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"Financial incentives have long been used to try to influence professional values and practices. Recent events including the global financial crisis and the BP Texas City refinery disaster have been linked to such incentives, with commentators calling for a critical look at these systems given the catastrophic outcomes. Risky Rewards engages with this debate, particularly in the context of the present and potential role of incentives to manage major accident risk in hazardous industries"-Provided by publisher

This paper discusses the evolution of safety case legislation in Australia over the last few years, with particular reference to both the offshore oil industry and major hazard facilities in Victoria. It argues that if the legislation is to be effective

Government agencies regularly use the argument that 'safety pays' as a way of motivating employers to attend to occupational health and safety. This paper looks at the effectiveness of this argument in the case of catastrophic hazards. It suggests that, while it may be true that safety pays in an abstract sense, this is irrelevant unless it can be shown that safety pays for relevant decision makers. All too often it does not. The article illustrates its claims by drawing on the literature on the Zeebrugge, Bhopal and Piper Alpha disasters, as well as on a study of a mine disaster in Australia.

This paper discusses the evolution of safety case legislation in Australia over the last few years, with particular reference to both the offshore oil industry and major hazard facilities in Victoria. It argues that if the legislation is to be effective

Government agencies regularly use the argument that 'safety pays' as a way of motivating employers to attend to occupational health and safety. This paper looks at the effectiveness of this argument in the case of catastrophic hazards. It suggests that, while it may be true that safety pays in an abstract sense, this is irrelevant unless it can be shown that safety pays for relevant decision makers. All too often it does not. The article illustrates its claims by drawing on the literature on the Zeebrugge, Bhopal and Piper Alpha disasters, as well as on a study of a mine disaster in Australia.

Although the advent of general duty legislation makes the task of the regulator far less clear-cut, inspectorates are still involved in monitoring and to some extent enforcing compliance with rules of various sorts. Monitoring compliance in this way is crucially important, but this article seeks to identify strategies that go beyond compliance monitoring, by drawing on research on the causes of accidents and the nature of organizations. The strategies identified include: auditing the auditors; proactive investigation; supporting company safety staff; advising on organizational design; exposing performance; and promoting regulatory crisis. These are all ways in which regulators can encourage companies to improve their management of risk, ways that are not focused on identifying noncompliance with rules of any sort.

Although the advent of general duty legislation makes the task of the regulator far less clear-cut, inspectorates are still involved in monitoring and to some extent enforcing compliance with rules of various sorts. Monitoring compliance in this way is crucially important, but this article seeks to identify strategies that go beyond compliance monitoring, by drawing on research on the causes of accidents and the nature of organizations. The strategies identified include: auditing the auditors; proactive investigation; supporting company safety staff; advising on organizational design; exposing performance; and promoting regulatory crisis. These are all ways in which regulators can encourage companies to improve their management of risk, ways that are not focused on identifying noncompliance with rules of any sort.

Although the advent of general duty legislation makes the task of the regulator far less clear‐cut, inspectorates are still involved in monitoring and to some extent enforcing compliance with rules of various sorts. Monitoring compliance in this way is crucially important, but this article seeks to identify strategies that go beyond compliance monitoring, by drawing on research on the causes of accidents and the nature of organizations. The strategies identified include: auditing the auditors; proactive investigation; supporting company safety staff; advising on organizational design; exposing performance; and promoting regulatory crisis. These are all ways in which regulators can encourage companies to improve their management of risk, ways that are not focused on identifying noncompliance with rules of any sort.

Perrow's normal accident theory suggests that some major accidents are inevitable for technological reasons. An alternative approach explains major accidents as resulting from management failures, particularly in relation to the communication of information. This latter theory has been shown to be applicable to a wide variety of disasters. By contrast, Perrow's theory seems to be applicable to relatively few accidents, the exemplar case being the Three Mile Island nuclear power station accident in the U.S. in 1979. This article re‐examines Three Mile Island. It shows that this was not a normal accident in Perrow's sense and is readily explicable in terms of management failures. The article also notes that Perrow's theory is motivated by a desire to shift blame away from front line operators and that the alternative approach does this equally well.

It is widely recognised that disasters are preceded by warning signs which are ignored or discounted because of cultural factors. There is now considerable discussion of the possibility of constructing safety cultures to counteract this effect. This paper contributes to this discussion by drawing on the case of a coal mine disaster in Australia. The paper shows that there were two sets of cultural factors at work preventing appropriate responses to warning signs. The first was a hierarchy of knowledge which placed greatest value on personal experience and systematically discounted the reports of others. The second was a culture of denial, an elaborate set of beliefs which held that 'it couldn't happen here'. The paper shows that the response of the authorities has been to mandate specific hazard management systems which force companies to attend to warnings. The paper concludes that only an understanding of safety culture which includes an organisational dimension provides an adequate way of conceptualising these developments.