Suchergebnisse

Frontmatter -- Contents -- Preface -- Acknowledgments -- CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW -- CHAPTER 2 DECISIONS AND GAMES -- CHAPTER 3 DOUBLE-AUCTION MARKETS -- CHAPTER 4 POSTED-OFFER MARKETS -- CHAPTER 5 BARGAINING AND AUCTIONS -- Chapter 6 PUBLIC GOODS, EXTERNALITIES, AND VOTING -- Chapter 7 ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION -- CHAPTER 8 INDIVIDUAL DECISIONS IN RISKY SITUATIONS -- CHAPTER 9 ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR AND EXPERIMENTAL METHODS: SUMMARY AND EXTENSIONS -- Index

AbstractBilateral conflict involves an attacker with several alternative attack methods and a defender who can take various actions to better respond to different types of attack. These situations have wide applicability to political, legal, and economic disputes, but they are particularly challenging to study empirically because the payoffs are unknown. Moreover, each party has an incentive to behave unpredictably, so theoretical predictions are stochastic. This article reports results of an experiment where the details of the environment are tightly controlled. The results sharply contradict the Nash equilibrium predictions about how the two parties' choice frequencies change in response to the relative effectiveness of alternative attack strategies. In contrast, nonparametric quantal response equilibrium predictions match the observed treatment effects. Estimation of the experimentally controlled payoff parameters across treatments accurately recovers the true values of those parameters with the logit quantal response equilibrium model but not with the Nash equilibrium model.

AbstractA central issue in behavioral economics is the role of fairness, and whether it is hard-wired or acquired as a result of self-interested considerations. Binmore (Crooked thinking or straight talk: Modernizing epicurean scientific philosophy, Springer, 2020) has recently argued that fairness does not always occur, and when it does, it is caused by self-interest. The ultimatum game is well known for the sharp divergence of experimental data from theoretical predictions based on self-interest. Proposers frequently offer 'fair' shares of a fixed "pie" of potential earnings, and unfair offers are often rejected, which results in zero earnings for both bargainers. Slight modifications of the ultimatum game, however, can add a more realistic context for some applications, and the resulting gamesman-like behavior can yield results closer to theoretical predictions. This paper reports an experiment based on a modified ultimatum game in which rejection results in a costly conflict with a stochastic outcome. We observe gamesman-like offer behavior, especially after role reversal and learning. Conflict adds an element of competition and seems to play a role in teaching subjects what offers are appropriate—often moving demands away from fair divisions towards the game-theoretic predictions.