What makes the collections of international institutions or regimes governing various domains—called in theliterature regime, institutional, or governance complexes—"complex"? This article examines several conditions for complexity discussed in that literature and finds them necessary but not sufficient. It argues that the sufficient condition is dependence and outlines a framework of increasing levels of synchronic (social/spatial) and diachronic (temporal) dependence. Putting dependence at the centre of discussions on regime complexes has four advantages: (1) it is analytically more precise a condition than proliferation or linkage; (2) it orients us toward questions of degree, 'how complex', instead of the binary 'whether complex'; (3) it informs a range of research design and theoretical choices, especially highlighting extra-dyadic dependencies and an underdeveloped temporal dimension; and (4) it arguably reconciles competing uses of the term "complex" in the literature without conflating it with complexity, structure, or topology.
AbstractThe 2011 policy pivot of the German government, from extending nuclear power plants terms to securing their shutdown for 2022, cannot be explained without looking at how the German political discourse network shifted in the months following Fukushima. This paper seeks to model and identify mechanisms that help explain how the two-mode network of political actors' support for claims developed. We identify possible mechanisms to explain discourse dynamics from literature on political discourse and discourse networks, and extend homophily mechanisms to two-mode networks as "tertius" effects. We then introduce and employ a multimodal extension of dynamic network actor models to answer two questions key to how the discourse has evolved: which actors support claims more frequently and which claims they support. Our results indicate that mechanisms vary according to the discursive phase, but that powerful actors participate in the discourse more often, and actors tend to support claims that have already found support by cross-party coalitions. These are the two most prominent mechanisms that help to explain the dramatic nuclear policy change in Germany after Fukushima.
Important questions in the social sciences are concerned with the circumstances under which individuals, organizations, or states mutually agree to form social network ties. Examples of these coordination ties are found in such diverse domains as scientific collaboration, international treaties, and romantic relationships and marriage. This article introduces dynamic network actor models (DyNAM) for the statistical analysis of coordination networks through time. The strength of the models is that they explicitly address five aspects about coordination networks that empirical researchers will typically want to take into account: (1) that observations are dependent, (2) that ties reflect the opportunities and preferences of both actors involved, (3) that the creation of coordination ties is a two-sided process, (4) that data might be available in a time-stamped format, and (5) that processes typically differ between tie creation and dissolution (signed processes), shorter and longer time windows (windowed processes), and initial and repeated creation of ties (weighted processes). Two empirical case studies demonstrate the potential impact of DyNAM models: The first is concerned with the formation of romantic relationships in a high school over 18 months, and the second investigates the formation of international fisheries treaties from 1947 to 2010.
AbstractAlthough most international agreements are concluded for indefinite periods, the issues they address and parties' preferences are constantly evolving. In some cases, parties seek to close any growing gaps between negotiators' expectations and the changing context by updating their original agreement to its new circumstances. States have several formal tools at their disposal to do so, such as protocols, amendments, and addenda. We refer to this process as institutional adaptation. This paper seeks to explain why some agreements are adapted numerous times during their lifetime while others are not. It argues that state parties are more likely to adapt their international agreements when they acquire new information about their partners' behavior, preferences, or the state of the environment. We focus on two key elements facilitating this process. The first consists of unexpected variation in treaty participation, and the second concerns the design features of the agreement. Relying on event history analysis and an original dataset of design features and membership of 371 multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs), we find that low levels of ratifications, high levels of accessions, highly institutionalized MEAs, and anticipatory design features are associated with more frequent institutional adaptation. These findings provide important lessons for the design of dynamic treaties.A pesar de que la mayoría de los acuerdos internacionales se celebran por períodos indefinidos, tanto las cuestiones que abordan como las preferencias de cada una de las partes evolucionan constantemente. En algunos casos, las partes tratan de cerrar cualquier brecha creciente entre las expectativas de los negociadores y el contexto cambiante actualizando el acuerdo original a las nuevas circunstancias. A este efecto, los Estados tienen varias herramientas formales a su disposición, tales como protocolos, enmiendas y adendas. Llamamos a este proceso adaptación institucional. Este artículo trata de explicar por qué algunos acuerdos se adaptan numerosas veces durante su existencia mientras que otros no se adaptan nunca. El artículo argumenta que es más probable que los Estados participantes adapten sus acuerdos internacionales cuando adquieran nueva información sobre el comportamiento, las preferencias o el estado del entorno de sus socios. Nos centramos en dos elementos clave que facilitan este proceso. El primero consiste en un cambio inesperado en relación con la participación en el tratado, y el segundo se refiere a las características de diseño del acuerdo. Teniendo en cuenta el análisis histórico de eventos, así como un conjunto original de datos en relación con las características de diseño y de adhesión de 371 acuerdos multilaterales sobre medio ambiente (MEAs, por sus siglas en inglés), encontramos que tanto los bajos niveles de ratificaciones como los altos niveles de adhesiones, los MEAs altamente institucionalizados y las características de diseño anticipatorio están asociados con una adaptación institucional más frecuente. Estas conclusiones proporcionan lecciones importantes de cara al diseño de tratados dinámicos.Bien que la majorité des accords internationaux soient conclus pour des durées indéfinies, les problématiques traitées et les préférences des parties évoluent constamment. Dans certains cas, les parties cherchent à refermer les écarts qui s'élargissent entre les attentes des négociateurs et l'évolution du contexte en mettant à jour l'accord initial pour prendre en compte les nouvelles circonstances. Pour ce faire, les États disposent de différents outils formels, comme les protocoles, les amendements et les addenda. Nous qualifions ce processus d'adaptation institutionnelle. Cet article tente d'expliquer pourquoi certains accords font l'objet de nombreuses adaptations au cours de leur durée de vie, et d'autres, d'aucunes. Il affirme que les parties étatiques adapteront plus certainement leurs accords internationaux quand elles acquièrent de nouvelles informations concernant le comportement, les préférences et l'état de l'environnement de leurs partenaires. Nous nous focalisons sur deux éléments clés favorisant ce processus : les variations inattendues dans la participation à un traité et les caractéristiques de la conception d'un accord. En nous fondant sur une analyse historique d'événements et un ensemble de données original sur les caractéristiques de conception et l'adhésion à 371 accords environnementaux multilatéraux (AEM), nous constatons que des niveaux de ratification faibles, des niveaux d'adhésion élevés, des niveaux d'institutionnalisation élevés des AEM et l'anticipation des caractéristiques de conception augmentent la fréquence de l'adaptation institutionnelle. Ces conclusions fournissent des enseignements importants pour la conception de traités dynamiques.
Although most international agreements are concluded for indefinite periods, the issues they address and parties' preferences are constantly evolving. In some cases, parties seek to close any growing gaps between negotiators' expectations and the changing context by updating their original agreement to its new circumstances. States have several formal tools at their disposal to do so, such as protocols, amendments, and addenda. We refer to this process as institutional adaptation. This paper seeks to explain why some agreements are adapted numerous times during their lifetime while others are not. It argues that state parties are more likely to adapt their international agreements when they acquire new information about their partners' behavior, preferences, or the state of the environment. We focus on two key elements facilitating this process. The first consists of unexpected variation in treaty participation, and the second concerns the design features of the agreement. Relying on event history analysis and an original dataset of design features and membership of 371 multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs), we find that low levels of ratifications, high levels of accessions, highly institutionalized MEAs, and anticipatory design features are associated with more frequent institutional adaptation. These findings provide important lessons for the design of dynamic treaties.
