Suchergebnisse

Cover -- Half Title -- Title Page -- Copyright Page -- Original Title Page -- Original Copyright Page -- Dedication Page -- Contents -- Preface and Acknowledgments -- Part One Introduction -- Chapter One Conceptualizing Change in Soviet National Security -- Part Two The Context of Change -- Chapter Two Military Crisis and Social Change in Russian and Soviet History -- Chapter Three The Soviet Debate over "New Thinking" and the Restructuring of U.S.-Soviet Relations -- Chapter Four The Soviet Economy: Growth, Decay, and Reform -- Part Three The Change Agents -- Chapter Five Modernization and the Military-Civil Competition for Resources: Gorbachev's Dilemma -- Chapter Six Technology and Soviet National Security -- Chapter Seven Domestic Politics and Gorbachev's Security Policy -- Chapter Eight Institutional Change and Soviet National Security Policy -- Part Four Change in the Elements of Soviet National Security -- Chapter Nine Gorbachev's Concept of Reasonable Sufficiency in National Defense -- Chapter Ten Changes in Soviet National Security Policy toward Western Europe under Gorbachev -- Chapter Eleven Changes in Soviet Security Policy toward Eastern Europe and the Warsaw Pact -- Chapter Twelve Changing Soviet National Security Policy in Relations with the Third World -- Chapter Thirteen Arms Control in Soviet National Security Policy under Gorbachev -- Part Five Conclusions and Implications -- Chapter Fourteen Toward an Explanation of Change in Soviet National Security Policy and Implications for the United States -- List of Contributors -- Index.

The two major and interrelated questions this study poses are: (1) How has Soviet naval doctrine developed and adapted to the demands of the nuclear age?; and (2) How do the changes in Soviet naval doctrine relate to the context of Soviet foreign policy and domestic politics? The article demonstrates that Soviet doctrine has accommodated to the challenges of the nuclear age by combining the tenets of traditional and modern warfare. Changes in naval doctrine have come about because of a need to meet the competition of the United States in world politics, and as a response to active interest-group pressure within the Soviet political system. Soviet naval doctrine does not necessarily "mirror" Western doctrine, but reflects a distinct, Soviet view of naval utilization.