efforts. However, while regulation is a fundamental first step, it is important to acknowledge that it is not enough to produce the desired change of cooperation and risk mitigation of emerging technologies. Previous experiences, such as the GDPR, offer relevant insights into the limitations of regulation to promote a shift in business models or different Internet behaviour. While the GDPR established clear obligations on the processing of personal data by operators, some have managed to circumvent or avoid these obligations. The €1.2 billion fine to Meta for violating the data privacy rules established in the GDPR is a clear example of how enforcement is not working. As such, other creative and innovative approaches should be considered – including the establishment of a new, digital social contract. Going beyond regulationBesides the challenges of interoperability and enforcement, global digital cooperation should extend beyond regulation. The unequal development and adoption of technologies around the world and the knowledge of these issues require further research and the development of capacity-building actions. Sharing best practices, promoting training for public administrations and the private sector, and ensuring the exchange of knowledge will be key to ensuring that the benefits of these technological changes are equally shared. In parallel, regulations should also be coupled with awareness-raising campaigns, to ensure that citizens, users, and developers are aware of their rights and responsibilities under these new frameworks.Secondly, given the unpredictable risks and impacts of these disruptive technologies, it is crucial to establish common safe spaces for experimental development, including sandboxes, funded by public bodies. The deployment of these spaces can help us identify and understand in the early stages of the development process the risks of specific technologies, but also, to test the effectiveness of regulations. Furthermore, these spaces will be useful in risk assessments. Adopting standards – based on a value-sensitive design and participatory approaches – for assessing the impact of these technologies before they are deployed in the market will test their respect for human rights and limit their negative externalities.Thirdly, global digital cooperation needs to provide public global goods and technological solutions for all. Government involvement can further enhance innovation, adopting a supporter investor and early customer role for these technological advancements. As such, countries should invest and develop open, shared digital public infrastructure – from computing power to democratically and justly governed data layers –, to boost global digital connectivity, and ensure that it is accessible for entrepreneurs and citizens. More critically, technological transfer will also be key between developed, emerging, and developing countries to leverage the opportunities of digital technologies and close the digital divide.Finally, one ambitious proposal concerns the need to establish new effective and flexible institutions of global governance that manage the profound changes that digital technologies pose for our societies. From international agencies to monitor and verify compliance, to global advisory bodies for truly multistakeholder and all-inclusive processes, public participation must be ensured to build the foundations of the future and take ownership of the governance of the unprecedented transformations for our societies.ReferencesColomina, Carme. "Una IA ética: la UE y la gobernanza algorítmica". CIDOB Opinion, 784 (December 2023). (online) https://www.cidob.org/es/publicaciones/serie_de_publicacion/opinion_cidob/2023/una_ia_etica_la_ue_y_la_gobernanza_algoritmicaFay, Robert. "Global Governance of Data and Digital Technologies: A Framework for Peaceful Cooperation". Center for International Governance Innovation (CIGI), February 2022. (online) https://www.cigionline.org/articles/global-governance-of-data-and-digital-technologies-a-framework-for-peaceful-cooperation/Tiberghien, Yves; Luo, Danielle and Pourmalek, Panthea. "Existential Gap: Digital/AI Acceleration and the Missing Global Governance Capacity". Center for International Governance Innovation (CIGI), February 2022 (online). https://www.cigionline.org/articles/existential-gap-digitalai-acceleration-and-the-missing-global-governance-capacity/United Nations (UN). Report of the Secretary-General's High-level Panel on Digital Cooperation. International Governance Forum, 2019 (online). https://intgovforum.org/en/content/report-of-the-un-secretary-general%E2%80%99s-high-level-panel-on-digital-cooperationUN. Report of the Secretary-General: Roadmap for Digital Cooperation. New York: United Nations, May 2020 (online). https://www.un.org/techenvoy/sites/www.un.org.techenvoy/files/general/Roadmap_for_Digital_Cooperation_9June.pdfUN. Report of the Secretary-General: Our Common Agenda. New York: United Nations, 2021 (online).https://www.un.org/en/content/common-agenda-report/assets/pdf/Common_Agenda_Report_English.pdfWheeler, Tom. "The three challenges of AI regulation" Brookings Commentary, June 2023 (online). https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-three-challenges-of-ai-regulation/

This document is based on the debates of the Santander-CIDOB Future Leaders Forum online session titled "Bridging the digital global governance gap: international cooperation and the regulation of emerging technologies" that took place on November 21st, 2023; and the video interviews with the selected leaders from the Santander-CIDOB 35 under 35 List. The document is structured in three blocs: first, it introduces the current landscape of international digital cooperation, second, it identifies the key challenges to achieve a global framework to regulate technology; and finally, it highlights three proposals for international digital cooperation identified by the participants. The text was finalized on December 21st, 2023.The rapid development of emerging technologies is driving unprecedented changes with profound implications for our societies. On the one hand, innovations such as Artificial Intelligence (AI), including its generative capabilities, are welcomed by public administrations, businesses, and citizens because they bear the promise of enormous opportunities, the potential to help solve global challenges and the positive transformation of our societies. In fact, these technological innovations are already being used by governments and businesses alike. Indeed, AI is increasingly considered a common good, with the potential to help us in decision-making processes, improving efficiency and service delivery, and addressing some of the global challenges, such as climate change or pandemic prevention. On the other hand, this swift progress is filled with risks which need to be prevented if possible and mitigated if not. While some of these risks are still unknown, it has become evident that societies cannot afford the cost of not regulating these technologies. The potential disruption of established social structures, rising inequality, the concentration of power in digital companies, the material and social costs linked to new technologies, threats to fundamental rights – such as privacy or freedom of expression – and the increase of cyber threats are some of the reasons why regulation is imperative. This situation has become evident in the past years, with renewed enthusiasm and hyperactivity in the governance of digital technologies alongside the development of multiple initiatives to promote international cooperation in digital and technological areas. However, the ever-changing landscape of emerging and disruptive technologies has evidenced the lack of global governance and international cooperation frameworks capable of responding to the challenges arising from these developments, with many of these initiatives only finding traction in a reactive – rather than proactive – manner. Additionally, as the United Nations highlights, there are many gaps in global digital cooperation, with multiple areas of digital governance and new technologies still unregulated. Moreover, in areas where some progress has been achieved, it has been at the cost of fragmentation and voluntary frameworks. Thus, a new push towards global digital cooperation is more needed than ever, especially in a complex context characterised by permacrises, growing conflict, changing globalisation patterns, and the erosion of democratic governance.1. What is global digital cooperation?In May 2020, as the world was grappling with the impact of the coronavirus pandemic, the United Nations Secretary-General published a report to establish a Roadmap for Digital Cooperation. This effort, which signals the relevance of digital technologies for rethinking the role of effective multilateralism, aimed to identify a set of five areas where the international community should collaborate and cooperate regarding the use of digital technologies while, at the same time, reducing and mitigating potential risks. One of these five key areas is fostering global digital cooperation, which is defined as a multi-stakeholder effort in which governmental actors and other stakeholders, including the private sector, technology companies, civil society, or academia, jointly work to achieve an interoperable framework for digital technologies. This approach aims to guarantee the adoption of effective, inclusive, and practical solutions and policies in the digital and technological domains (UN, 2020, p. 22). The prioritisation of global digital cooperation within the UN framework was further emphasised under the Secretary-General report in 2021, titled Our Common Agenda. This document invoked the adoption of a Global Digital Compact based on shared principles for an "open, free and secure digital future for all" for the first time (p. 63). Between 2022 and 2023, negotiations between member states and consultations with relevant stakeholders have advanced within the UN with the intention to avoid the fragmentation of the Internet, increase digital connectivity, build trust within cyberspace and promote the regulation of Artificial Intelligence. The culmination of this process will be the adoption of the Global Digital Compact during the 2024 Summit of the Future. However, the UN hasn't been the sole institution promoting new initiatives of global digital cooperation. Indeed, the unprecedented irruption of generative AI at the end of 2022 set off a global – although uncoordinated – push towards regulation, with significant advances in technical and standard-setting procedures and around social and ethical aspects of AI. Initiatives by other international organisations, like the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD); plurilateral agreements such as the Bletchley Declaration on security risks of AI adopted by 30 countries – including China – during the United Kingdom's AI Safety Summit in 2023; as well as regulations at national level and guidelines by private actors are rapidly proliferating. The most recent example is the G-7 adoption of the Hiroshima AI Process Comprehensive Policy Framework in December 2023, which includes guiding principles for the development of AI systems and a code of conduct with multiple recommendations for developers and users, with an explicit focus on disinformation, as well as project-based cooperation. The European Union (EU) has been at the forefront of many of these efforts, aiming to provide the world's first comprehensive legislation with solid standards in AI. The AI Act represents an act of 'courage', which will establish a series of technical standards, but it will also create moral ones. Through a de-risking approach to regulation, this initiative aims to identify some no-go zones in the development, deployment, and use of AI technologies – especially for those considered high-risk. In December 2023, the European Parliament and the European Council reached a provisional agreement on the AI Act, which will be ratified in early 2024.The EU's AI Act is the latest addition to Brussels' arsenal of digital regulations, including the Digital Services Act (DSA) and Digital Markets Act (DMA). In 2022, the EU adopted the Declaration on European Digital Rights, proposing a digital transition defined by European values and six principles, including a people-centric approach, solidarity and inclusion, freedom of choice, sustainability, safety and security, and participation. Moreover, the EU has also adopted further legislation in highly specialised domains, such as the management of crypto assets, with the adoption of the Markets in Crypto-Assets Regulation (MICA) in 2023. Concurrently, the EU and the United States have strengthened cooperation on standards and technical underpinnings of regulation through the Trade and Technology Council (TTC). These elements are setting the framework for the future development of the data economy, the European industry, and the digital future of Europe – but with potential expansion beyond European borders, reminiscing the 'Brussels Effect' after the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) adoption. Cities are another actor of utmost relevance. While local governance is embedded and affected by national regulations, cities are also key players in experimentation, cross-border collaboration, and regulation. Trying to close the global governance gap, local governments are also adopting their own frameworks – such as AI strategies or public procurement clauses sensitive to human rights – and implementing bans on specific applications, including facial recognition technologies. One of the successful examples of good practices on AI governance at this level is the adoption of AI registries by cities such as Helsinki or Amsterdam to ensure transparency and accountability. However, no actor – country, organisation or forum - has become the centre for digital cooperation and technology regulation. While no single approach can address the multiplicity of global challenges of emerging technologies given the transnational nature of the digital and cyber domains, as well as growing digital interdependence, what these examples show is how the current governance landscape is fragmented, nationally and internationally (Fay, 2022). Furthermore, there is a considerable overlap between the different initiatives, regulations and mechanisms addressing digital issues. This creates a highly complex architecture for coordination and cooperation without the certainty of its effectiveness (UN, 2019).2. What are the challenges to adopt an effective global governance framework to regulate emerging technologies?While there have been increasing calls from different stakeholders to adopt a global approach in the regulations of these technologies, especially AI, it is important to ask why we have failed to do so until now.Firstly, given the transnational nature of digital issues alongside the speed of technological change and development, it is challenging to rely on traditional forms of governance based on sovereignty and territoriality to regulate technology. Our current tools and structures for regulation are insufficiently agile and lack the flexibility to ensure adaptation to future challenges, needs and unknown risks (Wheeler, 2023). Indeed, deep, continuous international collaboration will be fundamental to adapt to groundbreaking developments and ensure that adopted frameworks do not foreclose the opportunity for civil society and latecomer actors to get their perspectives on the table. Moreover, the multidimensional impact of digital technologies cuts across different policy issues managed by different governmental structures or international organisations. The lack of a global institution with a substantive mandate to develop a policy model or regulation of technology that is truly universal further complicates the efforts to adopt a global framework for cooperation.Secondly, there has been a lack of consensus on critical and baseline issues. Taking the example of artificial intelligence, the first of these barriers has been the lack of consensus in such fundamental issues such as its definition, the venue or process that is desirable for the governance of disrupting technologies, the authority and responsibility of actors involved in regulation – including the role of the private sector and big tech – or the digital future (a more utopian or a dystopian one?) that we imagine (Colomina, 2023). This absence of consensus is also visible in the lack of a shared understanding by different actors of how basic foundations and principles of international law apply to the use of technologies. As such, there is a mismatch of focus and agreement on what we are regulating, which tools we have or should create or which areas we should prioritise in global cooperation.Thirdly, past efforts to adopt a global framework have failed given the diversity of interests, values, or approaches to risks. Regulation faces an inherent tension between the promotion and defence of national interests and values, the balance of ethical issues and human rights and the protection of the fundamental freedoms of every citizen. In other words, it is a tension between protecting rights and promoting innovation. A clear example is the more consumer-oriented approach of EU regulation of technologies, which contrasts with the security and control-focused Chinese model or the US' laissez-faire. According to Tiberghien, Luo and Pourmalek (2022) digital governance is fragmenting around the US, European, Chinese and Indian models – marked by multiple splits on the role of state, data ownership, industrial innovation and competitiveness, and protection and fundamental rights. In contrast, there is a significant disparity of substantive participation between the actors involved in global digital cooperation. Developing countries, for example, are still facing significant digital divides and may lack the resources for a successful participation in some of these debates and initiatives, being then forced to follow systems that do not fit their realities, concerns or needs. A similar trend is also visible in a more individual-focused perspective, where non-experts, indigenous communities, women, youth and elderly, and people with disabilities are not able to join the discussions or may lack the capacity to participate in a meaningful way. Fourthly, the most evident challenge is the growing trend of politicisation and securitisation of digital technologies and its intersection with growing geopolitical rivalries between the United States and China. Together with the EU and India, these actors are bidding to achieve technological supremacy and to dominate the standard setting of these technologies to harvest the benefits of their development and use. In parallel, each jurisdiction is becoming wary of the risks from data and digital technologies, prompting the adoption of more protectionist measures to achieve data sovereignty. The centrality of technology in their competition heavily influences the capability to reach a consensus on international standards while promoting contrasting approaches to regulate digital issues.In conclusion, the lack of a coherent, global approach is unsettling the international order in digital governance and negatively impacting the delivery of effective and innovative solutions for the governance of digital and technological issues. This situation has consequential risks, such as the splintering of the Internet or the incapacity of successfully responding to critical problems, given the failure to conduct a comprehensive and in-depth assessment of multiple risks, vulnerabilities, and outcomes of digital and technological developments. The different rules and regulations – as well as the existing gaps, for example, the military use of these technologies – can have deep impacts on governance and, as a result, on citizens' lives. Paradoxically, guidelines and regulations are more needed than ever in the current context.3. Towards an effective global digital cooperationTaking into consideration the challenges of establishing a set of shared values to guide technology development and deployment, global digital cooperation should be people-centered, transparent, open, ethical, inclusive, and equitable while keeping in mind the multi-level, multi-issue and multi-stakeholder nature of digital and tech governance.Considering the current challenges and developments, the international community should focus on making progress in three different areas: Meaningful multi-stakeholderism The recent digital advances show the tension and interplay between two different cultures of governance: a bottom-up multi-stakeholder approach – for example, in the open consultation processes adopted by the UN for the Global Digital Compact – and a top-down multilateral approach which gives primacy to the role of states. However, even in these multi-stakeholder initiatives, the current objective is a multilateral solution for a better tomorrow, implying the subordination of multi-stakeholder processes to multilateral solutions.As a result, the emphasis must be placed on achieving meaningful multi-stakeholderism while upholding inclusivity and effective participation. Current efforts at regulating these technologies are being led and dominated by traditional technological powerhouses – such as the US, the EU or China–, creating a highly specialised conversation with a limited number of countries alongside a small pool of big tech companies. Countries from the Global South are mostly absent or overlooked in ongoing regulatory processes. As such, adopted international agreements may not be suitable for non-Western realities.Besides more a representative global cooperation in terms of geography, the different actors involved – governmental representatives, civil society actors, academia and the private sector – should have the opportunity to participate and influence the conversations on an equal footing. Diversity of genders, generations, and underrepresented communities – including most vulnerable populations, indigenous communities, and people with disabilities – must have their participation ensured. This is also especially relevant when addressing and ensuring youth participation – as the decisions taken today will ultimately define their future. Each of these groups can bring a unique perspective to the table and, through communication and trust-building measures, these initiatives can help build consensus and common understandings, and identify shared challenges and risks. In conclusion, the governance of technology must incorporate democratic and participatory elements on national and international levels.Ensuring interoperability across regulatory frameworks and enforcementThe current hyperactivity in the international landscape risks creating a patchwork approach with too many loopholes that allow easy forum shopping. As a result, the most urgent task at hand is the need for coordination. Feedback loops should be established between ad hoc, regional and international initiatives to avoid duplication, overlapping – and contradicting – efforts. As Internet governance is a cross-cutting issue, the current siloed governance should be connected to accurately address and respond to related issues around digital technologies that cross borders, topics, rights, and regulations. As such, for a truly comprehensive and harmonised regulatory framework, intergovernmental processes and global multilateral forums should be aligned, with a clear division of labour and consistency when it comes to the rules that apply to the work of these forums. Beyond ensuring policy coordination, two further concerns and challenges that arise from current efforts are the interoperability of regulations and the consequent protection of citizens who could be subjected to different jurisprudential criteria depending on applicable legislation. By building international frameworks grounded in consensus-adopted shared values, different jurisdictions should be committed to following this leadership by the international community while retaining enough flexibility to develop regimes tailored to their domestic environments. This can be further encouraged through capacity-building initiatives in the digital and cyber domains at a global level, using cooperation to assist countries with practical insights on regulation and implementation. Moreover, further collaboration through bringing legal expertise and knowledge will be necessary to support other countries in transposing international agreements and standards in their own legislations as well as its implementation and enforcement.Finally, a further challenge will be how to fulfil the promises made in regulations to safeguard rights effectively. Enforcement and sanctioning will be a requirement for the international community. As such, these international agreements need to become binding. The development of global, joint enforcement mechanisms and a sanctions framework for those who fail to comply should also be part of global digital cooperation debates and efforts.Going beyond regulationBesides the challenges of interoperability and enforcement, global digital cooperation should extend beyond regulation. While regulation is a fundamental first step, it is important to acknowledge that it is not enough to produce the desired change of cooperation and risk mitigation of emerging technologies. Previous experiences, such as the GDPR, offer relevant insights into the limitations of regulation to promote a shift in business models or different Internet behaviour. While the GDPR established clear obligations on the processing of personal data by operators, some have managed to circumvent or avoid these obligations. The €1.2 billion fine to Meta for violating the data privacy rules established in the GDPR is a clear example of how enforcement is not working. As such, other creative and innovative approaches should be considered – including the establishment of a new, digital social contract.Moreover, the unequal development and adoption of technologies around the world and the knowledge of these issues require further research and the development of capacity-building actions. Sharing best practices, promoting training for public administrations and the private sector, and ensuring the exchange of knowledge will be essential to guarantee that the benefits of these technological changes are equally shared. Regulations should also be coupled with awareness-raising campaigns to ensure that citizens, users, and developers are aware of their rights and responsibilities under these new frameworks.Additionally, given the unpredictable risks and impacts of these disruptive technologies, it is crucial to establish common safe spaces for experimental development, including sandboxes, funded by public bodies. The deployment of these spaces can help us identify and understand in the early stages of the development process the risks of specific technologies, but also, to test the effectiveness of regulations. These spaces will be useful in risk assessments. Adopting standards based on a value-sensitive design and participatory approaches for assessing the impact of these technologies before they are deployed in the market will test their respect for human rights and limit their negative externalities.Furthermore, global digital cooperation needs to provide public global goods and technological solutions for all. Government involvement can further enhance innovation, adopting a supporter investor and early customer role for these technology advancements. As such, countries should invest and develop open, shared digital public infrastructure – from computing power to democratically and justly governed data layers –, to boost global digital connectivity and ensure it is accessible for entrepreneurs and citizens. More critically, technological transfer will also be key between developed, emerging, and developing countries to leverage the opportunities of digital technologies and close the digital divide.Finally, one ambitious proposal concerns the need to establish new effective and flexible institutions of global governance that manage the profound changes that digital technologies pose for our societies. From international agencies to monitor and verify compliance, to global advisory bodies for truly multi-stakeholder and all-inclusive processes, public participation must be ensured to build the foundations of the future and take ownership of the governance of the unprecedented transformations for our societies.ReferencesColomina, Carme. "Una IA ética: la UE y la gobernanza algorítmica". CIDOB Opinion, 784 (December 2023). (online) https://www.cidob.org/es/publicaciones/serie_de_publicacion/opinion_cidob/2023/una_ia_etica_la_ue_y_la_gobernanza_algoritmicaFay, Robert. "Global Governance of Data and Digital Technologies: A Framework for Peaceful Cooperation". Center for International Governance Innovation (CIGI), February 2022. (online) https://www.cigionline.org/articles/global-governance-of-data-and-digital-technologies-a-framework-for-peaceful-cooperation/Tiberghien, Yves; Luo, Danielle and Pourmalek, Panthea. "Existential Gap: Digital/AI Acceleration and the Missing Global Governance Capacity". Center for International Governance Innovation (CIGI), February 2022 (online). https://www.cigionline.org/articles/existential-gap-digitalai-acceleration-and-the-missing-global-governance-capacity/United Nations (UN). Report of the Secretary-General's High-level Panel on Digital Cooperation. International Governance Forum, 2019 (online). https://intgovforum.org/en/content/report-of-the-un-secretary-general%E2%80%99s-high-level-panel-on-digital-cooperationUN. Report of the Secretary-General: Roadmap for Digital Cooperation. New York: United Nations, May 2020 (online). https://www.un.org/techenvoy/sites/www.un.org.techenvoy/files/general/Roadmap_for_Digital_Cooperation_9June.pdfUN. Report of the Secretary-General: Our Common Agenda. New York: United Nations, 2021 (online).https://www.un.org/en/content/common-agenda-report/assets/pdf/Common_Agenda_Report_English.pdfWheeler, Tom. "The three challenges of AI regulation" Brookings Commentary, June 2023 (online). https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-three-challenges-of-ai-regulation/

SHARPEDEM-EU publication 4 (July 2024)This report is the first in a series of articles investigating the role of 12 non-EU external actors in the Eastern and Southern Neighbourhoods. These actors include the African Union, the Arab League, China, the Council of Europe, the Norh Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), Russia, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, the United Nations, the United Kingdom and the United States of America. Conducted within the framework of SHAPEDEM-EU Project, this mapping exercise aims at providing a better understanding of these actors' discursive and behavioural practices in the realms of democracy support, democracy prevention, autocracy support and autocracy promotion in both neighbourhoods. As defined in the SHAPEDEM-EU Concepts Manual practices refer to socially meaningful performed patterns of action that represent and impact knowledge, discourse and activities in and on the real world. Practices can be distinguished "between discursive practices (e.g., essential narratives) and behavioural practices (e.g., activities in a specific field of practices)" (Achrainer and Pace, 2024, p. 24). Below, we present a concise overview of the main findings gleaned from the twelve case studies.

CIDOB Report nº 11On the tenth anniversary of the launch of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in 2023, the Global South's importance to China is clearer than ever in its efforts to promote a multipolarinternational system and its desire to lead the challenge to the liberal international order, against a backdrop of greater geopolitical competition with the United States.Given these new dynamics reshaping international geopolitics, this CIDOB Report examines the chief diplomatic and geoeconomic instruments that China uses in its relations with the Global South and explores how the countries that form part of this group perceive the Asian power. In order to conduct this analysis, the report takes a regional approach structured into seven geographical areas, shining a light on the changes and (in)consistencies in Chinese foreign policy in the last two decades.With the support of:

CIDOB Report nº 11On the tenth anniversary of the launch of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in 2023, the Global South's importance to China is clearer than ever in its efforts to promote a multipolar international system and its desire to lead the challenge to the liberal international order, against a backdrop of greater geopolitical competition with the United States.Given these new dynamics reshaping international geopolitics, this CIDOB Report examines the chief diplomatic and geoeconomic instruments that China uses in its relations with the Global South and explores how the countries that form part of this group perceive the Asian power. In order to conduct this analysis, the report takes a regional approach structured into seven geographical areas, shining a light on the changes and (in)consistencies in Chinese foreign policy in the last two decades.With the support of:

CIDOB Report nº 11En el décimo aniversario del lanzamiento de la Iniciativa de la Franja y la Ruta (BRI, por sus siglas en inglés) en 2023, la importancia del Sur Global para China es más evidente que nunca, en sus esfuerzos por promover un sistema internacional multipolar y su deseo de liderar el desafío al orden internacional liberal, en un contexto de mayor competición geopolítica con Estados Unidos. Ante estas nuevas dinámicas que están alterando la configuración geopolítica internacional, este CIDOB Report examina los principales elementos diplomáticos y geoeconómicos que China utiliza en su relación con el Sur Global, y explora cómo los países que lo componen perciben la potencia asiática. Para el análisis, la publicación adopta una aproximación regional estructurada en siete zonas geográficas, lo que permite visualizar los cambios e (in)consistencias de la política exterior china en las últimas dos décadas.Con el apoyo de:

This summary report is based on the main conclusions of two panel discussions on foreign policy held at CIDOB on September 21st, 2023, as part of the project "Japan and the EU: Global partners for a secure and open Indo-Pacific". The document assesses the changing international environment and its impact on relations between the European Union (EU) and Japan. It goes on to highlight two new forms of security – economic and information security – that are a cause of concern for both partners and which open up new possibilities for joint action. It concludes by noting the new cooperation dynamics between Tokyo and Brussels and what the future holds for them.I. IntroductionThe current international order is under challenge from a confluence of enduring trends the pace of which has been quickened more recently by a series of critical events that only underline the international system's shortcomings and contradictions.The first of these events was the COVID-19 pandemic, which provided multiple examples of the fragility of global supply chains and the dependence on manufactured goods imported from China, often essential goods. The pandemic acted as an accelerator for at least three major long-term trends that were already underway. The first of these was the confrontation between the major international powers, the United States and China. They went from being partners for development to considering themselves competitors and, on certain matters, systemic rivals. Some commentators say there was already an underlying trend towards decoupling prior to the pandemic, acknowledging that the Chinese market was looking to replace imports with local products (increasing the US or German trade deficit) and two independent digital spheres were forming, tethered to two diverging socio-political models (García-Herrero, 2023). The pandemic, however, saw the strategic contest over international ascendancy and shaping norms and alliances step up a notch.The trend towards the securitisation of technology and innovation has also gained momentum in the wake of the pandemic. This was clear during the race to create and produce a vaccine against the coronavirus. Nonetheless, both before – with the disputes over 5G networks or industrial espionage – and after – in the framework of what has been called the "chip war" – we witnessed the rise of an increasingly strategic association between big tech corporations and the security of states. Taiwan is a prime example. One single firm, the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC), acts as a deterrent to any potential invasion of the island because it alone dominates the global market for the most advanced chips. Recent international conflicts, first in Ukraine and more lately in Gaza, have hastened this trend towards the technologisation of economic, political and social relations. Cyberwarfare, drones, satellites and grassroots innovation (or lack thereof) are elements that can make the difference between victory and defeat. We are witnessing the new nature of "hybrid wars", those that combine physical military operations with cybernetic action. They are not only fought on the battlefield, rather they involve the mass use of disinformation or cyberattacks that seek to undermine the values of the adversary and the legitimacy of their political systems; or in the case of a war, undermine their confidence and operability. In this type of conflict, the aim is not so much victory but destabilisation (Bargués and Bourekba, 2022).As well as this technological offshoot, the two conflicts are reinforcing the self-image of what are termed the Global North and South, which resonates through the main debates on economic development, international justice or the fight against climate change. Several votes at the United Nations and the imposition of sanctions on Russia have revealed greater coordination of agendas around the narrative of the "decline of the West" and the realisation that there is scope to increase the gains of middle powers and transnational corporations.While Japan and the EU are different in nature (one is a regional actor, the other a state) they share common ground: democracy, respect for a multipolar, rules-based international order that is peaceful and prosperous, plus many of the challenges mentioned at the start of this paper.II. New security dynamics: disinformation and economic securityAgainst this backdrop of transformation of the international system and acceleration of the geopolitical competition, new forms of (in)security have appeared on the agendas of Japan and the EU, but also of other international powers like China, the United States or India. We are talking about disinformation and economic security, two increasingly central elements of Japan and the EU's conception of security.DisinformationThe rapid succession of technological breakthroughs of recent years, along with the growing development of artificial intelligence (AI), the digital transition and the rise of disinformation have laid bare the exploitation of new technology and the challenges it poses to the security and the future of states. In times of crisis, we have seen how disinformation becomes a "weapon of mass infoxication" on the margins of international law, which comes at a relatively low cost and prevents effective governance. Though not a new phenomenon – propaganda was crucial during the Cold War, for instance – viral media and the current porousness of social networks have amplified their potential as a weapon in the narrative war in the hands of external actors. The emergence of generative AI, moreover, not only raises the possibility of an "alternative account" of the facts, but rather enables credibly recreating the facts and even replacing them in people's perception of reality (through deep fakes). This threatens notions of truth and trust, which are essential to democratic governance and election processes.Unlike the EU and the United States, Japan has not been significantly exposed to outside interference in the shape of disinformation. But Tokyo considers this phenomenon a potential threat to national security and democratic health. Namely, the rise of generative AI could quickly break down some of the barriers, such as the language factor, which certain analysts had identified as having put a brake on the proliferation of this phenomenon on the archipelago (Kuwahara, 2022). Thus, in the framework of the National Security Strategy launched in late 2022 by the Kishida administration, Japan identified the challenge of the manipulation of information in situations of conflict and announced the adoption of countermeasures. The government is the chief instigator (top-down action) through coordination with its counterparts in other countries (government-to-government) and non-governmental actors.In the case of the EU, the destabilising effect of disinformation reached new heights during the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014. It is the reason why, nearly a decade ago now, its greater exposure to this type of campaign prompted Brussels to begin to pursue strategies to respond to this hybrid threat. Since then, Brussels has tried to tackle disinformation via a consumer-based rather than security-centred approach. Initially, the European Commission focused its efforts on controlling content rather than trying to regulate tech companies and the major platforms. That approach has shifted, however, with the realisation that the problem of disinformation is not so much the message as its replication and amplification. This shift in focus also counters one of the main risks of focusing on the message, which is that it jeopardises the right to freedom of expression. It is with this rationale that the Digital Services Act (DSA) entered into force in January 2024. It contains specific provisions to control algorithms, which are responsible for "clustering" potentially like-minded social media users, which in turn is key for the propagation of the message through information bubbles and echo chambers.Action that is limited exclusively to algorithmic governance, however, falls short in the face of the complexity of the sociopsychological processes involved in disinformation (Colomina, 2022). With that in mind, the EU has adopted a whole-of-society approach that recognises that it is essential to combine online action with offline measures – in the real world – that mitigate the inequalities, divisions and social fractures that disinformation thrives on. Thus, while the Japanese approach has prioritised government-to-government exchange, a more decentralised strategy prevails in Brussels, where other social sectors, such as journalists, fact checkers, researchers and civil society, play an extremely important role in lockstep with the efforts at the highest level. The EU's decentralised approach to confronting disinformation suits the fragmented media landscape of the 27 member states, which differs from the high degree of concentration in the case of Japan, where large print and television media are the main channels of information. Economic securityThe new dynamics of reglobalisation, coupled with a return to protectionist measures, the exploitation of interdependencies and economic coercion, are shaping a new global economic landscape in which open economies and interdependence have come to be seen as risks rather than factors of mutual security. Consequently, "economic security" is gaining ground in the national strategies of countries like Japan, one of its chief proponents. While there is no one single definition of economic security, nor of the areas it encompasses, in general terms it seeks to protect a national economy from external interference, minimising the impact of supply chain disruptions, dependence on certain products or the capacity for economic coercion in the hands of others to bring pressure to bear or influence domestic political decisions.Japan has been an early advocate of this concept, which, aside from its habit of putting forward terms that then become all the rage in strategic thinking, can be put down to its insular nature and its heavy dependence on imported commodities and natural resources. Starting in 2020, Tokyo has begun a process of institutionalising economic security through the creation of government positions assigned to this task, as well as the adoption of various legislative packages to ensure its defence. One of the main ones is the Economic Security Promotion Act of 2022, which rests on four key pillars: 1) strengthening supply chains, especially of critical raw materials, 2) security of critical and core infrastructure, 3) developing advanced technology and 4) a patent non-disclosure system. At the same time, Japan has transferred the concept to its bilateral relations – with the United States, South Korea or the United Kingdom – and the fora in which it participates, like the G7 or the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad). The G7 statement on economic resilience and economic security during the Hiroshima summit in May 2023 was particularly important. It was the first ever reference to the concept in the multilateral sphere, which is a measure of its consolidation on the agenda and in international cooperation.At the same time, these economic security initiatives are indirectly linked to Tokyo's proposal for a "Free and Open Indo-Pacific" (FOIP), a strategy unveiled in 2016 that aims to safeguard the rules-based international order, promote peace and shared prosperity, maritime and air security, and develop connectivity in the region. It is hard to disassociate this approach from Beijing's growing assertiveness in the South China Sea and the need to preserve freedom of navigation through this vital artery for Japan and the rest of the world, as approximately a third of global trade flows through it. Although the FOIP's principles of openness and inclusivity could be seen to be at odds with economic security – particularly given the economic rivalry between Beijing and Tokyo in the region – cooperation in this field depends on a free and open region, and vice versa. What is more, it is through greater development of connectivity and exchange with the countries of the region (including the ASEAN members and India) that Tokyo can diversify its trade portfolio and boost its economic resilience.The EU too has adopted the principle of economic security in the last year. Supply chain disruptions during the pandemic, the closure of the Russian gas tap after the invasion of Ukraine and the restriction on imports that China imposed on Lithuania following the opening of a representative office in Taiwan in 2021 are powerful incentives for the adoption of instruments to safeguard the EU's economic security. Among the various measures adopted, four types of mechanism stand out: 1) the revitalisation of industrial policy and the adoption of political initiatives to improve EU production capacity and productivity; 2) diversification and stockpiling efforts to reduce dependence on products and natural resources; 3) the adoption of measures to counter external mechanisms that give competitors the edge, such as anti-subsidy measures; and 4) tools devoted to strategic competition, like the anti-coercion instrument or controls on exports of certain products (Burguete, 2023). More recently, in January 2024, Brussels launched new initiatives aimed at reinforcing its Economic Security Strategy, put forward for the first time in June 2023. With a more geopolitical approach akin to that of Washington, Brussels is seeking tighter control over investments, greater coordination in the control of exports, investment for research into advanced technologies and the protection of innovation. It remains to be seen, however, to what extent the different member states will accept this new legislative package.We can say that Japan and the EU are adopting different, though complementary, mechanisms that can boost domestic capacities to address the challenges ahead of them. Yet, while we can note progress in the field of economic security – as we shall see below – cooperation in the field of disinformation remains at an earlier stage. There is, however, huge potential for bilateral cooperation, and there are powerful incentives for it.III. A new era of cooperation between Japan and the European Union?In the last two decades relations between the EU and Japan have been marked by a considerable degree of mutual understanding, with a predominance of economic matters, despite the trade tensions and conflicts towards the end of the 20th century. Yet this has yielded limited results in terms of joint initiatives and plans (Tanaka, 2013). In 2022, Japan was the EU's second biggest trading partner in Asia, behind China, and the seventh globally. That same year Japanese imports into the EU came to nearly €70bn, while EU exports the other way amounted to over €71.6bn (European Commission, 2023).As far as security is concerned, progress has been slow, fettered by Japan's constitutional constraints, which place restrictions on its military capabilities, and, on the European side, owing to its complex security framework and its partial overlap with NATO. Until a few years ago, cooperation in this area had been limited to "softer" forms of security such as antipiracy operations off Somalia. It is worth recalling that in the case of both the EU and Japan traditional security (the military aspect) falls to the United States, since both actors are eminently economic powers but lacking in comparable military might. They are, then, relations that on security matters are triangular rather than bilateral and cannot be understood without Washington.This has been no impediment to Brussels and Tokyo strengthening ties over the last few years, primarily on political and trade matters. In 2019, the two parties adopted the Japan-EU Economic Partnership Agreement, which lifted most of the tariffs existing between the two economies, and the Strategic Partnership Agreement, based on cooperation and the defence of shared values such as democracy, the rule of law, human rights or free trade. In the latter agreement, Japan and the EU identified the common threats of cybersecurity, natural disasters, terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and maritime (in)security. The two agreements established a framework that would cement political, security and development cooperation cast in liberal values to jointly uphold the rules-based international order.In this new phase of cooperation, security issues have gained importance because both actors perceive a greater interdependence and interconnection in their security. According to the Joint Statement of the Japan-EU Summit of July 2023, "the security of Europe and that of the Indo-Pacific are closely interlinked". And the facts appear to bear it out. Japan was one of the countries that did not hesitate to show its support for Ukraine following the Russian invasion of 2022, taking part in the international sanctions regime, as well as dispatching arms to Kyiv. Coordination with the EU in this field has been remarkable.If we look at the EU Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific released in 2021, Brussels also aspires to greater involvement in the security of the region in four main areas: maritime security, counterterrorism, cybersecurity and crisis management. However, despite European ambitions, there are differences over the commitment (economic and/or military) that the various member states would be willing to make in the Indo-Pacific. As often happens, European policy towards the region is the sum of the convergences and divergences of the member states. According to a survey by the European Council for Foreign Relations, 23 out of the 27 member states point to security as an important element of Europe's Indo-Pacific strategy. Yet only 12 would be interested in contributing to freedom of navigation operations and just 4 would commit warships to the region (Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands and Spain). It will also be important to consider NATO involvement in this area. In 2023, it submitted a proposal to open a civilian liaison office in Tokyo, an idea that was dropped largely due to French reluctance in the face of a possible response from China.Japan welcomes even limited European involvement in the region and this is in step with the growing interconnection between Europe's security and that of the Indo-Pacific. However, more coordination and communication among the various European and international actors in the region, especially in the military field, will be essential in order to avoid undesired tensions.Lastly, cooperation on economic security has acquired a more central position in recent months. In June 2023, this was a particularly important matter during the High-Level Economic Dialogue between Japan and the EU, especially with regard to cases of economic coercion, non-market access policies and control over investments and exports, as well as action aimed at making supply chains more resilient. In a subsequent joint statement, the two actors identified multiple areas of cooperation in this field, with a clear reference to de-risking, as well as cooperation on semiconductors and protecting critical infrastructure like submarine cables. This first reference reveals a complementary approach to economic security conceptions and strategies for the two actors, which makes for a more holistic approach.However, one of the future challenges in order to guarantee this cooperation is related to two fundamental contradictions of economic security. For one thing, it is an area where economic interests and national security may collide. For another, owing to the long list of issues it encompasses – security, trade, tech or industrial policies – economic security has a cooperative side, but also a competitive one. The predominance of security issues may come at the expense of economic interests for the two actors, both in their relations and in their own domestic dynamics, and vice versa. Thus, careful and respectful communication and coordination between them, as well as within them, in the EU's case, will be key in order to guarantee effective cooperation between Japan and the EU. IV. ConclusionsOver the last two decades, bilateral relations between the EU and Japan (which on security matters become triangular on account of the simultaneous presence of the United States) have been marked by stability and ongoing outreach. There are those who say that this is the main problem: the lack of problems. Three factors, however, have brought about a more recent revitalisation and strengthening of relations:(1) The situation of "permacrisis" and the speeding up of dynamics of geopolitical competition and fracture.(2) The new balances of power in the international system thanks to the consolidation of China as a global player with the capacity to influence in any part of the world, plus the rise of the Global South as a new "imagined community" on the geopolitical map. Despite their diversity, they share a growing interest in exploring alternatives to a Western-led international order.(3) The acceleration of new international dynamics such as digitalisation, the emergence of hybrid threats or reglobalisation, which, together with the COVID-19 pandemic and the outbreak of war in Ukraine, have alerted states to new dimensions of national security.As a result, in the face of future uncertainties and the prospect of greater rapport between Tokyo and Brussels, three main issues stand out. First, as democracies committed to the liberal, rules-based multilateral system, Japan and the EU are natural partners – "like- minded" allies– that share values and principles, as well as a vital interest in maintaining peace and prosperity in their regional environments.Second, although together they are the world's first and fourth biggest economies, they do not wield political and military power to match their economic might. However, after three decades of prioritising the economy and trade, they now see the need to invest in their defence, with a view to preserving their "strategic autonomy" and not being dragged into a conflict against their will or against their interests. Moreover, despite the triangular relationship in the military sphere, both actors are moving forward on cooperation in new forms of security, such as economic security. These new dynamics have enabled closer exchange and coordination between Tokyo and Brussels, though there is still room for improvement. Namely, cooperation on tech, including cybersecurity and disinformation, offers new opportunities to strengthen Japan-EU ties and common defence in the face of these challenges.Third, there is a growing sense thatEuropean and Asian security scenarios are increasingly connected,and that the security of Japan, South Korea or Taiwan also depend, more and more so, on what happens in Ukraine. In such a scenario, the United States' allies aim to be active players – not just a battleground – in the rivalry between Washington and Beijing.Despite that, there are still multiple areas for greater cooperation between Tokyo and Brussels and the 27 member states. The challenge is to ensure the agenda of the two actors keeps in step with the tempo of the systemic changes the international order is undergoing and to play a role in them that is commensurate with their economic, cultural and human power. Just months away from a possible return of Donald Trump to the White House, who could renege on his international commitments and threaten security alliances, the ties between the EU and Japan may offer a necessary foothold for facing the turbulence ahead.ReferencesBargués, Pol and Bourekba, Moussa. "War by all means: the rise of hybrid warfare", in Bargués, Pol, Bourekba, Moussa, and Colomina, Carme. (eds.), Hybrid threats, vulnerable order. Barcelona: CIDOB Report no. 8, 2022, pp. 11-16. Available online.Benson, Emily; Steinberg, Federico and Álvarez-Aragonés, Pau. "The European Union's Economic Security Strategy Update". CSIS Commentary, 2024. (online) accessed February 23rd, 2024. Available online.Burguete, Víctor. "Contribución de la UE a la reglobalización: de la búsqueda de la autonomía a la estrategia de seguridad económica". Notes Internacionals CIDOB, 298, 2023.Colomina, Carme. "Words as weapons: from disinformation to the global battle for the narrative" in Bargués, Pol, Bourekba, Moussa, and Colomina, Carme. (eds.), Hybrid threats, vulnerable order. Barcelona: CIDOB Report no. 8, 2022, pp. 17-24. Available online.European Commission. EU trade Relations with Japan (online) accessed February 23rd, 2024. Available online.García-Herrero, Alicia. China-EU roller-coaster relations: Where do we stand and what to do? Text of testimony to the US Congress, June 2023. Available onlineTanaka, Toshiro. "EU-Japan Relations" in Christiansen, Thomas; Kirchner, Emil and Murray, Philomena (eds), The Palgrave Handbook of EU-Asia Relations, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2013, pp. 509-520.Tirado, Carmen. "Free and Open Indo-Pacific: Una iniciativa japonesa de política exterior para la cooperación global", Global Affairs Journal 2, 2020.Kuwahara, Kyoko. "Disinformation Threats during a Taiwan Contingency and Countermeasures". Research Report, The Japan Institute of International Affairs, March 22, 2022. Available online.Vidal, Lluc. "Beyond the Gaiatsu Model: Japan's Asia-Pacific Policy and Neoclassical Realism", Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs, 2022, 9 (1), pp. 26–49.

This summary report is based on the main conclusions of two panel discussions on foreign policy held at CIDOB on September 21st, 2023, as part of the project "Japan and the EU: Global partners for a secure and open Indo-Pacific". The document assesses the changing international environment and its impact on relations between the European Union (EU) and Japan. It goes on to highlight two new forms of security – economic and information security – that are a cause of concern for both partners and which open up new possibilities for joint action. It concludes by noting the new cooperation dynamics between Tokyo and Brussels and what the future holds for them.I. IntroductionThe current international order is under challenge from a confluence of enduring trends the pace of which has been quickened more recently by a series of critical events that only underline the international system's shortcomings and contradictions.The first of these events was the COVID-19 pandemic, which provided multiple examples of the fragility of global supply chains and the dependence on manufactured goods imported from China, often essential goods. The pandemic acted as an accelerator for at least three major long-term trends that were already underway. The first of these was the confrontation between the major international powers, the United States and China. They went from being partners for development to considering themselves competitors and, on certain matters, systemic rivals. Some commentators say there was already an underlying trend towards decoupling prior to the pandemic, acknowledging that the Chinese market was looking to replace imports with local products (increasing the US or German trade deficit) and two independent digital spheres were forming, tethered to two diverging socio-political models (García-Herrero, 2023). The pandemic, however, saw the strategic contest over international ascendancy and shaping norms and alliances step up a notch.The trend towards the securitisation of technology and innovation has also gained momentum in the wake of the pandemic. This was clear during the race to create and produce a vaccine against the coronavirus. Nonetheless, both before – with the disputes over 5G networks or industrial espionage – and after – in the framework of what has been called the "chip war" – we witnessed the rise of an increasingly strategic association between big tech corporations and the security of states. Taiwan is a prime example. One single firm, the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC), acts as a deterrent to any potential invasion of the island because it alone dominates the global market for the most advanced chips. Recent international conflicts, first in Ukraine and more lately in Gaza, have hastened this trend towards the technologisation of economic, political and social relations. Cyberwarfare, drones, satellites and grassroots innovation (or lack thereof) are elements that can make the difference between victory and defeat. We are witnessing the new nature of "hybrid wars", those that combine physical military operations with cybernetic action. They are not only fought on the battlefield, rather they involve the mass use of disinformation or cyberattacks that seek to undermine the values of the adversary and the legitimacy of their political systems; or in the case of a war, undermine their confidence and operability. In this type of conflict, the aim is not so much victory but destabilisation (Bargués and Bourekba, 2022).As well as this technological offshoot, the two conflicts are reinforcing the self-image of what are termed the Global North and South, which resonates through the main debates on economic development, international justice or the fight against climate change. Several votes at the United Nations and the imposition of sanctions on Russia have revealed greater coordination of agendas around the narrative of the "decline of the West" and the realisation that there is scope to increase the gains of middle powers and transnational corporations.While Japan and the EU are different in nature (one is a regional actor, the other a state) they share common ground: democracy, respect for a multipolar, rules-based international order that is peaceful and prosperous, plus many of the challenges mentioned at the start of this paper.II. New security dynamics: disinformation and economic security Against this backdrop of transformation of the international system and acceleration of the geopolitical competition, new forms of (in)security have appeared on the agendas of Japan and the EU, but also of other international powers like China, the United States or India. We are talking about disinformation and economic security, two increasingly central elements of Japan and the EU's conception of security.DisinformationThe rapid succession of technological breakthroughs of recent years, along with the growing development of artificial intelligence (AI), the digital transition and the rise of disinformation have laid bare the exploitation of new technology and the challenges it poses to the security and the future of states. In times of crisis, we have seen how disinformation becomes a "weapon of mass infoxication" on the margins of international law, which comes at a relatively low cost and prevents effective governance. Though not a new phenomenon – propaganda was crucial during the Cold War, for instance – viral media and the current porousness of social networks have amplified their potential as a weapon in the narrative war in the hands of external actors. The emergence of generative AI, moreover, not only raises the possibility of an "alternative account" of the facts, but rather enables credibly recreating the facts and even replacing them in people's perception of reality (through deep fakes). This threatens notions of truth and trust, which are essential to democratic governance and election processes.Unlike the EU and the United States, Japan has not been significantly exposed to outside interference in the shape of disinformation. But Tokyo considers this phenomenon a potential threat to national security and democratic health. Namely, the rise of generative AI could quickly break down some of the barriers, such as the language factor, which certain analysts had identified as having put a brake on the proliferation of this phenomenon on the archipelago (Kuwahara, 2022). Thus, in the framework of the National Security Strategy launched in late 2022 by the Kishida administration, Japan identified the challenge of the manipulation of information in situations of conflict and announced the adoption of countermeasures. The government is the chief instigator (top-down action) through coordination with its counterparts in other countries (government-to-government) and non-governmental actors.In the case of the EU, the destabilising effect of disinformation reached new heights during the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014. It is the reason why, nearly a decade ago now, its greater exposure to this type of campaign prompted Brussels to begin to pursue strategies to respond to this hybrid threat. Since then, Brussels has tried to tackle disinformation via a consumer-based rather than security-centred approach. Initially, the European Commission focused its efforts on controlling content rather than trying to regulate tech companies and the major platforms. That approach has shifted, however, with the realisation that the problem of disinformation is not so much the message as its replication and amplification. This shift in focus also counters one of the main risks of focusing on the message, which is that it jeopardises the right to freedom of expression. It is with this rationale that the Digital Services Act (DSA) entered into force in January 2024. It contains specific provisions to control algorithms, which are responsible for "clustering" potentially like-minded social media users, which in turn is key for the propagation of the message through information bubbles and echo chambers.Action that is limited exclusively to algorithmic governance, however, falls short in the face of the complexity of the sociopsychological processes involved in disinformation (Colomina, 2022). With that in mind, the EU has adopted a whole-of-society approach that recognises that it is essential to combine online action with offline measures – in the real world – that mitigate the inequalities, divisions and social fractures that disinformation thrives on. Thus, while the Japanese approach has prioritised government-to-government exchange, a more decentralised strategy prevails in Brussels, where other social sectors, such as journalists, fact checkers, researchers and civil society, play an extremely important role in lockstep with the efforts at the highest level. The EU's decentralised approach to confronting disinformation suits the fragmented media landscape of the 27 member states, which differs from the high degree of concentration in the case of Japan, where large print and television media are the main channels of information. Economic security The new dynamics of reglobalisation, coupled with a return to protectionist measures, the exploitation of interdependencies and economic coercion, are shaping a new global economic landscape in which open economies and interdependence have come to be seen as risks rather than factors of mutual security. Consequently, "economic security" is gaining ground in the national strategies of countries like Japan, one of its chief proponents. While there is no one single definition of economic security, nor of the areas it encompasses, in general terms it seeks to protect a national economy from external interference, minimising the impact of supply chain disruptions, dependence on certain products or the capacity for economic coercion in the hands of others to bring pressure to bear or influence domestic political decisions.Japan has been an early advocate of this concept, which, aside from its habit of putting forward terms that then become all the rage in strategic thinking, can be put down to its insular nature and its heavy dependence on imported commodities and natural resources. Starting in 2020, Tokyo has begun a process of institutionalising economic security through the creation of government positions assigned to this task, as well as the adoption of various legislative packages to ensure its defence. One of the main ones is the Economic Security Promotion Act of 2022, which rests on four key pillars: 1) strengthening supply chains, especially of critical raw materials, 2) security of critical and core infrastructure, 3) developing advanced technology and 4) a patent non-disclosure system. At the same time, Japan has transferred the concept to its bilateral relations – with the United States, South Korea or the United Kingdom – and the fora in which it participates, like the G7 or the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad). The G7 statement on economic resilience and economic security during the Hiroshima summit in May 2023 was particularly important. It was the first ever reference to the concept in the multilateral sphere, which is a measure of its consolidation on the agenda and in international cooperation.At the same time, these economic security initiatives are indirectly linked to Tokyo's proposal for a "Free and Open Indo-Pacific" (FOIP), a strategy unveiled in 2016 that aims to safeguard the rules-based international order, promote peace and shared prosperity, maritime and air security, and develop connectivity in the region. It is hard to disassociate this approach from Beijing's growing assertiveness in the South China Sea and the need to preserve freedom of navigation through this vital artery for Japan and the rest of the world, as approximately a third of global trade flows through it. Although the FOIP's principles of openness and inclusivity could be seen to be at odds with economic security – particularly given the economic rivalry between Beijing and Tokyo in the region – cooperation in this field depends on a free and open region, and vice versa. What is more, it is through greater development of connectivity and exchange with the countries of the region (including the ASEAN members and India) that Tokyo can diversify its trade portfolio and boost its economic resilience.The EU too has adopted the principle of economic security in the last year. Supply chain disruptions during the pandemic, the closure of the Russian gas tap after the invasion of Ukraine and the restriction on imports that China imposed on Lithuania following the opening of a representative office in Taiwan in 2021 are powerful incentives for the adoption of instruments to safeguard the EU's economic security. Among the various measures adopted, four types of mechanism stand out: 1) the revitalisation of industrial policy and the adoption of political initiatives to improve EU production capacity and productivity; 2) diversification and stockpiling efforts to reduce dependence on products and natural resources; 3) the adoption of measures to counter external mechanisms that give competitors the edge, such as anti-subsidy measures; and 4) tools devoted to strategic competition, like the anti-coercion instrument or controls on exports of certain products (Burguete, 2023). More recently, in January 2024, Brussels launched new initiatives aimed at reinforcing its Economic Security Strategy, put forward for the first time in June 2023. With a more geopolitical approach akin to that of Washington, Brussels is seeking tighter control over investments, greater coordination in the control of exports, investment for research into advanced technologies and the protection of innovation. It remains to be seen, however, to what extent the different member states will accept this new legislative package.We can say that Japan and the EU are adopting different, though complementary, mechanisms that can boost domestic capacities to address the challenges ahead of them. Yet, while we can note progress in the field of economic security – as we shall see below – cooperation in the field of disinformation remains at an earlier stage. There is, however, huge potential for bilateral cooperation, and there are powerful incentives for it.III. A new era of cooperation between Japan and the European Union? In the last two decades relations between the EU and Japan have been marked by a considerable degree of mutual understanding, with a predominance of economic matters, despite the trade tensions and conflicts towards the end of the 20th century. Yet this has yielded limited results in terms of joint initiatives and plans (Tanaka, 2013). In 2022, Japan was the EU's second biggest trading partner in Asia, behind China, and the seventh globally. That same year Japanese imports into the EU came to nearly €70bn, while EU exports the other way amounted to over €71.6bn (European Commission, 2023).As far as security is concerned, progress has been slow, fettered by Japan's constitutional constraints, which place restrictions on its military capabilities, and, on the European side, owing to its complex security framework and its partial overlap with NATO. Until a few years ago, cooperation in this area had been limited to "softer" forms of security such as antipiracy operations off Somalia. It is worth recalling that in the case of both the EU and Japan traditional security (the military aspect) falls to the United States, since both actors are eminently economic powers but lacking in comparable military might. They are, then, relations that on security matters are triangular rather than bilateral and cannot be understood without Washington.This has been no impediment to Brussels and Tokyo strengthening ties over the last few years, primarily on political and trade matters. In 2019, the two parties adopted the Japan-EU Economic Partnership Agreement, which lifted most of the tariffs existing between the two economies, and the Strategic Partnership Agreement, based on cooperation and the defence of shared values such as democracy, the rule of law, human rights or free trade. In the latter agreement, Japan and the EU identified the common threats of cybersecurity, natural disasters, terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and maritime (in)security. The two agreements established a framework that would cement political, security and development cooperation cast in liberal values to jointly uphold the rules-based international order.In this new phase of cooperation, security issues have gained importance because both actors perceive a greater interdependence and interconnection in their security. According to the Joint Statement of the Japan-EU Summit of July 2023, "the security of Europe and that of the Indo-Pacific are closely interlinked". And the facts appear to bear it out. Japan was one of the countries that did not hesitate to show its support for Ukraine following the Russian invasion of 2022, taking part in the international sanctions regime, as well as dispatching arms to Kyiv. Coordination with the EU in this field has been remarkable.If we look at the EU Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific released in 2021, Brussels also aspires to greater involvement in the security of the region in four main areas: maritime security, counterterrorism, cybersecurity and crisis management. However, despite European ambitions, there are differences over the commitment (economic and/or military) that the various member states would be willing to make in the Indo-Pacific. As often happens, European policy towards the region is the sum of the convergences and divergences of the member states. According to a survey by the European Council for Foreign Relations, 23 out of the 27 member states point to security as an important element of Europe's Indo-Pacific strategy. Yet only 12 would be interested in contributing to freedom of navigation operations and just 4 would commit warships to the region (Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands and Spain). It will also be important to consider NATO involvement in this area. In 2023, it submitted a proposal to open a civilian liaison office in Tokyo, an idea that was dropped largely due to French reluctance in the face of a possible response from China.Japan welcomes even limited European involvement in the region and this is in step with the growing interconnection between Europe's security and that of the Indo-Pacific. However, more coordination and communication among the various European and international actors in the region, especially in the military field, will be essential in order to avoid undesired tensions.Lastly, cooperation on economic security has acquired a more central position in recent months. In June 2023, this was a particularly important matter during the High-Level Economic Dialogue between Japan and the EU, especially with regard to cases of economic coercion, non-market access policies and control over investments and exports, as well as action aimed at making supply chains more resilient. In a subsequent joint statement, the two actors identified multiple areas of cooperation in this field, with a clear reference to de-risking, as well as cooperation on semiconductors and protecting critical infrastructure like submarine cables. This first reference reveals a complementary approach to economic security conceptions and strategies for the two actors, which makes for a more holistic approach.However, one of the future challenges in order to guarantee this cooperation is related to two fundamental contradictions of economic security. For one thing, it is an area where economic interests and national security may collide. For another, owing to the long list of issues it encompasses – security, trade, tech or industrial policies – economic security has a cooperative side, but also a competitive one. The predominance of security issues may come at the expense of economic interests for the two actors, both in their relations and in their own domestic dynamics, and vice versa. Thus, careful and respectful communication and coordination between them, as well as within them, in the EU's case, will be key in order to guarantee effective cooperation between Japan and the EU. IV. ConclusionsOver the last two decades, bilateral relations between the EU and Japan (which on security matters become triangular on account of the simultaneous presence of the United States) have been marked by stability and ongoing outreach. There are those who say that this is the main problem: the lack of problems. Three factors, however, have brought about a more recent revitalisation and strengthening of relations:(1) The situation of "permacrisis" and the speeding up of dynamics of geopolitical competition and fracture.(2) The new balances of power in the international system thanks to the consolidation of China as a global player with the capacity to influence in any part of the world, plus the rise of the Global South as a new "imagined community" on the geopolitical map. Despite their diversity, they share a growing interest in exploring alternatives to a Western-led international order.(3) The acceleration of new international dynamics such as digitalisation, the emergence of hybrid threats or reglobalisation, which, together with the COVID-19 pandemic and the outbreak of war in Ukraine, have alerted states to new dimensions of national security.As a result, in the face of future uncertainties and the prospect of greater rapport between Tokyo and Brussels, three main issues stand out. First, as democracies committed to the liberal, rules-based multilateral system, Japan and the EU are natural partners – "like- minded" allies– that share values and principles, as well as a vital interest in maintaining peace and prosperity in their regional environments.Second, although together they are the world's first and fourth biggest economies, they do not wield political and military power to match their economic might. However, after three decades of prioritising the economy and trade, they now see the need to invest in their defence, with a view to preserving their "strategic autonomy" and not being dragged into a conflict against their will or against their interests. Moreover, despite the triangular relationship in the military sphere, both actors are moving forward on cooperation in new forms of security, such as economic security. These new dynamics have enabled closer exchange and coordination between Tokyo and Brussels, though there is still room for improvement. Namely, cooperation on tech, including cybersecurity and disinformation, offers new opportunities to strengthen Japan-EU ties and common defence in the face of these challenges.Third, there is a growing sense thatEuropean and Asian security scenarios are increasingly connected,and that the security of Japan, South Korea or Taiwan also depend, more and more so, on what happens in Ukraine. In such a scenario, the United States' allies aim to be active players – not just a battleground – in the rivalry between Washington and Beijing.Despite that, there are still multiple areas for greater cooperation between Tokyo and Brussels and the 27 member states. The challenge is to ensure the agenda of the two actors keeps in step with the tempo of the systemic changes the international order is undergoing and to play a role in them that is commensurate with their economic, cultural and human power. Just months away from a possible return of Donald Trump to the White House, who could renege on his international commitments and threaten security alliances, the ties between the EU and Japan may offer a necessary foothold for facing the turbulence ahead. ReferencesBargués, Pol and Bourekba, Moussa. "War by all means: the rise of hybrid warfare", in Bargués, Pol, Bourekba, Moussa, and Colomina, Carme. (eds.), Hybrid threats, vulnerable order. Barcelona: CIDOB Report no. 8, 2022, pp. 11-16. Available online.Benson, Emily; Steinberg, Federico and Álvarez-Aragonés, Pau. "The European Union's Economic Security Strategy Update". CSIS Commentary, 2024. (online) accessed February 23rd, 2024. Available online.Burguete, Víctor. "Contribución de la UE a la reglobalización: de la búsqueda de la autonomía a la estrategia de seguridad económica". Notes Internacionals CIDOB, 298, 2023.Colomina, Carme. "Words as weapons: from disinformation to the global battle for the narrative" in Bargués, Pol, Bourekba, Moussa, and Colomina, Carme. (eds.), Hybrid threats, vulnerable order. Barcelona: CIDOB Report no. 8, 2022, pp. 17-24. Available online.European Commission. EU trade Relations with Japan (online) accessed February 23rd, 2024. Available online.García-Herrero, Alicia. China-EU roller-coaster relations: Where do we stand and what to do? Text of testimony to the US Congress, June 2023. Available onlineTanaka, Toshiro. "EU-Japan Relations" in Christiansen, Thomas; Kirchner, Emil and Murray, Philomena (eds), The Palgrave Handbook of EU-Asia Relations, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2013, pp. 509-520.Tirado, Carmen. "Free and Open Indo-Pacific: Una iniciativa japonesa de política exterior para la cooperación global", Global Affairs Journal 2, 2020.Kuwahara, Kyoko. "Disinformation Threats during a Taiwan Contingency and Countermeasures". Research Report, The Japan Institute of International Affairs, March 22, 2022. Available online.Vidal, Lluc. "Beyond the Gaiatsu Model: Japan's Asia-Pacific Policy and Neoclassical Realism", Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs, 2022, 9 (1), pp. 26–49.

This summary report is based on the main conclusions of two panel discussions on foreign policy held at CIDOB on September 21st, 2023, as part of the project "Japan and the EU: Global partners for a secure and open Indo-Pacific". The document assesses the changing international environment and its impact on relations between the European Union (EU) and Japan. It goes on to highlight two new forms of security – economic and information security – that are a cause of concern for both partners and which open up new possibilities for joint action. It concludes by noting the new cooperation dynamics between Tokyo and Brussels and what the future holds for them.I. IntroductionThe current international order is under challenge from a confluence of enduring trends the pace of which has been quickened more recently by a series of critical events that only underline the international system's shortcomings and contradictions.The first of these events was the COVID-19 pandemic, which provided multiple examples of the fragility of global supply chains and the dependence on manufactured goods imported from China, often essential goods. The pandemic acted as an accelerator for at least three major long-term trends that were already underway. The first of these was the confrontation between the major international powers, the United States and China. They went from being partners for development to considering themselves competitors and, on certain matters, systemic rivals. Some commentators say there was already an underlying trend towards decoupling prior to the pandemic, acknowledging that the Chinese market was looking to replace imports with local products (increasing the US or German trade deficit) and two independent digital spheres were forming, tethered to two diverging socio-political models (García-Herrero, 2023). The pandemic, however, saw the strategic contest over international ascendancy and shaping norms and alliances step up a notch.The trend towards the securitisation of technology and innovation has also gained momentum in the wake of the pandemic. This was clear during the race to create and produce a vaccine against the coronavirus. Nonetheless, both before – with the disputes over 5G networks or industrial espionage – and after – in the framework of what has been called the "chip war" – we witnessed the rise of an increasingly strategic association between big tech corporations and the security of states. Taiwan is a prime example. One single firm, the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC), acts as a deterrent to any potential invasion of the island because it alone dominates the global market for the most advanced chips. Recent international conflicts, first in Ukraine and more lately in Gaza, have hastened this trend towards the technologisation of economic, political and social relations. Cyberwarfare, drones, satellites and grassroots innovation (or lack thereof) are elements that can make the difference between victory and defeat. We are witnessing the new nature of "hybrid wars", those that combine physical military operations with cybernetic action. They are not only fought on the battlefield, rather they involve the mass use of disinformation or cyberattacks that seek to undermine the values of the adversary and the legitimacy of their political systems; or in the case of a war, undermine their confidence and operability. In this type of conflict, the aim is not so much victory but destabilisation (Bargués and Bourekba, 2022).As well as this technological offshoot, the two conflicts are reinforcing the self-image of what are termed the Global North and South, which resonates through the main debates on economic development, international justice or the fight against climate change. Several votes at the United Nations and the imposition of sanctions on Russia have revealed greater coordination of agendas around the narrative of the "decline of the West" and the realisation that there is scope to increase the gains of middle powers and transnational corporations.While Japan and the EU are different in nature (one is a regional actor, the other a state) they share common ground: democracy, respect for a multipolar, rules-based international order that is peaceful and prosperous, plus many of the challenges mentioned at the start of this paper.II. New security dynamics: disinformation and economic security Against this backdrop of transformation of the international system and acceleration of the geopolitical competition, new forms of (in)security have appeared on the agendas of Japan and the EU, but also of other international powers like China, the United States or India. We are talking about disinformation and economic security, two increasingly central elements of Japan and the EU's conception of security.DisinformationThe rapid succession of technological breakthroughs of recent years, along with the growing development of artificial intelligence (AI), the digital transition and the rise of disinformation have laid bare the exploitation of new technology and the challenges it poses to the security and the future of states. In times of crisis, we have seen how disinformation becomes a "weapon of mass infoxication" on the margins of international law, which comes at a relatively low cost and prevents effective governance. Though not a new phenomenon – propaganda was crucial during the Cold War, for instance – viral media and the current porousness of social networks have amplified their potential as a weapon in the narrative war in the hands of external actors. The emergence of generative AI, moreover, not only raises the possibility of an "alternative account" of the facts, but rather enables credibly recreating the facts and even replacing them in people's perception of reality (through deep fakes). This threatens notions of truth and trust, which are essential to democratic governance and election processes.Unlike the EU and the United States, Japan has not been significantly exposed to outside interference in the shape of disinformation. But Tokyo considers this phenomenon a potential threat to national security and democratic health. Namely, the rise of generative AI could quickly break down some of the barriers, such as the language factor, which certain analysts had identified as having put a brake on the proliferation of this phenomenon on the archipelago (Kuwahara, 2022). Thus, in the framework of the National Security Strategy launched in late 2022 by the Kishida administration, Japan identified the challenge of the manipulation of information in situations of conflict and announced the adoption of countermeasures. The government is the chief instigator (top-down action) through coordination with its counterparts in other countries (government-to-government) and non-governmental actors.In the case of the EU, the destabilising effect of disinformation reached new heights during the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014. It is the reason why, nearly a decade ago now, its greater exposure to this type of campaign prompted Brussels to begin to pursue strategies to respond to this hybrid threat. Since then, Brussels has tried to tackle disinformation via a consumer-based rather than security-centred approach. Initially, the European Commission focused its efforts on controlling content rather than trying to regulate tech companies and the major platforms. That approach has shifted, however, with the realisation that the problem of disinformation is not so much the message as its replication and amplification. This shift in focus also counters one of the main risks of focusing on the message, which is that it jeopardises the right to freedom of expression. It is with this rationale that the Digital Services Act (DSA) entered into force in January 2024. It contains specific provisions to control algorithms, which are responsible for "clustering" potentially like-minded social media users, which in turn is key for the propagation of the message through information bubbles and echo chambers.Action that is limited exclusively to algorithmic governance, however, falls short in the face of the complexity of the sociopsychological processes involved in disinformation (Colomina, 2022). With that in mind, the EU has adopted a whole-of-society approach that recognises that it is essential to combine online action with offline measures – in the real world – that mitigate the inequalities, divisions and social fractures that disinformation thrives on. Thus, while the Japanese approach has prioritised government-to-government exchange, a more decentralised strategy prevails in Brussels, where other social sectors, such as journalists, fact checkers, researchers and civil society, play an extremely important role in lockstep with the efforts at the highest level. The EU's decentralised approach to confronting disinformation suits the fragmented media landscape of the 27 member states, which differs from the high degree of concentration in the case of Japan, where large print and television media are the main channels of information. Economic security The new dynamics of reglobalisation, coupled with a return to protectionist measures, the exploitation of interdependencies and economic coercion, are shaping a new global economic landscape in which open economies and interdependence have come to be seen as risks rather than factors of mutual security. Consequently, "economic security" is gaining ground in the national strategies of countries like Japan, one of its chief proponents. While there is no one single definition of economic security, nor of the areas it encompasses, in general terms it seeks to protect a national economy from external interference, minimising the impact of supply chain disruptions, dependence on certain products or the capacity for economic coercion in the hands of others to bring pressure to bear or influence domestic political decisions.Japan has been an early advocate of this concept, which, aside from its habit of putting forward terms that then become all the rage in strategic thinking, can be put down to its insular nature and its heavy dependence on imported commodities and natural resources. Starting in 2020, Tokyo has begun a process of institutionalising economic security through the creation of government positions assigned to this task, as well as the adoption of various legislative packages to ensure its defence. One of the main ones is the Economic Security Promotion Act of 2022, which rests on four key pillars: 1) strengthening supply chains, especially of critical raw materials, 2) security of critical and core infrastructure, 3) developing advanced technology and 4) a patent non-disclosure system. At the same time, Japan has transferred the concept to its bilateral relations – with the United States, South Korea or the United Kingdom – and the fora in which it participates, like the G7 or the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad). The G7 statement on economic resilience and economic security during the Hiroshima summit in May 2023 was particularly important. It was the first ever reference to the concept in the multilateral sphere, which is a measure of its consolidation on the agenda and in international cooperation.At the same time, these economic security initiatives are indirectly linked to Tokyo's proposal for a "Free and Open Indo-Pacific" (FOIP), a strategy unveiled in 2016 that aims to safeguard the rules-based international order, promote peace and shared prosperity, maritime and air security, and develop connectivity in the region. It is hard to disassociate this approach from Beijing's growing assertiveness in the South China Sea and the need to preserve freedom of navigation through this vital artery for Japan and the rest of the world, as approximately a third of global trade flows through it. Although the FOIP's principles of openness and inclusivity could be seen to be at odds with economic security – particularly given the economic rivalry between Beijing and Tokyo in the region – cooperation in this field depends on a free and open region, and vice versa. What is more, it is through greater development of connectivity and exchange with the countries of the region (including the ASEAN members and India) that Tokyo can diversify its trade portfolio and boost its economic resilience.The EU too has adopted the principle of economic security in the last year. Supply chain disruptions during the pandemic, the closure of the Russian gas tap after the invasion of Ukraine and the restriction on imports that China imposed on Lithuania following the opening of a representative office in Taiwan in 2021 are powerful incentives for the adoption of instruments to safeguard the EU's economic security. Among the various measures adopted, four types of mechanism stand out: 1) the revitalisation of industrial policy and the adoption of political initiatives to improve EU production capacity and productivity; 2) diversification and stockpiling efforts to reduce dependence on products and natural resources; 3) the adoption of measures to counter external mechanisms that give competitors the edge, such as anti-subsidy measures; and 4) tools devoted to strategic competition, like the anti-coercion instrument or controls on exports of certain products (Burguete, 2023). More recently, in January 2024, Brussels launched new initiatives aimed at reinforcing its Economic Security Strategy, put forward for the first time in June 2023. With a more geopolitical approach akin to that of Washington, Brussels is seeking tighter control over investments, greater coordination in the control of exports, investment for research into advanced technologies and the protection of innovation. It remains to be seen, however, to what extent the different member states will accept this new legislative package.We can say that Japan and the EU are adopting different, though complementary, mechanisms that can boost domestic capacities to address the challenges ahead of them. Yet, while we can note progress in the field of economic security – as we shall see below – cooperation in the field of disinformation remains at an earlier stage. There is, however, huge potential for bilateral cooperation, and there are powerful incentives for it.III. A new era of cooperation between Japan and the European Union? In the last two decades relations between the EU and Japan have been marked by a considerable degree of mutual understanding, with a predominance of economic matters, despite the trade tensions and conflicts towards the end of the 20th century. Yet this has yielded limited results in terms of joint initiatives and plans (Tanaka, 2013). In 2022, Japan was the EU's second biggest trading partner in Asia, behind China, and the seventh globally. That same year Japanese imports into the EU came to nearly €70bn, while EU exports the other way amounted to over €71.6bn (European Commission, 2023).As far as security is concerned, progress has been slow, fettered by Japan's constitutional constraints, which place restrictions on its military capabilities, and, on the European side, owing to its complex security framework and its partial overlap with NATO. Until a few years ago, cooperation in this area had been limited to "softer" forms of security such as antipiracy operations off Somalia. It is worth recalling that in the case of both the EU and Japan traditional security (the military aspect) falls to the United States, since both actors are eminently economic powers but lacking in comparable military might. They are, then, relations that on security matters are triangular rather than bilateral and cannot be understood without Washington.This has been no impediment to Brussels and Tokyo strengthening ties over the last few years, primarily on political and trade matters. In 2019, the two parties adopted the Japan-EU Economic Partnership Agreement, which lifted most of the tariffs existing between the two economies, and the Strategic Partnership Agreement, based on cooperation and the defence of shared values such as democracy, the rule of law, human rights or free trade. In the latter agreement, Japan and the EU identified the common threats of cybersecurity, natural disasters, terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and maritime (in)security. The two agreements established a framework that would cement political, security and development cooperation cast in liberal values to jointly uphold the rules-based international order.In this new phase of cooperation, security issues have gained importance because both actors perceive a greater interdependence and interconnection in their security. According to the Joint Statement of the Japan-EU Summit of July 2023, "the security of Europe and that of the Indo-Pacific are closely interlinked". And the facts appear to bear it out. Japan was one of the countries that did not hesitate to show its support for Ukraine following the Russian invasion of 2022, taking part in the international sanctions regime, as well as dispatching arms to Kyiv. Coordination with the EU in this field has been remarkable.If we look at the EU Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific released in 2021, Brussels also aspires to greater involvement in the security of the region in four main areas: maritime security, counterterrorism, cybersecurity and crisis management. However, despite European ambitions, there are differences over the commitment (economic and/or military) that the various member states would be willing to make in the Indo-Pacific. As often happens, European policy towards the region is the sum of the convergences and divergences of the member states. According to a survey by the European Council for Foreign Relations, 23 out of the 27 member states point to security as an important element of Europe's Indo-Pacific strategy. Yet only 12 would be interested in contributing to freedom of navigation operations and just 4 would commit warships to the region (Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands and Spain). It will also be important to consider NATO involvement in this area. In 2023, it submitted a proposal to open a civilian liaison office in Tokyo, an idea that was dropped largely due to French reluctance in the face of a possible response from China.Japan welcomes even limited European involvement in the region and this is in step with the growing interconnection between Europe's security and that of the Indo-Pacific. However, more coordination and communication among the various European and international actors in the region, especially in the military field, will be essential in order to avoid undesired tensions.Lastly, cooperation on economic security has acquired a more central position in recent months. In June 2023, this was a particularly important matter during the High-Level Economic Dialogue between Japan and the EU, especially with regard to cases of economic coercion, non-market access policies and control over investments and exports, as well as action aimed at making supply chains more resilient. In a subsequent joint statement, the two actors identified multiple areas of cooperation in this field, with a clear reference to de-risking, as well as cooperation on semiconductors and protecting critical infrastructure like submarine cables. This first reference reveals a complementary approach to economic security conceptions and strategies for the two actors, which makes for a more holistic approach.However, one of the future challenges in order to guarantee this cooperation is related to two fundamental contradictions of economic security. For one thing, it is an area where economic interests and national security may collide. For another, owing to the long list of issues it encompasses – security, trade, tech or industrial policies – economic security has a cooperative side, but also a competitive one. The predominance of security issues may come at the expense of economic interests for the two actors, both in their relations and in their own domestic dynamics, and vice versa. Thus, careful and respectful communication and coordination between them, as well as within them, in the EU's case, will be key in order to guarantee effective cooperation between Japan and the EU. IV. ConclusionsOver the last two decades, bilateral relations between the EU and Japan (which on security matters become triangular on account of the simultaneous presence of the United States) have been marked by stability and ongoing outreach. There are those who say that this is the main problem: the lack of problems. Three factors, however, have brought about a more recent revitalisation and strengthening of relations:(1) The situation of "permacrisis" and the speeding up of dynamics of geopolitical competition and fracture.(2) The new balances of power in the international system thanks to the consolidation of China as a global player with the capacity to influence in any part of the world, plus the rise of the Global South as a new "imagined community" on the geopolitical map. Despite their diversity, they share a growing interest in exploring alternatives to a Western-led international order.(3) The acceleration of new international dynamics such as digitalisation, the emergence of hybrid threats or reglobalisation, which, together with the COVID-19 pandemic and the outbreak of war in Ukraine, have alerted states to new dimensions of national security.As a result, in the face of future uncertainties and the prospect of greater rapport between Tokyo and Brussels, three main issues stand out. First, as democracies committed to the liberal, rules-based multilateral system, Japan and the EU are natural partners – "like- minded" allies– that share values and principles, as well as a vital interest in maintaining peace and prosperity in their regional environments.Second, although together they are the world's first and fourth biggest economies, they do not wield political and military power to match their economic might. However, after three decades of prioritising the economy and trade, they now see the need to invest in their defence, with a view to preserving their "strategic autonomy" and not being dragged into a conflict against their will or against their interests. Moreover, despite the triangular relationship in the military sphere, both actors are moving forward on cooperation in new forms of security, such as economic security. These new dynamics have enabled closer exchange and coordination between Tokyo and Brussels, though there is still room for improvement. Namely, cooperation on tech, including cybersecurity and disinformation, offers new opportunities to strengthen Japan-EU ties and common defence in the face of these challenges.Third, there is a growing sense thatEuropean and Asian security scenarios are increasingly connected,and that the security of Japan, South Korea or Taiwan also depend, more and more so, on what happens in Ukraine. In such a scenario, the United States' allies aim to be active players – not just a battleground – in the rivalry between Washington and Beijing.Despite that, there are still multiple areas for greater cooperation between Tokyo and Brussels and the 27 member states. The challenge is to ensure the agenda of the two actors keeps in step with the tempo of the systemic changes the international order is undergoing and to play a role in them that is commensurate with their economic, cultural and human power. Just months away from a possible return of Donald Trump to the White House, who could renege on his international commitments and threaten security alliances, the ties between the EU and Japan may offer a necessary foothold for facing the turbulence ahead. ReferencesBargués, Pol and Bourekba, Moussa. "War by all means: the rise of hybrid warfare", in Bargués, Pol, Bourekba, Moussa, and Colomina, Carme. (eds.), Hybrid threats, vulnerable order. Barcelona: CIDOB Report no. 8, 2022, pp. 11-16. Available online.Benson, Emily; Steinberg, Federico and Álvarez-Aragonés, Pau. "The European Union's Economic Security Strategy Update". CSIS Commentary, 2024. (online) accessed February 23rd, 2024. Available online.Burguete, Víctor. "Contribución de la UE a la reglobalización: de la búsqueda de la autonomía a la estrategia de seguridad económica". Notes Internacionals CIDOB, 298, 2023.Colomina, Carme. "Words as weapons: from disinformation to the global battle for the narrative" in Bargués, Pol, Bourekba, Moussa, and Colomina, Carme. (eds.), Hybrid threats, vulnerable order. Barcelona: CIDOB Report no. 8, 2022, pp. 17-24. Available online.European Commission. EU trade Relations with Japan (online) accessed February 23rd, 2024. Available online.García-Herrero, Alicia. China-EU roller-coaster relations: Where do we stand and what to do? Text of testimony to the US Congress, June 2023. Available onlineTanaka, Toshiro. "EU-Japan Relations" in Christiansen, Thomas; Kirchner, Emil and Murray, Philomena (eds), The Palgrave Handbook of EU-Asia Relations, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2013, pp. 509-520.Tirado, Carmen. "Free and Open Indo-Pacific: Una iniciativa japonesa de política exterior para la cooperación global", Global Affairs Journal 2, 2020.Kuwahara, Kyoko. "Disinformation Threats during a Taiwan Contingency and Countermeasures". Research Report, The Japan Institute of International Affairs, March 22, 2022. Available online.Vidal, Lluc. "Beyond the Gaiatsu Model: Japan's Asia-Pacific Policy and Neoclassical Realism", Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs, 2022, 9 (1), pp. 26–49.

Este documento de síntesis se basa en las principales conclusiones de dos diálogos sobre política exterior celebrados en CIDOB el 21 de septiembre de 2023, en el marco del proyecto «Japan and the EU: Global Partners for a Secure and Open Indo-Pacific». El documento realiza un diagnóstico del contexto internacional cambiante y su impacto en las relaciones entre la Unión Europea y Japón; a continuación, destaca dos nuevas formas de seguridad ‒económica e informativa‒ que preocupan a ambos actores y que abren nuevas posibilidades para una acción conjunta. Finalmente, concluye señalando las nuevas dinámicas de cooperación entre Tokio y Bruselas y su futuro. I. IntroducciónEl orden internacional vigente se está viendo cuestionado por la confluencia de diversas tendencias de largo recorrido que, de manera más reciente, se han acelerado por diversos sucesos coyunturales que han subrayado las carencias y las incoherencias del sistema internacional.El primero de estos acontecimientos fue la pandemia global de la COVID-19, que dio múltiples ejemplos de la fragilidad de las cadenas de distribución globales y de la enorme dependencia de las importaciones de bienes manufacturados en China, en muchos casos, bienes esenciales. La pandemia fue un factor acelerador de, por lo menos, tres grandes tendencias de largo recorrido que estaban ya desplegándose: la primera, la confrontación entre las grandes potencias internacionales ‒Estados Unidos y China‒ que, de socios para el desarrollo, pasaron a considerarse competidores y en algunas cuestiones, rivales sistémicos. Algunos autores afirman que la tendencia de fondo era ya hacia el desacople con anterioridad a la pandemia debido a que el mercado chino aspiraba a sustituir importaciones por producción local (agrandando el déficit comercial de EEUU o de Alemania) y también, a la configuración de dos esferas digitales independientes, ligadas también a dos modelos sociopolíticos divergentes (García-Herrero, 2023). No obstante, la pandemia ha adelantado varias casillas la partida estratégica por la influencia internacional y la conformación de normas y alianzas.También a raíz de la pandemia, ha tomado velocidad la tendencia hacia la securitización de la tecnología y la innovación, algo que fue evidente durante la carrera para el diseño y la producción de las vacunas frente al coronavirus. No obstante, tanto antes ‒con las disputas por las redes 5G o el espionaje industrial‒ como después ‒en el marco de la denominada «guerra de los chips»‒ hemos visto emerger una asociación cada vez más estratégica entre las grandes corporaciones tecnológicas y la seguridad de los estados. Taiwán es uno de los casos paradigmáticos, donde una sola empresa, la Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) actúa como elemento disuasorio de cualquier potencial invasión de la isla debido a que domina en solitario el mercado global de los semiconductores más avanzados. Esta tendencia a la tecnologización de las relaciones económicas, políticas y sociales se ha visto acelerada por los recientes conflictos internacionales, primero en Ucrania y más recientemente en Gaza, donde la importancia de la ciberguerra, los drones, los satélites y la innovación autóctona (o la ausencia de estas capacidades) son elementos que dirimen la victoria, de la derrota. Estamos siendo testigos de la nueva naturaleza de las denominadas «guerras híbridas», que combinan operaciones militares cinéticas con cibernéticas y que no solo se luchan en el campo de batalla, sino que emplean masivamente elementos de desinformación o los ciberataques y que persiguen dañar los valores cohesionantes del adversario y la legitimidad de su sistema político, o en el caso de una guerra, minar su confianza y su operatividad. En este tipo de conflictos, el objetivo no es tanto la victoria como la desestabilización (Bargués y Bourekba, 2022).Además de la derivada tecnológica, ambos conflictos están reforzando la autoconsciencia de los denominados Norte y Sur global, que ha impregnado muchos debates de las últimas décadas ‒respecto al desarrollo económico, la justicia internacional o la lucha contra el cambio climático‒ pero que a través de las diversas votaciones en el seno de las Naciones Unidas y de la imposición de sanciones a Rusia, ha generado incentivos mucho más potentes para la coordinación de agendas, en aras a la narrativa del «declive de occidente» y a la constatación de que aumenta el margen de ganancia de las potencias medias y las corporaciones transnacionales.Si bien Japón y la Unión Europea (UE) son actores de naturaleza distinta ‒uno regional y el otro nacional‒, comparten atributos como la democracia, el respeto de un orden internacional basado en reglas, multipolar, próspero y pacífico y también, muchos de los retos hemos citado al principio.II. Nuevas dinámicas de seguridad: desinformación y seguridad económica En este contexto de transformación del sistema internacional y de aceleración de la competición geopolítica, nuevas formas de (in)seguridad han aparecido en las agendas políticas de Japón y la Unión Europea, pero también de otras potencias internacionales como China, Estados Unidos o la India. Hablamos de la desinformación y la seguridad económica, dos elementos cada vez más centrales en la concepción de seguridad de Japón y de la UE.DesinformaciónLos rápidos avances tecnológicos de los últimos años, con el creciente desarrollo de la inteligencia artificial (IA), la transición digital y el auge de la desinformación han evidenciado la instrumentalización de las nuevas tecnologías y los retos que suponen para la seguridad y el futuro de los estados. En momentos de crisis, hemos visto como la desinformación se convierte en un «arma de infoxicación masiva» en los márgenes del derecho internacional, con un coste relativamente bajo que impide una gobernanza efectiva. Aunque no se trata de un fenómeno nuevo ‒sin ir más lejos, la propaganda fue clave durante la Guerra Fría‒ la viralización y la porosidad actual de las redes sociales han amplificado su potencial como arma de guerra narrativa en manos de actores ajenos. Además, el surgimiento de la IA generativa no solo plantea un relato alternativo de los hechos, sino que permite recrearlos de manera creíble e incluso reemplazarlos en la percepción de realidad de los individuos (a través de las Deep Fake), poniendo con ello en peligro las nociones de verdad y de confianza, que son esenciales para la gobernanza democrática y los procesos electorales.A diferencia de la UE o de EEUU, Japón no se ha visto expuesto significativamente a interferencias externas de desinformación. No obstante, Tokio considera este fenómeno como un peligro potencial para la seguridad nacional y para la salud democrática. En concreto, el auge de la IA generativa puede erosionar rápidamente algunas de las barreras ‒como el elemento lingüístico‒, que algunos análisis habían identificado como un freno a la proliferación de este fenómeno en el archipiélago (Kuwahara, 2022). Así, en el marco de la Estrategia de Seguridad Nacional lanzada a finales de 2022 por la administración Kishida, Japón identificó el reto de la instrumentalización de la información en contextos de conflicto y anunció la adopción de contramedidas en las que el gobierno es el principal impulsor (top-down) a través de la coordinación con sus homólogos en otros países (government-to-government) y con actores no gubernamentales.Para la UE, el efecto desestabilizador de la desinformación alcanzó cotas inéditas durante la anexión rusa de Crimea en 2014. Es por ello que hace ya casi una década, su mayor exposición a este tipo de campañas provocó que Bruselas empezara a buscar estrategias para responder a esta amenaza híbrida. Desde entonces, Bruselas ha tratado de hacer frente a la desinformación a través de un enfoque basado en el consumidor ‒y no securitario‒. Inicialmente, la Comisión Europea dedicó sus esfuerzos al control de contenidos en lugar de intentar regular las compañías tecnológicas y las grandes plataformas. No obstante, dicho enfoque ha variado debido a la constatación de que el problema de la desinformación no es tanto el mensaje, como su réplica y la amplificación. Este cambio de foco solventa, además, uno de los principales riesgos de centrarse en el mensaje, como es el de comprometer el derecho a la libertad de expresión. Es con esta lógica que la Digital Service Act (DSA) entró en vigor en enero de 2024, ya que contiene disposiciones específicas para controlar los algoritmos, que son responsables de la clusterización de usuarios potencialmente afines de redes sociales y que es clave para la propagación del mensaje dentro de burbujas informativas y cámaras de resonancia.No obstante, una actuación que se ciña exclusivamente a la gobernanza algorítmica es insuficiente ante la complejidad de procesos sociopsicológicos vinculados a la desinformación (Colomina, 2022). Consciente de ello, la UE ha adoptado un enfoque que abarca a toda la sociedad (whole-of-society approach) y que comprende que es imprescindible acompañar las acciones online de intervenciones offline ‒en el mundo real‒,que palien las desigualdades, divisiones y fracturas sociales en las que medra la desinformación. Así, mientras el enfoque japonés ha priorizado los intercambios de gobierno a gobierno, en Bruselas prevalece una estrategia más descentralizada, donde otros sectores sociales –como los periodistas, los verificadores, los investigadores y la sociedad civil– comparten un papel extremadamente relevante en paralelo a los esfuerzos al más alto nivel. Esta estrategia también se adecua a la fragmentación del ecosistema mediático de los 27 países miembros y que difiere de la alta concentración en el caso de Japón, donde los grandes medios de prensa y televisión son los principales canales de información.Seguridad económica Las nuevas dinámicas de reglobalización, sumadas a un retorno de medidas proteccionistas, la instrumentalización de las interdependencias y la coerción económica, están dibujando un nuevo panorama económico global, en el que la apertura económica y la interdependencia han pasado de a ser vistas como riesgos en lugar de ser factores de seguridad mutua. Como consecuencia, la seguridad económica está ganando relevancia dentro de las estrategias nacionales de países como Japón, que ha sido uno de sus principales impulsores. Aunque no existe una definición única sobre la seguridad económica, ni de los ámbitos que esta engloba, de manera general busca proteger de injerencias externas la economía nacional, minimizando el impacto de las disrupciones en las cadenas de suministros, la dependencia en ciertos productos o la capacidad de coerción económica en manos de otros para presionar o influenciar las decisiones políticas domésticas.Japón ha sido uno de los promotores iniciales de este concepto, algo que, además de por su tendencia a sugerir términos que luego harán fortuna en el pensamiento estratégico, se explica por su carácter insular y por su profunda dependencia de las importaciones de materias primas y recursos naturales. Desde 2020, Tokio ha iniciado un proceso de institucionalización de la seguridad económica mediante la creación de posiciones gubernamentales dedicadas a esta cuestión, así como la adopción de diferentes paquetes legislativos para su defensa. Uno de los principales es la Ley de Promoción de la Seguridad Económica de 2022, que identifica cuatro pilares clave: 1) el fortalecimiento de las cadenas de suministros, especialmente de materias primas críticas, 2) la protección de infraestructuras críticas y esenciales, 3) el desarrollo de tecnología puntera y 4) un sistema de confidencialidad de las patentes. En paralelo, Japón también ha trasladado este concepto a sus relaciones bilaterales –en concreto, con Estados Unidos, Corea del Sur o Reino Unido– y los foros en los que participa, como el G7 y el Diálogo Cuadrilateral de Seguridad (QUAD por sus siglas en inglés), siendo especialmente relevante la declaración del G7 durante la cumbre de Hiroshima para la resiliencia económica y seguridad económica en mayo de 2023. Se trata de la primera referencia en el ámbito multilateral en este concepto, lo que es indicativo de su consolidación en la agenda y la cooperación internacional.En paralelo, estas iniciativas para la seguridad económica se encuentran vinculadas de forma indirecta a la propuesta de Tokio de un «Indopacífico Libre y Abierto» (FOIP por sus siglas en inglés), una estrategia presentada en 2016 que busca defender el orden internacional basado en normas, la promoción de la paz y la prosperidad conjunta, la seguridad marítima y aérea y el desarrollo de la conectividad en la región. Resulta difícil desvincular este enfoque de la creciente asertividad de Beijing en el mar de China Meridional y del imperativo de preservar la libertad de navegación por esta artería de comunicación que es vital para Japón, pero también para el resto de mundo, ya que por ella discurre aproximadamente un tercio del comercio mundial. Si bien los principios de apertura e inclusividad de la FOIP podrían ser vistos como contrapuestos a la seguridad económica ‒especialmente debido a la competición económica entre Beijing y Tokio en la región‒, la cooperación en este ámbito depende de una región abierta y libre, y viceversa. Es más, es mediante un mayor desarrollo de la conectividad y los intercambios con los países de la región (incluyendo a los miembros de ASEAN y la India) que Tokio puede diversificar su cartera comercial y potenciar su resiliencia económica.También la Unión Europea ha adoptado el principio de seguridad económica en el último año. Las disrupciones en la cadena de suministros durante la pandemia, el cierre del grifo del gas ruso tras la invasión rusa de Ucrania y la restricción de importaciones que China aplicó a Lituania tras la apertura de una oficina de representación de Taiwán en 2021, han sido poderosos incentivos para la adopción de instrumentos que garanticen la seguridad económica de la Unión. Entre las diferentes medidas adoptadas, destacan cuatro tipos de mecanismos: 1) la revitalización de la política industrial y la adopción de iniciativas políticas para mejorar la capacidad de producción y la productividad en la UE; 2) los esfuerzos de diversificación y almacenamiento para reducir las dependencias en productos y recursos naturales; 3) la adopción de medidas para contrarrestar mecanismos externos que dotan a los competidores de mayor competitividad – como los mecanismos antisubvención– y, 4) herramientas dedicadas a la competición estratégica, como el instrumento de anticoerción o el control de exportación de ciertos productos (Burguete, 2023). Más recientemente, en enero de 2024, Bruselas ha presentado nuevas iniciativas dirigidas a fortalecer su Estrategia de Seguridad Económica, propuesta por primera vez en junio de 2023. Con un enfoque más geopolítico y similar al de Washington, Bruselas busca un control más estricto de las inversiones, mayor coordinación en el control de exportaciones, inversiones para la investigación en tecnologías avanzadas y la protección de la innovación, si bien está aún por ver hasta qué punto los diferentes estados miembros aceptarán este nuevo paquete legislativo (Benson, Steinberg and Alvarez-Aragones, 2024)‒.Es posible afirmar que tanto Japón como la UE están adoptando mecanismos diferentes, aunque con perspectivas complementarias que pueden fortalecer las capacidades domesticas para enfrentar los retos que les aguardan. Sin embargo, si bien podemos registrar avances en el ámbito de la seguridad económica ‒como veremos a continuación‒, la cooperación en el ámbito de la desinformación está aún en una fase más temprana. Existe, no obstante, un gran potencial para la cooperación bilateral, al que se suman cada vez más, incentivos inexcusables.III. ¿Una nueva era de cooperación entre Japón y la Unión Europea? En las últimas dos décadas, la relación entre la Unión Europea y Japón ha estado marcada por una gran sintonía entre ambos, con una predominancia de las cuestiones económicas ‒pese a las tensiones y conflictos comerciales de finales del siglo XX‒ que, no obstante, ha tenido una materialización reducida en términos de iniciativas y planes conjuntos (Tanaka, 2013). En 2022, Japón era el segundo socio comercial asiático de la Unión Europea ‒por detrás de China‒ y el séptimo en el mundo. Ese mismo año, las importaciones japonesas por parte de la Unión alcanzaron casi 70.000 millones de euros y, a su vez, la UE exportó más de 71.600 millones de euros (Comisión Europea, 2023).En cuanto al ámbito de seguridad, los avances han sido limitados, coartados por los límites constitucionales de Japón ‒que le imponen restricciones a sus capacidades militares‒ y por la parte europea, debido al complejo entramado securitario y a su parcial superposición con el de la Organización del Tratado del Atlántico Norte (OTAN). La cooperación en este ámbito había estado, hasta hace unos años, circunscrita a formas de seguridad más «blandas», como operaciones antipiratería en Somalia. Cabe recordar que la seguridad tradicional (en su vertiente militar) recae tanto en el caso de la UE como de Japón, en los Estados Unidos, ya que ambos actores son potencias eminentemente económicas, pero que carecen de unas fuerzas militares equiparables. Es, por tanto, una relación que, en materia de seguridad, es más triangular que bilateral, y que no se explica sin la concurrencia de Washington.Esto no ha sido impedimento para que en los últimos años, Bruselas y Tokio hayan estrechado sus lazos, principalmente en asuntos políticos y comerciales. En 2019, ambas partes adoptaron el Acuerdo de Asociación Económica Japón-UE –que ponía fin a la existencia de la mayoría de los aranceles entre ambas economías– y el Acuerdo de Asociación Estratégica –basado en la cooperación y la defensa de valores comunes como la democracia, el estado de derecho, los derechos humanos o el libre comercio–. En este último, Japón y la Unión Europea identificaron como amenazas comunes la ciberseguridad, las catástrofes naturales, el terrorismo, la proliferación de armas de destrucción marina y la (in)seguridad marítima. Ambos acuerdos establecieron un marco vinculante que cementaría una cooperación política, de seguridad y desarrollo enmarcada en valores liberales para sostener conjuntamente el orden internacional basado en reglas.En este nuevo estadio de cooperación, las cuestiones securitarias han ganado importancia debido a que ambos actores perciben una mayor interdependencia e interconexión de su seguridad. Según la Declaración Conjunta de la Cumbre Japón-Unión Europea de julio de 2023, «la seguridad de Europa y la del Indopacífico se encuentran estrechamente interrelacionadas». Y los hechos parecen reafirmarlo; Japón ha sido uno de los países que no ha dudado en mostrar su apoyo a Ucrania tras la invasión rusa de 2022, participando en el régimen internacional de sanciones, así como el envío de armamento a Kiev. La coordinación con la Unión Europea en este ámbito ha sido remarcable.Si atendemos a la Estrategia de la UE para la Cooperación en el Indopacífico publicada en 2021, también Bruselas aspira a una mayor implicación en la seguridad de la región en cuatro dominios principales: la seguridad marítima, el contraterrorismo, la ciberseguridad y la gestión de crisis. No obstante, pese a las ambiciones europeas, existen divergencias en cuanto a la implicación –económica y/o militar– que los distintos estados miembros estarían dispuestos a destinar al Indopacífico. Como sucede a menudo, la política europea hacia la región es la suma resultante de las convergencias y divergencias de los estados miembros. Según una encuesta del European Council for Foreign Relations, 23 estados miembros de los 27 identifican la seguridad como un elemento importante de la estrategia europea para el Indopacífico; no obstante, solo 12 de ellos estarían interesados en contribuir a las operaciones de libertad de navegación y tan solo 4 destinarían buques de guerra a la región (Bélgica, Alemania, Holanda y España). En este ámbito también será importante considerar el papel de la OTAN, que en 2023 elevó la propuesta de abrir una oficina civil de enlace de la Alianza en Tokio, una idea que quedó abandonada principalmente debido a la reticencia francesa ante la posible respuesta de China.Para Japón, aunque sea limitada, la implicación europea en la región es bienvenida y está en consonancia con la creciente interrelación entre la seguridad de Europa y la del Indopacífico. No obstante, más coordinación y comunicación entre los diferentes actores europeos e internacionales presentes en la región, especialmente en el ámbito militar, será esencial para evitar tensiones indeseadas.Finalmente, la cooperación en el ámbito de la seguridad económica ha ganado centralidad en los últimos meses. En junio de 2023, esta cuestión fue de especial relevancia durante el Diálogo Económico de Alto Nivel entre Japón y la Unión Europea, especialmente en lo referente a casos de coerción económica, políticas de no-acceso a mercados, el control de inversiones y de exportaciones, así como acciones destinadas a hacer las cadenas de suministros más resilientes. En la posterior declaración conjunta, ambos actores identificaron múltiples áreas de cooperación en este ámbito, con una referencia clara a minimizar riesgos (de-risking) así como en la cooperación en semiconductores y la protección de infraestructuras críticas, como los cables submarinos. Esta primera referencia hace evidente un enfoque complementario de las estrategias y concepciones de la seguridad económica para ambos actores, ofreciendo un enfoque más holístico.Sin embargo, uno de los retos futuros para garantizar esta cooperación tiene que ver con dos contradicciones fundamentales de la seguridad económica. Por una parte, se trata de un área en la que los intereses económicos y de seguridad nacional pueden entrar en contradicción. Por otra, y debido a la larga lista de cuestiones que contempla ‒desde políticas de seguridad, comerciales, tecnológicas o industriales‒, la seguridad económica tiene una vertiente cooperativa, aunque también competitiva. El predominio de cuestiones de seguridad puede ser a expensas de intereses económicos para ambos actores, tanto en su relación como en sus propias dinámicas domésticas‒ y viceversa. Por lo tanto, una comunicación y coordinación cuidadosa y respetuosa entre ambos acores, así como dentro de ellos, será clave para garantizar una cooperación efectiva entre Japón y la Unión Europea. IV. ConclusionesA lo largo de las dos últimas dos décadas, la relación bilateral UE-Japón ‒que en temas de seguridad deviene triangular por la concurrencia de EEUU‒ ha estado marcada por la estabilidad y el acercamiento. Hay incluso quién afirma que ése es su principal problema: la ausencia de problemas. No obstante, tres factores han propiciado más recientemente una revitalización y el fortalecimiento de la relación:(1) La situación de permacrisis y la aceleración de dinámicas de competición geopolítica y de fractura;(2) Los nuevos equilibrios de poder en el sistema internacional, debido a la consolidación de China como un actor global con capacidad de influencia en cualquier parte del planeta; pero también el auge del Sur Global como nueva «comunidad imaginada» geopolítica que, pese a su diversidad, comparten un creciente interés en explorar alternativas a un orden internacional liderado por Occidente.(3) La aceleración de nuevas dinámicas internacionales, como la digitalización, la emergencia de amenazas híbridas o la reglobalización, que sumadas a la pandemia de la COVID y al inicio de la guerra de Ucrania, que han subrayado nuevas dimensiones de seguridad nacional a los estados.Como resultado, frente a las incertidumbres del futuro y la mayor complicidad entre Tokio y Bruselas, cabe destacar tres cuestiones principales. Primero, en tanto que democracias comprometidas con el sistema multilateral liberal y basado en reglas, Japón y la UE son dos socios naturales‒de «mentalidad afín»‒, que comparten valores y principios, además de un interés vital por mantener la paz y la prosperidad en sus entornos regionales.Segundo, si bien en su conjunto, representan la primera y la cuarta economía del mundo, no disponen de un poder político y militar acorde a su poder económico. No obstante, tras décadas de priorizar la economía y el comercio, ven ahora la necesidad de invertir en su defensa, con vistas a preservar su «autonomía estratégica» y no verse arrastrados a un conflicto contra su voluntad o sus intereses. Además, pese a esta relación triangular en el ámbito militar, ambos actores avanzan en la cooperación de nuevas formas de seguridad, como la seguridad económica. Estas nuevas dinámicas han permitido fortalecer los intercambios y la coordinación entre Tokio y Bruselas, aunque aún existe margen de mejora. En concreto, la cooperación en el ámbito tecnológico, incluyendo la ciberseguridad y la desinformación, ofrece nuevas oportunidades para fortalecer los vínculos y las defensas comunes frente a estos retos.Tercero, aumenta la sensación de que los escenarios de seguridad europeo y asiático están cada vez más conectados, y que la seguridad de Japón, de Corea del Sur o de Taiwán, dependen también y de manera creciente, de lo que suceda en Ucrania. En este escenario, los aliados de EEUU aspiran a ser un jugador activo ‒y no un mero campo de juego‒ de la rivalidad entre Washington y Beijing.Pese a ello, aún existen múltiples áreas para una mayor cooperación entre Tokio y Bruselas y los 27 estados miembros. El reto es acompasar la agenda de los dos actores al tempo de los cambios sistémicos que experimenta el orden internacional, y lograr tener un papel protagonista en ellos, que sea acorde al enorme poder económico, cultural y humano. A meses vista de un posible retorno a la Casa Blanca de Donald Trump, que podría renegar de sus compromisos internacionales y amenazar las alianzas de seguridad, el vínculo entre la UE y Japón puede ser un asidero necesario para enfrentar las turbulencias que nos aguardan. ReferenciasBargués, Pol y Bourekba, Moussa. «La guerra por todos los medios: la intensificación de los conflictos híbridos», en Bargués, Pol, Bourekba, Moussa, y Colomina, Carme. (eds.), Amenazas Híbridas, Orden Vulnerable. Barcelona: CIDOB Report nº 8, 2022, pp. 11-16. Accesible en línea.Benson, Emily; Steinberg, Federico y Álvarez-Aragonés, Pau. «The European Union's Economic Security Strategy Update». CSIS Commentary, 2024. (en línea) [Fecha de consulta: 23.02.2024]. Accesible en línea.Burguete, Víctor. «Contribución de la UE a la reglobalización: de la búsqueda de la autonomía a la estrategia de seguridad económica». Notes Internacionals CIDOB, 298, 2023.Colomina, Carme. «La palabra como arma: de la desinformación a la batalla global por la narrativa» en Bargués, Pol, Bourekba, Moussa, y Colomina, Carme. (eds.), Amenazas Híbridas, Orden Vulnerable. Barcelona: CIDOB Report nº8, 2022, pp. 17-24.Comisión Europea. EU trade Relations with Japan (en línea). [Fecha de consulta: 23.02.2024]. Accesible en línea. García-Herrero, Alicia. China-EU roller-coaster relations: Where do we stand and what to do?. Texto de la comparecencia ante el Congreso de los EEUU, junio de 2023. Accesible en línea.Tanaka, Toshiro. «EU-Japan Relations» en Christiansen, Thomas; Kirchner, Emil y Murray, Philomena (eds), The Palgrave Handbook of EU-Asia Relations, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2013, pp. 509-520.Tirado, Carmen. «Free and Open Indo-Pacific: Una iniciativa japonesa de política exterior para la cooperación global», Global Affairs Journal 2, 2020.Kuwahara, Kyoko. «Disinformation Threats during a Taiwan Contingency and Countermeasures». Research Report, The Japan Institute of International Affairs, March 22, 2022Vidal, Lluc. «Beyond the Gaiatsu Model: Japan's Asia-Pacific Policy and Neoclassical Realism», Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs, 2022, 9(1), pp. 26–49.

The polls in the race for the White House show that the two main candidates, former President Donald Trump and the Democrats' Kamala Harris, are running neck and neck. The surprise effect of the assassination attempts on the former and the rapid nomination of the latter (following President Joe Biden's withdrawal) has subsided, and the presidential election is too close to call. The battle continues in a few key states, and it looks likely it will be another case of the winner of the popular vote failing to secure the electoral college majority required to become president. This Nota Internacional is the product of a collective effort on the part of the CIDOB research team to analyse the main issues on the transatlantic agenda that will surely be impacted by the result. Introduction: Harris and Trump, the known and the unknownPol Morillas, Director of CIDOBEstimating the implications of the US presidential elections for the transatlantic relations recently, a senior European Union (EU) official paraphrased former US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld: should Kamala Harris win, we will remain in the realms of "the known unknown" while if Donald Trump clinches victory, we would enter "the unknown known". We know that Harris stands for continuity in transatlantic relations as the Democratic Party sees them today. The alliance between the United States and the EU remains a fundamental pillar of the international liberal order. It is also the world's biggest bi-regional cooperation framework, both in economic and political terms and in terms of security and values. Western support for Ukraine was key to the failure of the Kremlin's initial intentions, but we know that assisting third countries is increasingly unpopular among certain sectors of the Democratic base, for whom helping disadvantaged communities comes before spending on foreign policy. Without having twisted Israel's arm over its regional offensive in the Middle East, the United States and Europe agree on the need for a ceasefire in Gaza and Lebanon. We also know that Harris is a champion of multilateral cooperation frameworks and of women's and minority rights. What we do not know is to what extent Harris will depart from her predecessor's agenda. The vice president is no child of the Cold War, as Biden certainly is. In the pursuit of foreign policy, she tends to put US interests before ideological frameworks and before an outlook defined by the democracy-authoritarianism cleavage. Relations with the EU may increasingly pass through the strainer of economic protectionism and the transactionalism of US interests, with more or less explicit calls to increase the European contribution to NATO and defence spending, or for the EU's relations with China to fall in line with the de-risking agenda pushed by the White House. Harris is also likely to seek to bolster "minilateral" partnerships with likeminded allies in the Indo-Pacific, such as the Quad or AUKUS, to the detriment of broader and more multilateral regional cooperation frameworks. Divergence with the EU in specific regulatory sectors, from the climate agenda, energy and sustainability to technology and artificial intelligence (AI), may increase too. As for Trump, we have no idea what his temperamental and unpredictable character might bring. We do not know how he means to end the war in Ukraine "in 24 hours" or, to put it another way, what terms he envisages for Ukraine's capitulation in the territories occupied by Russia and the consequences of Trump's cosy relationship with Putin or other "strongmen". We are not aware of how he intends to secure peace with the Palestinians and Arabs when Republican Party foreign policy increasingly draws on messianic evangelist approaches in line with the "Greater Israel" concept. We are, however, familiar with the content of Project 2025, from which Trump tries to distance himself but which has become the handbook of the MAGA (Make America Great Again) movement: co-option of the entire administration by the movement's faithful, a minimal state, extremely transactional foreign policy, contempt for multilateralism and partnership with nationalist and patriotic forces. In the EU, the parties on the radical right will feel vindicated by a victory for Trump. And the risk of disunity among the member states could mean jockeying among leaders from the bloc to be the first to go to the White House, or even a visit by Hungary's Viktor Orbán to Trump's mansion in Mar-a-Lago, congratulating him on his victory, or, perhaps, disputing the legitimacy of elections won by Harris. Foreign and defence policy: elements of continuityPol Bargués, Senior Research Fellow, CIDOBIn defence and foreign policy discussions, Kamala Harris and Donald Trump are more similar than they would care to admit, more than what is often acknowledged in analysis and academic comparisons and more than how the candidates define themselves. Taking a conciliatory and normative tone, Harris champions the defence of democracy on a global scale, multilateralism and international relations predicated on respect for laws and rules. She accuses Trump of choosing isolationism, relinquishing the sense of responsibility, belittling allies and opting for unilateral action. Harris is proud of the leadership that President Joe Biden provides on foreign policy, highlighting his support for Ukraine. She vows to continue defending the country in order to safeguard the security of Europe, while stating that if Trump were in power, Putin would already be in Kyiv. With a more strident, controversial and Manichaean tone, Trump espouses an isolationist policy that stands in contrast to the supposed liberal internationalism and cosmopolitanism of the Democrats, hence the "America First" and "Make America Great Again" mantras. Trump declares himself to be the most "pro-Israel" president in history and warns voters that Harris would be the "most anti-Israel". He regularly criticises the Biden administration's lack of "fierceness" and constantly brags that he would resolve the Russia-Ukraine or Israel-Palestine conflicts "in one day". Yet Trump's fortress America is not so different to that of Harris, who boasts that for the first time this century the United States is neither involved in a war nor has troops fighting in any corner of the world. On defence, both candidates agree on modernising the armed forces (and on not wanting to increase them) and place great importance on deterrence in a world of competing powers. They have little to say about fragile or failed states, or about the threat of international terrorism, let alone about how their troops could assist in the reconstruction of nations and states in Africa or Latin America, a common feature of debates in previous decades. Both Harris and Trump point to China as the main enemy. Harris believes that China's influence is the "leading national security threat" while Trump, who already embarked on a trade war with Beijing in his first term, is now announcing that he will step up technological and industrial confrontation. Both support Israel politically and militarily and stand firm against Iran and its allies. Nor does the decision taken on Afghanistan divide them. As was clear in the presidential debate, they blame each other for the controversial troop withdrawal. Harris reproaches Trump for having negotiated with the Taliban in 2020; Trump is scathing about the deaths of a dozen US soldiers during the troop pull-out under the Biden administration in 2021. But they do not dispute the drawdown decision, and both are committed to steering clear of direct military intervention in the Middle East.This is not to ignore the differences. There is significant disagreement over the Ukraine war, for example, even though both candidates criticise Vladmir Putin's expansionism. While Harris always underscores the need to continue supporting Ukraine for as long as needed, Trump, who acknowledges he gets on well with Putin, brags about his plan to end the war in 24 hours. There are also clear differences in manners and the cordiality shown to allies in Europe and NATO (which Harris acclaims and Trump questions). As a marker, we cannot forget that during his presidency Trump sought to destroy the liberal international order and withdraw from multilateral agreements, which the Biden administration has wanted to restore. Ultimately, it is about observing how this world of mounting geopolitical confrontation shapes a major power in retreat: Trump and Harris share allies and villains, and they are inclined to pursue a cautious policy towards the outside world.Competition with China: the devil is in the detailInés Arco Escriche, Research Fellow, CIDOBChina is perhaps the presidential candidates' most important point of convergence. Republicans and Democrats are of the same mind on both the diagnosis (Beijing is a threat) and the general dynamics of relations (strategic competition). Whoever wins, there will be a continuation of the antagonistic approach to the Asian giant that increasingly permeates domestic debates and policies on the economy, technology or climate change. That said, there are significant nuances and disagreement reigns on the central issues and the strategies for competing with China. While Harris has still to spell out her policy on China, in a 2023 interview she said that competition with Beijing "is about de-risking". The focus of a new Democratic administration will be on managing the rivalry by continuing the Biden administration's incisive strategy, directed at imposing tariffs and export controls in strategic sectors (including renewable energy, semiconductors or medical products) and boosting US industry through greater investment.The "small yard and high fence" strategy devised by Jake Sullivan will be complemented by "broad coalitions" to coordinate with allies in response to Chinese assertiveness both on Taiwan and the South China Sea disputes. The choice of Minnesota Governor Tim Walz as the potential vice president, someone who has extensive experience of China, also signals a readiness to maintain an open dialogue and a certain pragmatism with the rival.Trump's intent, meanwhile, is decoupling at any cost. For one thing, the former president aims to "secure strategic independence from China" by revoking its most favoured nation trade status and imposing 60% tariffs on all goods of Chinese origin, at the expense of an estimated cost to American households of nearly $2,600 a year. For another, we may see a resurrection of measures similar to the China Initiative, which led to the near persecutory investigation of Chinese and Asian academics in US universities to prevent the theft of intellectual property. As the Stop AAPI Hate platform points out, these measures were discriminatory and fuelled an increase in racism against Americans of Asian descent. Trump's isolationist and transactional approach will also impact relations with other international actors, including Taiwan. The Republican has already warned Taipei that it "should pay for its defence" and he accuses the country of "taking our chip business". But Trump's erratic rhetoric, with constant praise for Chinese President Xi Jinping, could reach new heights in a new, second administration, depending on his team. Figures such as Matt Pottinger, former deputy national security advisor, explicitly advocate for a regime change in China, while other voices that are contenders for the State Department post, like Elbridge Colby or Robert O'Brien, are opposed. And what does Beijing make of it all? In the Chinese authorities' view, there are scarcely any differences between the two candidates: neither is good nor an unknown quantity. But given the adverse context and China's risk aversion, it may prefer the predictability of Harris to the volatility of Trump. Technology: geopolitical consensus, regulatory question marksJavier Borràs, Research Fellow, CIDOBThe United States and the EU have taken different tacks on technology over the last few decades. The US model has been fundamentally optimistic, prioritising the free market and innovation. Europe's model, meanwhile, has been more sceptical, using the power of the state to counter that of the big tech companies. A third "digital empire", China, has arisen and generated suspicion both in Washington, because of its impact on US hegemony, and in Brussels, because of its statist-authoritarian mould.In the later stages of the Biden administration, however, there has been greater convergence between the US and European views. For one thing, the EU has "Americanised" its position towards Beijing by placing tough restrictions on exports of advanced hardware and limiting Chinese investment in cutting-edge technological sectors. In turn, the United States has "Europeanised", with greater regulation of Big Tech and antitrust lawsuits against Google, Apple, Meta or Amazon.What will it mean for this new US take on technology – more confrontational with China, more pro-regulation – if Kamala Harris wins the election or, on the other hand, Donald Trump is victorious? As far as technological competition with China is concerned, no matter who wins the policy pursued by Biden will remain intact. In a highly polarised United States, one of the few things Democrats and Republicans can agree on is support for fierce competition with China in which technology plays a central role.There are more question marks over the field of regulation. While Harris is thought to be ready to continue Biden's policies, her links to Silicon Valley and her political tenure in the pro-tech California may indicate that while the battle with Big Tech will go on, it is not going to intensify. The mere implementation of her predecessor's initiatives may be enough to satisfy a Democratic base that called for more regulation.In the case of the Republicans, the situation is not so clear. Primarily, because of the unpredictability of Donald Trump, who has championed less regulation in some areas, but at the same time has repeatedly attacked firms from Silicon Valley. Nor does his candidate for vice president, J.D. Vance, offer more certainty. He has received support from tech figures such as Peter Thiel, while he has also come out in favour of "breaking up" Google. Although the Republicans have garnered support from the more "personalistic" and venture capital end of Silicon Valley – Elon Musk, Marc Andreessen – most of the "corporate" side remains in the Democratic camp.Over the next few years, the most important tech issue for the United States will be artificial intelligence (AI). In this field, geopolitical competition and regulatory effort converge. There is a fear that regulating AI too much will favour China, yet, at the same time, underregulating will trigger unexpected crises and inequalities. The United States sees AI as the key to staying ahead of China. But to do so, AI must meet the revolutionary expectations attributed to it, something over which there is growing scepticism. In addition, AI may once again stretch the traditional transatlantic ideological-technological divergence, with a United States (again) more open to the risks of AI and an EU more inclined to regulate it.Trade: following Biden's lead or tariff warPatricia Garcia Duran, Associate Researcher, CIDOB The EU is one of the world's major trading powers, along with the United States and China. According to Eurostat, in 2023 the EU exported and imported goods totalling €5.07tn (not including trade within the bloc). This was €417bn less than China and €271bn more than the United States. The biggest goods exporter in the world is China (17.5% of the total), the second biggest is the EU (14.3%) and in third place is the United States (10.5%). But the US is the world's biggest importer of goods (15.9% of the total), followed by the EU (13.7%) and then by China (12.9%). For the EU, the United States is its chief customer and, therefore, it takes a keen interest in its trade policy.Despite US importance in global trade and its traditional liberal approach, the last decade has seen a tightening of its trade policy. During his time as president, Donald Trump blocked new appointments to the World Trade Organization (WTO) appellate body, hamstringing its ability to resolve international trade disputes, which debilitated the organisation. He also entered into a trade war with China, raising tariffs above 20% and blocking technology exports. And he clashed with his allies, the EU included, over several products (such as steel and aluminium). It was a period fraught with trade tension. In the subsequent Joe Biden presidency, America has maintained high tariffs and its control of exports to China, as well as the block on the WTO's appellate body. It has, however, made up with its allies by reaching cooperation agreements such the establishment of the Trade and Technology Council (TTC) with the EU or the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) in Asia, in support of strengthening the Western bloc. Reviewing events since 2017 helps us to understand what might happen in the future, depending on who wins the upcoming presidential election. If Kamala Harris is victorious, things will remain pretty much as they are: the EU will be able to continue its close cooperation via the TTC and the United States will pressure it to be tougher on China. If Trump wins, however, the situation will be one of tension again, both globally and between the EU and the United States. The candidate has promised to raise tariffs to 60% on goods from China and to 10% for the rest of the world. He has also vowed a 15% tax rate for products that are "made in America" to attract investment from the world's biggest manufacturers. Trump intends to attack the foundations of the WTO and enter into a tariff and investment war that would also impact the EU. Disinformation: political violence and alternative realitiesCarme Colomina, Senior Research Fellow, CIDOBAmericans are heading into elections that, according to Donald Trump, could be "rigged" even before they are held. The US deputy attorney general has warned of an "unprecedented rise" in threats to public officials and election workers, "from elected or appointed secretaries of state to volunteers" at polling sites. The Department of Justice has filed hundreds of lawsuits and warned of the risk this increase in threats of violence and actual violence poses to election security. According to a Reuters/Ipsos poll, two out of three Americans say they are concerned about the risk of political violence and election vengeance after November 5th, recalling the storming of the Capitol on January 6th, 2021. The toxicity of the election debate in the United States echoes across the Atlantic: from theories of supposed election fraud to outbursts of political violence during campaigns; from the assassination attempt on Donald Trump at a rally in Butler, Pennsylvania, to the shooting that wounded the prime minister of Slovakia, Robert Fico, in May 2024. The strengthening of extremes, the hardening of language and verbal violence against adversaries mean election campaigns and political dynamics are more fraught, both in the EU and in the United States. Yet these transatlantic similarities are highly nuanced. First, there is the role that social media play and differing conceptions of the limits of freedom of expression; and second, there is the matter of who is behind the disinformation contaminating the public debate. Elon Musk's entry into the campaign as guest of honour on stage, cheerleading for Trump, and as an interviewer and spreader of fake news, symbolises what the EU means to curtail with its Digital Services Act (DSA). In the two years since Musk bought and renamed Twitter as X, he has posted or reposted 52 messages about noncitizen voting, which have reached nearly 700m views, according to a Washington Post analysis. In the circumstances, the European Commission has engaged in its own battle against Musk. Following a seven-month investigation, last July Brussels denounced the X platform, stating that the social media outlet's blue checkmarks for verified users are deceptive and in breach of the EU bloc's transparency and accountability requirements, in addition to failing to comply with advertising transparency rules. Yet, despite the initial headlines, the commission probe into "the dissemination of illegal content and the effectiveness of measures taken to combat information manipulation" remains ongoing. Despite the legislation introduced in the EU, Brussels is well aware of the battle for freedom of expression raging in the United States and of the problems facing the Biden administration and all those who have tried to discuss the limits of online toxicity. A Congress investigation, led by a Republican, Jim Jordan, in late 2022 accused the Biden administration of forcing the major tech firms to censor conservative voices and gag Americans in general. Over the last few months, the European far right has begun to echo those talking points and there is a sense of an incipient risk of importing a divisive politicisation of the debate on disinformation to this side of the Atlantic too.In addition, while the EU remains obsessed with Russian interference in the European debate, in the United States, even with Department of Justice accusations against certain campaigns linked to Russia and Iran, controversy over foreign influence that marked the 2016 campaign has been eclipsed by the volume of disinformation generated by actors at home and particularly by Donald Trump himself. The Republican candidate, who on the very day he took office in January 2017 coined the idea of "alternative facts" to mould his own narrative, has ended up embracing an "alternative reality" where immigrants eat pets, there are states in which it is legal to abort after giving birth and where insult, discredit and hate speech form part of his estimation of the "other", starting with his rival, Kamala Harris.Immigration: everything ends at the border Blanca Garcés, Senior Research Fellow, CIDOBImmigration is once again one of the hot button issues of the election campaign. It is hardly surprising if one considers that, according to the polls, it counts among the public's chief concerns. It is, moreover, a topic that divides the electorate. While six out of ten Republican voters favour deporting undocumented immigrants, almost nine out of ten Democratic voters are of the opposite opinion, that is to say, they think they should be able to stay legally. It is hard to know what comes first, the polarisation of the electorate or the polarisation of the debate. The Republicans paint the Democrats as inept, accusing them of sparking a crisis at the border with their liberal policies. The Democrats argue that the Republicans' "tough" policies fail to address the structural causes of migration and are contrary to the core values of the United States. In terms of concrete measures, Donald Trump vows that if he is president, he will carry out mass deportations and end the right to citizenship by birth. Kamala Harris, meanwhile, says that she will continue to work towards passing a new act that restricts irregular entries (blocked in Congress by the Republicans until now) and facilitate lawful entry pathways.There are also differences in what the two governments have done to date. The Biden administration, for example, immediately halted two of Trump's policies: the one forcing asylum seekers to remain in Mexico awaiting the settlement of their appeals and the one separating children from parents arriving at the border irregularly. More recently, in June 2024, the Democratic administration recognised the right to remain and work of undocumented spouses of US citizens, a regularisation measure that would be unthinkable under a Republican government. Where there have barely been any fundamental differences is, once again, at the border. Under pressure from a rise in irregular arrivals, which in 2023 hit a record annual high of over 2.4m attempted crossings, and from Democratic mayors in cities overwhelmed by the increase in arrivals from the south of the country, in June 2024 the Biden administration passed an executive order allowing, in pure Trump style, the immediate deportation of immigrants without the need to process their asylum requests.This flip-flopping, or yielding at the border, is not exclusive to Biden. Remember that Obama deported more aliens that any other president before him. With an eye on the presidency, Harris too has moderated her positions, now championing the construction of the border wall, express asylum processes or deportation policies. "There must be consequences" for immigrants who cross the border irregularly, she recalled during the campaign.If they win, immigration will remain an awkward issue for the Democrats. Whatever they do, it will be too little for some (immigrant rights defenders) and too much for others (proponents of a hard line on immigration). Meanwhile, Donald Trump continues to gesticulate and make incendiary remarks. In his case, it makes no difference what he says and what he ends up doing. As in Europe, for voters of those who espouse populist and anti-immigration positions, rhetoric counts for more than actual facts. It is precisely this that means, on this issue at least, they have everything to gain.The United States and the multipolar geopolitics of the Global South Anna Ayuso, Senior Research Fellow, CIDOBFaced with mounting instability and international competition, demands are emerging from the Global South given the perceived stasis of the Global North. Neither the Trump nor Biden administration has had a clear strategy towards a group of nations they consider heterogenous and lacking in cohesion. Trump, with his Manichaean division of the world into friends and enemies, identified them as a threat to be confronted. The Biden administration too has been wary of China's attempts to style itself as the leader of the Global South in opposition to the liberal order. In the early years of his term, Biden tried to forge alliances by championing democracy and liberal values to check the advance of illiberal and autocratic regimes.More recently, however, he has gradually been settling for a more pragmatic and less ideological stance, pursuing a diplomacy of variable geometry based on strengthening common interests with the emerging powers of the Global South. This has resulted in a new approach, one that has seen the president, the vice president and the secretary of state engage in an enhanced round of contacts with Global South countries, as well as with regional bodies like the African Union (AU) or the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). This strategy, of which Harris forms a part, seeks to strengthen economic ties based on mutual interest, rather than on ideological factors. The Democratic candidate represents a more open attitude towards the Global South, more multilateralist than Trump, as long as the national interest is not at risk. Harris has said that the United States will win the 21st century competition between major powers without abdicating global leadership. Trump, on the other hand, takes a more defensive and isolationist position, opposed to overspending on cooperation with third parties, unless it is to America's benefit. A clear example are the different approaches to the climate agenda, where the two candidates' positions are conflicting and have major repercussions for the Global South. If Trump returns to the White House, fresh cuts for United Nations agencies are probably on the way, as was the case in his first term, placing the multilateral system in jeopardy. There are other fronts in US relations with the Global South with transatlantic implications. Many Global South countries do not share the position of the United States and its European allies on the war in Ukraine and reject sanctions on Moscow. They also accuse the West of double standards in the Middle East. The war in Gaza and its spread into Lebanon have compounded America's loss of prestige in the Global South, which extends to the West and the United Nations too, owing to their ineffectiveness. The Democratic administration has come round to the possibility of a reform of the Security Council, something the United States had traditionally resisted. It agrees with the EU and the Global South on this, though with differences over the scope of the reforms, as demonstrated in the negotiation of the Pact for the Future adopted in September 2024. A fresh failure of the reforms would debilitate an already beleaguered collective security system, with collateral damage in NATO.Other fronts open with the Global South are the growing demands for a reform of the international financial architecture and, more specifically, funding for the 2030 Agenda and addressing the debt problem. Negotiations at the Fourth International Conference on Financing for Development, to be held in Spain in 2025, will be compromised with an administration that is averse to multilateralism. Lack of progress in the reforms poses the risk of greater fragmentation of the financial system and the rise of alternative channels like those promoted by the BRICS. This is already reflected in the bid for the dedollarisation of transactions, which seeks to reduce reliance on the US currency and thus weaken its global position. The continuation of a Democratic administration would mean a consolidation of the diplomatic approach, which favours multilateral governance like that promoted by the EU. A reissue of Trump, meanwhile, bodes greater confrontation with the Global South. But in either case demands from the Global South will continue to emerge and present a challenge to the status quo. Only a pro-multilateralism government in the United States will allow it to move forward with its partners in the reforms required to modernise the international system and make it more inclusive and effective, as the Global South countries are calling for.Climate change: breathing space or a fresh withdrawal from the Paris AgreementRicardo Martinez, Senior Research Fellow, CIDOBWith 2024 poised to be the hottest year on record, the presidential elections in the United States are of transcendental importance for the global climate agenda. As the second largest greenhouse gas emitter after China, a victory for Donald Trump would probably mean abandoning once and for all the increasingly difficult goal of keeping global warming to 1.5°C below preindustrial levels. According to estimates made by CarbonBrief in early 2024, Donald Trump's return to the White House could spell an additional 4bn tonnes of US emissions of CO2 equivalent by 2030 compared with Joe Biden's measures, a figure that matches the combined annual emissions of the EU and Japan. A victory for Kamala Harris, meanwhile, would keep the climate agenda as a political priority. On rejoining the Paris Agreement in 2021, the Biden-Harris administration pledged a 50-52% reduction in the country's greenhouse gas emissions by 2030 compared to 2005 levels, exceeding the target set by the Democratic former president, Barack Obama, in 2015. The cornerstone of the Biden administration's climate policy was the adoption of the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA). Cast as the broadest package of climate measures in the country's history, it secured the approval of the Senate precisely thanks to Vice President Harris's tie-breaking vote. Despite her recent change of stance on banning fracking, the controversial method of gas and oil extraction, the Democratic candidate's record on the environment is unquestionable compared with the Republican, as shown by Harris's first steps as attorney general of California between 2011 and 2017, when she brought lawsuits against oil companies over environmental damage and irregularities. Negotiations at COP29 in Azerbaijan will take place immediately after the elections, in an international climate deeply marked by two diametrically opposed scenarios. If Trump is re-elected, his campaign team has announced that he would expand domestic production of oil and gas and would withdraw the United States from the Paris Agreement again1 and even from the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). With or without this decision, a second Trump administration would issue a dangerous signal of relaxation to the more reluctant hydrocarbons-producing countries, undermining both international climate support and the bilateral climate agreements with China. Likewise, given the EU's initiative of introducing a carbon tax on imports, transatlantic trade relations would be put under further strain. In turn, if the United States once again disengaged from international climate action, the EU could take on the mantle of global leadership, in cooperation with China. With an America still far from reaching the emissions reduction goal it has set itself, a Harris administration, meanwhile, could, quite literally, provide some breathing space by redoubling efforts both nationally and globally in support of the energy transition required to fulfil the Paris Agreement.Note:1- When Trump announced the decision to withdraw the country from the Paris Agreement in 2017, he said he had been elected to represent the people of Pittsburgh, not Paris. The decision was condemned by the mayor of Pittsburgh himself, who instead did pledge to honour the global climate goals, along with a further 406 American mayors. DOI: https://doi.org/10.24241/NotesInt.2024/310/enAll the publications express the opinions of their individual authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of CIDOB or its donor