Suchergebnisse

This paper investigates the output effects of IMF-supported stabilization programs, especially those introduced at the time of a severe balance of payments/currency crisis. Using a panel data set over the 1975-97 period and covering 67 developing and emerging-market economies (with 461 IMF stabilization programs and 160 currency crises), we find that currency crises - even after controlling for macroeconomic developments, political and regional factors - significantly reduce output growth for 1-2 years. Output growth is also lower (0.7 percentage points annually) during IMF-stabilization programs, but it appears coinciding with recent balance of payments or currency crises do not appear to further damage short-run growth prospects. Countries participating in IMF programs significantly reduce domestic credit growth, but no effect is found on budget policy. Applying this model to the collapse of output in East Asia following the 1997 crisis, we find that the unexpected (forecast error) collapse of output in Malaysia - where an IMF-program was not followed - was similar in magnitude to those countries adopting IMF programs (Indonesia, Korea, Philippines and Thailand).

The great Japanese stagnation: lessons for industrial countries / Michael M. Hutchinson, Takatoshi Ito, Frank Westermann -- Bank fragility in Japan / Takatoshi Ito, Kimie Harada -- Deposit insurance, regulatory forbearance, and economic growth: implications for the Japanese banking crisis / Robert Dekle, Ken Kletzer -- Determinants of voluntary bank disclosure: evidence from Japanese Shinkin banks / Mark M. Spiegel, Nobuyoshi Yamori -- Secondary bank lending in Japan / Zekeriya Eser, Joe Peer, Eric S. Rosengren -- Monetary policy in the great stagnation / Yoichi Arai, Takeo Hoshi -- The policy duration effect and zero interest rates: an application of wavelet analysis / Kunio Okina, Shigenori Shiratsuka -- Exchange rate pass-through in deflationary Japan: how effective is the Yen's depreciation for fighting deflation? / Eiji Fujii -- Japan's imbalance of payments / Nikolas Müller-Plantenberg

Studies of central bank intervention are complicated by the fact that we typically observe intervention only during periods of turbulent exchange markets. Furthermore, entering the market during these particular periods is a conscious self-selection" choice made by the intervening central bank. We estimate the counterfactual" exchange rate movements that allow us to determine what would have occurred in the absence of intervention and we introduce the method of propensity score matching to the intervention literature in order to estimate the average treatment effect" (ATE) of intervention. Specifically, we estimate the ATE for daily Bank of Japan intervention over the January 1999 to March 2004 period. This sample encompasses a remarkable variation in intervention frequencies as well as unprecedented frequent intervention towards the latter part of the period. We find that the effects of intervention vary dramatically and inversely with the frequency of intervention: Intervention is effective over the 1999 to 2002 period, ineffective during 2003 and counterproductive during the first quarter of 2004.

Studies of central bank intervention are complicated by the fact that we typically observe intervention only during periods of turbulent exchange markets. Furthermore, entering the market during these particular periods is a conscious "self-selection" choice made by the intervening central bank. We estimate the "counterfactual" exchange rate movements that allow us to determine what would have occurred in the absence of intervention and we introduce the method of propensity score matching to the intervention literature in order to estimate the "average treatment effect" (ATE) of intervention. Specifically, we estimate the ATE for daily Bank of Japan intervention over the January 1999 to March 2004 period. This sample encompasses a remarkable variation in intervention frequencies as well as unprecedented frequent intervention towards the latter part of the period. We find that the effects of intervention vary dramatically and inversely with the frequency of intervention: Intervention is effective over the 1999 to 2002 period, ineffective during 2003 and counterproductive during the first quarter of 2004.