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AbstractBureaucratic elites and national public administrations' experts play a key role in the preparation of supranational policies and in shaping global governance instruments. However, we know surprisingly little about what factors drive their preferences and support for supranational solutions. Drawing on the results of a vignette and conjoint experiment and the case of the European Commission's policy initiative to develop European Public Sector Accounting Standards, this study analyzes the effect of the communicative framing of a policy's objective and how experts' attitudes influence their preferences for policy outcomes. The study shows that the communicative framing of a policy's objective based on functional needs rather than on normative grounds increases support among national administrations' experts. Moreover, the study finds evidence that experts who internalized a public service motivation and those with a supranationalist collective identity are more willing to give up national sovereignty in favor of supranational policy solutions.

In political science literature, it is often argued that compulsory voting can serve as a remedy against turnout inequality and thereby contribute to more egalitarian societies. However, the literature neglects differences between compulsory voting systems, and most studies consider the obligation to vote as a dichotomous variable. As a result, relatively little is known about the causal effects of particular stimuli and features of compulsory voting. By exploiting quasi-experimental conditions from direct-democratic decision-making in Switzerland, this research assesses the degree to which abstention fines account for a citizen's willingness to vote under a compulsory voting context. The findings reveal that a marginal increase in monetary sanctions for voter-abstention leads temporally to a sizeable increase in turnout. However, it does not necessarily contribute to the expression of preferences by those traditionally underrepresented in direct-democratic decision-making since a third of those motivated to vote by the threat of a heavier fine will cast an empty or invalid ballot. The effect on turnout is further found to be moderated by income.

The European Union's response to the financial and sovereign debt crisis has been broadly discussed in the literature, but only few contributions acknowledge the importance of the European statistical agency EUROSTAT as an actor within that process. This is surprising, given that the European Government Finance Statistics (GFS) regulatory regime is central when it comes to the implementation of effective fiscal surveillance (Gandrud & Hallerberg, 2016). Fiscal surveillance in the economic and monetary union (EMU) essentially builds on GFS data, which in turn is compiled from accounting information. Because EU member states elaborate their accounting policies independently, heterogeneity in accounting practices arises, which adversely affects GFS data quality (Jesus & Jorge, 2015). In response, EUROSTAT as a directorate of the European Commission has engaged in developing European Public Sector Accounting Standards (EPSAS), aimed at introducing binding accrual based governmental accounting practices across the member states. However, beyond the issuance of consultation and reflection papers, ongoing discussions between government officials, EUROSTAT, practitioners and academia, the EPSAS project did not progress much in recent years. This paper aims to explain this stalemate by drawing on a political economy account of integration. In particular, it argues that electoral incentives at the level of the member states hinder integrative progress in this area. This theory will be tested by analysing publicly available consultation papers, which are used to identify the reasons for the stalling of the supranational harmonization efforts. In contrast to previous research (Aggestam & Brusca, 2016) this paper focusses less on the process and the extent of participation, but rather on the substance of the feedback given. In particular, it deploys discourse network analysis to debunk the main arguments and preferences issued in the consultation process. Reaching beyond previous work on the process of "glocalization" of public sector accounting standards (Baskerville & Grossi, 2018), it provides insights into Europeanization of governmental accounting practices and the dynamics of supranational administrative policy harmonization at the interface of political economy.

Eine funktionierende Demokratie stiftet der Allgemeinheit einen Nutzen. Deren Aufrechterhaltung bedarf jedoch der Partizipation der Bürgerinnen und Bürger. Wie viele Demokratien weltweit ist auch die Schweizer Abstimmungs-Demokratie mit einer rückläufigen Stimmbeteiligung konfrontiert. Vor diesem Hintergrund rückt immer wieder der Kanton Schaffhausen in den Fokus der Aufmerksamkeit, der seine Bürgerinnen und Bürger zur Teilnahme zwingt und aus dem Stimmrecht eine Stimmpflicht macht. Als einziger Schweizer Kanton kennt Schaffhausen gegenwärtig noch die sogenannte Stimm- und Wahlpflicht, welche im Zuge der Änderung des Wahlgesetzes seit Anfang des Jahres 2015 mit einem Bussgeld von 6 Schweizer Franken (CHF) sanktioniert wird. Zuvor lag das Bussgeld fürs Nicht-Abstimmen oder Wählen bei CHF 3. Einher mit dieser Bussgeld-Verdoppelung geht eine Veränderung des Budgetsets der Bürgerinnen und Bürger, denn letztendlich stehen diese vor der Wahl die Zeitkosten der Abstimmungs-Teilnahme oder die Kosten des Bussgeldes zu tragen. Die vorliegende Masterarbeit untersuchte die Wirkung dieser Policy Intervention auf das Abstimmungsverhalten der stimmpflichtigen Schaffhauser Bevölkerung. Ausgehend von der Überlegung, dass im Kanton Schaffhausen bedingt durch die Bussgeldverdoppelung das Budgetset der stimmpflichtigen Bürgerinnen und Bürger verändert wurde und jenes in allen anderen Schweizer Kantonen konstant blieb, ergibt sich bei den eidgenössischen Sachabstimmungen ein quasi-experimentelles Setting, worin die anderen Kantone als Kontrollgruppe fungieren. Durch Anwendung der Difference-in-Differences Methodik und auf Basis eines aus der Theorie hergeleiteten empirischen Modells wurde der interventionsbedingte Effekt auf die Stimmbeteiligung, sowie den Anteil leerer und ungültiger Stimmen ermittelt. Während ein Anstieg der Stimmbeteiligung sich basierend auf der durchgeführten Analyse statistisch nicht verlässlich nachweisen liess, konnte empirisch belegt werden, dass die mit der Bussgeldverdoppelung einhergehende Veränderung des Budgetsets der stimmpflichtigen Bürgerinnen und Bürger im Kanton Schaffhausen einen Anstieg des Anteils ungültiger und leerer Stimmen bewirkte. Aus der Arbeit geht entsprechend Evidenz hervor, dass aufgrund der Verdoppelung des Bussgeldes ein zusätzlicher Anteil von 0,75 Prozent der Schaffhauser Stimmbevölkerung zur Vermeidung des Bussgeldes und zur Reduktion des kognitiven Entscheidungsaufwandes die Abstimmungsunterlagen leer oder ungültig in die Urne legt. Die Untersuchung bestätigt somit, dass sowohl im Kontext der Schweizer Abstimmungsdemokratie das Wählerverhalten rational geprägt sein kann und bei gewissen Individuen ein Nutzenmaximierungs-Kalkül mitschwingt. Der Beitrag der verschärften monetären Sanktionierung der Stimmpflicht im Kanton Schaffhausen zur Aufrechterhaltung einer funktionierenden, lebendigen Demokratie ist aufgrund des Anstiegs leerer und ungültiger Stimmen anzuzweifeln. Eine effektive Präferenzäusserung und Stimulation der politischen Partizipation wäre entsprechend wohl anderweitig anzuregen.

There are some major conceptual differences between government financial statistics (GFS) and public sector accounting, since both Public Financial Management (PFM) instruments fulfil different reporting purposes and cover different user needs. Nevertheless, GFS is dependent on data input from accounting. In that view, GFS data quality is often deemed to be adversely affected by the prevalence of heterogeneous accounting practices and the application of different bases, as it makes different material adjustments necessary in the data compiling process (Dabbicco, 2013). However, even under IPSAS compliant accrual accounting, GFS data accuracy could be limited due to conceptual differences related to the measurement of stock positions, which shall be valued at market value according to the GFS Manual 2014 (GFSM2014). On the contrary, IPSAS allow to account for assets by using historic costs, which might leads to some discrepancies between the two PFM reporting instruments, making bridging adjustments indispensable even under the regime of accrual accounting. This paper aims to contribute to the overarching discourse on GFS data accuracy by conceptually discussing different current value estimation practices and assessing a sample of OECD countries current bridging adjustment techniques based on a qualitative survey.

World Bank PULSAR knowledge product ; This PULSAR knowledge product elaborates mechanisms through which asset accounting may contribute to optimize fixed asset portfolios of governments by providing scientifically sound and practical answers to the following main questions: - How are fixed assets recorded in an asset registry? - How is fixed asset information captured in financial reports? - How can the best use of asset information be made? The paper further presents good practices rooted in international country experience and relevant standards, such as the International Public Sector Accounting Standards (IPSAS). It also discusses key issues and challenges related to fixed asset management through the lens of public sector accounting.

There is little doubt that the great financial crisis (GFC) that started in 2007 has substantially changed central banking. Central banks (CBs) were forced to undertake financial interventions that were larger and financially riskier than any previously undertaken. Such interventions have led CBs balance sheets – together with the corresponding underlying risks – expand to record levels. Such interventions have undoubtedly intensified the debate about central bank equity and financial resilience. If the public wants to finds reasons for criticism, then an easy target may be central bank (negative) equity, and more generally, central bank financial resilience. Overall, the financial strength and resilience of CBs have come under closer academic, political and also public scrutiny. Despite closer scrutiny, there exists surprisingly little academic work concerning the role and importance of central bank financial resilience. This paper will complement limited academic research with respect to central bank financial resilience and aims to establish a comprehensive framework to manage and govern financial resilience through combining operational and institutional aspects of CB. Based on the established theoretical resilience framework, we aim to analyze and measure the resilience of all 36 OECD central banks, by scrutinizing CB legislative frameworks and financial statements in order to elaborate different roles, targets and managing aspects of CB financial resilience. First results show a heterogeneous landscape of CB financial resilience and that the consequences of weak financial resilience might be underestimated significantly. The paper reveals the need to establish a recognized practice guideline, to govern and monitor CB financial resilience.

Over the last decades fiscal deficits and public debt among OECD countries increased drastically. In this context instruments fostering fiscal discipline have been promoted to restore the financial situation and to ensure sustainability in public spending policy in order to preserve future service delivery capacity (IMF, 2009). The theoretical fundaments justifying fiscal discipline have been originally developed by public choice scholars like Buchanan (1958, 1964, 1991) with his well-known golden rule of public finance or like Tollison and Wagner (1987), who advocated fiscal/budget rules in order to contain the government size. While most literature focuses on fiscal performance in the presence of fiscal rules (Yerly, 2013; Alesina, Hausmann, Hommes & Stein, 1999) or the analysis of different design options (Yerly, 2013), only few authors consider the accounting dimension and technical aspects despite the fact that fiscal rules (debt breaks) usually build on accrual accounting information (Bergmann, 2012). Yet, this connection was subject of research concerned with the rise of creative accounting and fiscal gimmickry in the presence of fiscal rules (Von Hagen & Wolff, 2006; Koen & Van den Noord, 2005; Milesi-Ferretti, 2003), which was inspired by political economy literature advocating that politicians and public decision makers have a strong incentive to embellish budget balance (Alesina & Perotti, 1995). Following this avenue of research, this paper serves the illumination of the connection between debt break mechanisms and the adoption of accrual public sector accounting standards and principles in the interface of political economy in the Swiss context. By explicitly considering the technical accounting dimension, this paper develops an integrated conceptual view on well-established Public Financial Management (PFM) institutions and elaborates how their interdependencies can co-create value with regard to the contemporary challenge of fiscal sustainability. Derivation of this integrated view follows an explorative approach, taking into account expert interviews with director level staff from cantonal finance administrations and policy documents, as well as literature from both research areas – public sector accounting and political economy.

Deviations from modern public sector accounting principles and standards are potentially politically motivated. To avoid jeopardizing adherence to the institutionalized self-constraining debt brake mechanisms, financial flexibility is aimed to be preserved in the institutional framework governing public finances. This paper elaborates and discusses potential tensions between debt containment rules and the application of true and fair accounting at the example of three Swiss cantons by building on case-based empirical evidence, which was gained out of semi-structured interviews. Abweichungen gegenüber den heutigen Rechnungslegungsstandards und -prinzipien des öffentlichen Gemeinwesens sind potentiell politisch motiviert. Um die Einhaltung der selbst auferlegten Schuldenbremsen nicht zu gefährden, ist man versucht finanzpolitischen Spielraum zu bewahren und den institutionellen Rahmen zur Steuerung öffentlicher Finanzen entsprechend zu gestalten und auszurichten. Dieser Beitrag untersucht und diskutiert mögliche Spannungsfelder zwischen Schuldenbremse-Regelungen und der Anwendung von modernen Rechnungslegungsnormen am Beispiel von drei Kantonen.

Deviations from modern public sector accounting principles and standards are potentially politically motivated. To avoid jeopardizing adherence to the institutionalized self-constraining debt brake mechanisms, financial flexibility is aimed to be preserved in the institutional framework governing public finances. This paper elaborates and discusses potential tensions between debt containment rules and the application of true and fair accounting at the example of three Swiss cantons by building on case-based empirical evidence, which was gained out of semi-structured interviews.

In recent years, several risk management standards have been developed and established which highlight the "management of opportunities" (MOO). Although risk management is considered to be part of good governance today, it still focuses mainly on the management of "downside" (or "negative") risks. Possible explanations may be that: - the standards themselves provide little guidance on how to deal with opportunities; - there is evidence for a risk adverse culture in public administration; - there is a lack of understanding in public administration that risks are also part of innovation; - reporting on risks towards stakeholders as part of good governance is a difficult task for public managers who are acting in a political environment.

Matengo Githae & Associates were appointed to undertake an assessment of the Annual Capacity Programme Assessment (ACPA) as part of the Kenya Devolution Support programme of the Ministry of Devolution Programme. The ACPA process started in June 2016 when the participating counties conducted the Self-Assessment exercise. The process was guided by the National Government technical team that was inducting county government on participation of the KDSP. The self-assessment forms the basis of capacity building plans for FY 2016/17. It is based on the development of these capacity building plans that county government will qualify to receive the C&P Grant in FY 2016/17. The assessment was carried out in the forty seven counts in all the areas of the tool except for the ones that were supposed to be subjected to the year 2 funding. This mainly affected MPC 5 on the investment menu. The synthesis report analysed the performance of the Counties in all areas of Minimum Access Conditions, Minimum Performance Conditions and the Performance Measurement. The assignment technically covered all the three areas of the tool though it's noted that the Minimum Access Conditions had already been assessed and as such were not actually reviewed. The details of the two levels of the assignment the Minimum Performance Conditions and the Performance Measures form the basis of the report. The assessment as mentioned in this document was geared towards enhancing the County government capacity to respond to the support that they are to receive from the World Bank as part of the Capacity Performance for Grant.

The PULSAR Program, launched in 2017, is a regional and country level program for 13 beneficiary countries in Europe and Central Asia. Its objective is to support the enhancement of public sector accounting and financial reporting frameworks, in line with international standards and in accordance with good practices, in order to improve government accountability, transparency, and performance. The objectives and scope of the PULSAR Program are jointly determined by the PULSAR Partners - Austria, Switzerland, and the World Bank – who also provide institutional support for its implementation and mobilize the resources needed for its activities. Beneficiary countries help shape the Program through regional cooperation platforms and input to two Communities of Practice focused on financial reporting frameworks and on education. The FINCOP supports government officials in developing reform strategies & roadmaps, and helps to define and implement improved legislation, standards, IT systems, and tools in the respective countries. The Benchmarking Guide for Integrating Public Sector Accounting and Government Finance Statistics aims to inform practitioners and public sector accounting reforms by highlighting the similarities and differences between International Public Sector Accounting Standards and Government Finance Statistics reporting guidelines such as the Government Finance Statistics Manual of the International Monetary Fund (GFSM 2014) and the European System of Accounts (ESA 2010). This Guide facilitates an integrated view of the two sets of reporting guidelines and outlines a process to more closely align them. It also discusses fundamental challenges and corresponding mitigation strategies. In the Guide's presentation of key conceptual issues, care was taken to maintain consistency with the technical guidelines of the reference frameworks. Nevertheless, it is recommended that the original sources are consulted with regards to specific technical questions related to recognition, measurement, and disclosure under IPSAS and ESA 2010 or GFSM 2014.