The effect of employment protection on worker effort: a comparison of absenteeism during and after probation
In: Working paper series Center for Economic Studies ; Ifo Institute ; 596
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In: Working paper series Center for Economic Studies ; Ifo Institute ; 596
In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Band 67, Heft 3-4, S. 820-831
This paper shows that monitoring a partner too much in the initial phase of a relationship may not be optimal if the goal is to determine his loyalty to the match and if the cost of ending the relationship increases over time. The intuition is simple: by monitoring too much we learn less about how the partner will behave when he is not monitored. Only by giving to the partner the possibility to mis-behave might he be tempted to do it, and only in this case is there a chance to learn his type at a time where separation would be possible at a relatively low cost.
In: NBER Working Paper No. w12369
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In: IZA Discussion Paper No. 2207
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In: Journal of labor economics: JOLE, Band 24, Heft 1, S. 39-57
ISSN: 1537-5307
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In: NBER macroeconomics annual, Band 10, S. 13
ISSN: 1537-2642
In: Journal of labor economics: JOLE, Band 22, Heft 1, S. 57-87
ISSN: 1537-5307
In: CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP17284
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Working paper
In: Journal of political economy, Band 128, Heft 1, S. 158-205
ISSN: 1537-534X
In: CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP14664
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Working paper
Exploiting admission thresholds in a Regression Discontinuity Design, we study the causal effects of daycare at age 0–2 on cognitive and non-cognitive outcomes at age 8–14. One additional month in daycare reduces IQ by 0.5% (4.5% of a standard deviation). Effects for conscientiousness are small and imprecisely estimated. Psychologists suggest that children in daycare experience fewer one-to-one interactions with adults, which should be particularly relevant for girls who are more capable than boys of exploiting cognitive stimuli at an early age. In line with this interpretation, losses for girls are larger and more significant, especially in affluent families.
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In: American economic review, Band 104, Heft 2, S. 609-623
ISSN: 1944-7981
A single worker allocates her time among different projects which are progressively assigned. When the worker works on too many projects at the same time, the output rate decreases and completion time increases according to a law which we derive. We call this phenomenon "task juggling" and argue that it is pervasive in the workplace. We show that task juggling is a strategic substitute of worker effort. We then present a model where task juggling is the result of lobbying by clients, or coworkers, each seeking to get the worker to apply effort to his project ahead of the others'. (JEL J22, M12, M54)
In: NBER Working Paper No. w15946
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