The Aftermath of Defeats in War: Between Revenge and Recovery
Intro -- Acknowledgments -- Book Abstract -- Contents -- Chapter 1: Introduction and Theoretical Framework -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Why Defeat? -- 3 Theoretical Framework -- 3.1 National Self-Images -- 3.2 Political Parties -- 3.2.1 Strong Political Parties -- 3.2.2 Weak Political Parties -- 3.2.3 Strength of Opposition Forces -- 3.3 International Environment -- 4 Methodology -- 4.1 Case Selection -- 4.2 Criteria for Case Selection -- 4.3 Typology of Defeat/Intensity of Defeat -- 4.4 Total Defeat -- 4.5 Dire/Decisive Defeat -- 4.6 Colonial Defeats -- 4.7 Temporary Defeats -- 4.8 Criteria for Exclusion -- 4.9 Criteria for Inclusion -- 4.10 Structured, Focused Comparison -- Chapter 2: Egypt: Defeat and the Transformation of State and Society -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Notes on Whether Defeat Is a Catalyst or a Causal Variable -- 3 Various Explanations of the Causes of Defeat -- 4 Egypt's Self-Image -- 5 Political Organizations -- 6 Strong Presidency -- 7 Public Pressures After Defeat -- 8 Domestic Changes -- 8.1 Left Radicalism -- 8.2 Islamist Militant Radicalism -- 8.3 Conclusions on Domestic Changes and Radicalization -- 9 Changes in Foreign Policy -- 9.1 Nasser's Foreign Policy -- 9.2 Sadat's Foreign Policy -- 9.3 Regional Effects/Strategic Environment -- 9.4 Concluding Remarks on Egypt's Foreign Policy -- 10 Conclusion -- Chapter 3: Bulgaria: Defeat and Nationalist Demobilization During the Peasant Era -- 1 Introduction -- 2 The Balkan Wars -- 3 The First World War -- 4 National Self-Image -- 5 Political Organizations/Bulgarian Agrarian National Union (BANU) -- 6 The Impact of Defeat -- 6.1 BANU Consolidating and Discrediting Established Parties -- 6.2 Turn Away from Irredentism -- 6.3 Domestic Reforms -- 6.4 Cooperative Foreign Policy -- 7 The Descent: The June 1923 Coup -- 8 Conclusion -- Chapter 4: Hungary: The Cult of Defeat -- 1 Introduction.