Suchergebnisse

Cover -- Half Title -- Series Page -- Title Page -- Copyright Page -- Contents -- List of figures -- List of tables -- 1 Competition: a novel concept? -- 2 Competition traits as psychological drivers -- 3 Competition within an organization -- 4 Competing with an organization -- 5 Governance from the competition perspective -- 6 Competition and governance in the future -- Index.

While many studies have focused on the link between economics and democracy in exploring the strategies adopted by developing countries, they have tended to overlook the role of bureaucracy in democratization. This study seeks the missing link between bureaucracy and democratization. What are the conditions necessary for bureaucracy to facilitate the democratization process of a country? This article begins by briefly reviewing the bureaucracy literature from Max Weber and Karl Marx and then argues that despite its shortcomings, bureaucracy in its Weberian form can facilitate the political democratization of a developmental state. This study concludes that although bureaucracy is often regarded as dysfunctional, it can be instrumental in the democratization process in the context of the developmental state.

While participatory e-government is increasingly advocated, few studies have investigated whether it is feasible across all national contexts. This study investigates how certain contextual features influence the success of participatory applications of e-government. In particular, it assesses how the political, economic, and social context in which a particular government operates influence the introduction of participatory e-government, and compares participatory e-government applications in Romania and South Korea. These nations possess important similarities and differences in their political, social, and economic contexts. The study results suggest that the success of participatory e-government projects is to a large extent contingent upon political and economic factors and less related to social factors.

This study explores the effects of information technology (IT) in terms of longitudinal changes in organizational structures at the central government level. Interestingly, although IT has increased the ratio of middle managers to subordinates, the number of middle managers has not changed radically and, in some cases, has steadily increased, while the proportion of lower‐level employees has decreased. Contrary to the belief in a pyramid structure, the actual form of an agency looks like a rocket. The analysis shows that IT effects on the agency's morphology differ according to the core technology of the agency. However, these effects seem to be constrained by the rigidity of the Korean government in terms of organizational management. This article proposes that agency autonomy in fitting the organizational structure to the real work situation is a necessary condition for seeing the full effects of e‐government.

This article elucidates the temporal dimension of time stress among employees in public organizations. Employees working at five agencies in Indiana were surveyed. Job characteristics and personal variables such as overtime, repetitiveness, gender, family obligation, and age group were found to be insignificant as time stressors. However, political factors such as level of government, goal awareness, political sensitivity, and time allotted for meetings were significant independent variables affecting time stress. To enhance performance in the public sector, especially when a merit pay system is not fully instituted, more attention needs to be paid to the time dimension.

This paper proposes a new approach to organizational studies that places greater empahsis upon the temporal dimension. Time is seen to be a key variable to explain the observed differences in organizational effectiveness. To explore the relationship between a ministry's core function and its internal operation, this study examines two polar cases for the Republic of Korea: the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry (MAF), and the Ministry of Information and Communication (MIC). The hypothesis is that the time span required by the core fucntions of the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry is greater than that of the Ministry of Information and Communication. In order to test this hypothesis, this study administered questionnaires to high-ranking civil servants in both ministries. From their responses, we find that the hypothesis is rejected. Indeed, the opposite hypothesis is supported with a statistical significance of 0.10. This finding can be explained by the uniform standard operating procedures used by Korean ministries in areas such as planning, decision-making procedure, career system, etc. To interpret this pshenomenon from a time perspective, we argue that there is a discrepancy betwen task time and sequential time and the role of politics in the bureaucracy. This paper proposes to consider time variable as important in the sense that to become more effective, each ministry must differentiate between its organizational structures and internal operational principles with explicit reference to the temporal characteristics of the ministry's core function.

This paper argues the limits of New Public Management reforms. More precisely, it examines the process of introducing pulic service charters in Korean local governments simply benchmarking fom western countries. Having elaborated two opposing models, the Jupiter and Hercules models, this paper defines public service charter as a reform based on the Hercules model, which goes against Korean public administration based on Jupiter model. From this theoretical viewpoint, I examine the way of introducing this reform and discuss its questionable cost and effectiveness.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the evolution of the intergovernmental relations in Korea since the decentralization reforms begun in 1991. This study evaluates the Korean experience of 10 years of decentralization has significantly changed the decision-making structure in the country. Even though the apparent framework of tiers and local governments are the same as those before decentralization reform, the real number of decision-making units has increased and a new decision making structure has emerged since the introduction of local elections. The creation of local council as well as the elections of heads of local government brought about the loss of the central government's controlling power over local governments. However many people are not satisfied with the actual state of decentralization. Constrains and limits that most local governments face support this thesis. In this point of view, the experience of the last ten years can be summarized as 'controlled decentralization'. However, the central government is not totally responsible for this dissatisfaction. Citizens' low participation and local governments' incapacity and inefficiency are also responsible. These resulted in 'the New Iron Triangle' Model of decision making.