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Previous studies comparing ideological groups have been restricted to tests of between-group differences in the means of relevant political psychological variables, thereby neglecting group differences in the variances, meanings and nomological networks of the tested variables. A first exploratory study used data from the European Social Survey (N=7,314) comparing groups of political party members on the basis of their scores on a self-placement left-right scale. The second study (N=69) constituted an in-depth test for the presence of differences between samples of political activists of moderate parties, communists, anarchists and right-wing extremists. The results revealed that there is a fair amount of heterogeneity within left-wing and right-wing extremists, indicating a substantial amount of within-group variance of social attitudes, values and prejudice. Moreover, the extremist ideologies are best approached as distinct ideologies that cannot be reduced to extreme versions of moderate ideology, and differences in the meanings and nomological networks of the various extremist ideologies were also obtained. It is erroneous to consider members of extremist groups as being "all alike". The findings obtained from samples of political moderates are not a particularly solid basis for theories about extremism. Adapted from the source document.

AbstractPrevious studies comparing ideological groups have been restricted to tests of between‐group differences in the means of relevant political psychological variables, thereby neglecting group differences in the variances, meanings and nomological networks of the tested variables. A first exploratory study used data from the European Social Survey (N = 7,314) comparing groups of political party members on the basis of their scores on a self‐placement left–right scale. The second study (N = 69) constituted an in‐depth test for the presence of differences between samples of political activists of moderate parties, communists, anarchists and right‐wing extremists. The results revealed that there is a fair amount of heterogeneity within left‐wing and right‐wing extremists, indicating a substantial amount of within‐group variance of social attitudes, values and prejudice. Moreover, the extremist ideologies are best approached as distinct ideologies that cannot be reduced to extreme versions of moderate ideology, and differences in the meanings and nomological networks of the various extremist ideologies were also obtained. It is erroneous to consider members of extremist groups as being 'all alike'. The findings obtained from samples of political moderates are not a particularly solid basis for theories about extremism.

The joint impact of antiegalitarian attitudes and social‐cultural attitudes on citizens' tendency to vote for extreme right‐wing political parties was investigated. In the first study, we explored these attitudes in representative samples of seven Western European countries. In a follow‐up study, we predicted respondents' likelihood of voting for a Dutch right‐wing party on the basis of the measures of social‐dominance orientation (as an indicator of antiegalitarian attitudes) and right‐wing authoritarianism (as an indicator of social‐cultural attitudes). Our findings demonstrated that voting for extreme right‐wing parties was associated more consistently with antiegalitarian attitudes than with social‐cultural attitudes. Moreover, the effect of antiegalitarian attitudes was partly mediated by migration attitudes (Study 1) and ethnic prejudice (Study 2). We discuss the finding that antiegalitarian attitudes are more strongly related to extreme right‐wing voting than social‐cultural attitudes.

Using a representative sample of Dutch adults ( N = 1238), we investigated the moderating influence of direct contact and authoritarianism on the potential of extended contact to reduce prejudice. As expected, direct contact and authoritarianism moderated the effect of extended contact on prejudice. Moreover, the third-order moderation effect was also significant, revealing that extended contact has the strongest effect among high authoritarians with low levels of direct contact. We identified trust and perceived threat as the mediating processes underlying these moderation effects. The present study thus attests to the theoretical and practical relevance of reducing prejudice via extended contact. The discussion focuses on the role of extended contact in relation to direct contact and authoritarianism as well as on the importance of trust in intergroup contexts.

Objective: The present research tests the effects of time pressure and noise on openmindedness to discover new problem-solving strategies. Background: We are primarily interested in transfer of skill from one phase to the next. More specifically, this study investigates whether the presence of stressors makes participants adhere to the sustained use of complex rules. Method: Participants learned to apply a complex rule in the first phase of a category learning task. In the second phase, this rule became dysfunctional and participants had to search for a new categorization rule in order to assign the stimuli to the correct classes. Two experiments were set up to investigate this issue. Results: Participants were found to have difficulty discovering a complex Phase 2 rule in the presence of stressors, whereas the discovery of a simple rule was not hindered by the presence of stressors. Conclusion: In the discussion, it is argued that the present results are compatible with previous research on stressors showing that time pressure and noise induce the application of simple strategies. The innovative finding here is that this simplification also occurs in individuals who are accustomed to using complex solutions. Application: The implications of the present results for emergency response training are elaborated upon.

Three studies tested the relationship between political extremism and cognitive complexity in an adult sample (N = 135), a sample of students (N = 145), and a sample of political party members (N = 47). According to value pluralism theory, advocates of extreme ideologies exhibit low levels of cognitive complexity. Context theory, in contrast, states that extremists think in a more complex and sophisticated way about politics. In accordance with context theory, significant positive correlations between cognitive complexity and extremist ideology were found in all samples. The results of these studies also revealed weak correlations among the cognitive complexity instruments used in previous research. Problems concerning the measurement of cognitive style and cognitive complexity are discussed.

The present research investigates whether prospective minority and majority members exhibit information acquisition bias to exert social influence in a forthcoming group interaction. In particular, the question of whether (a) the mere fact of attending to a forthcoming group discussion and (b) group decision rule (majority rule vs. unanimity rule) alter the orientation toward supporting evidence is investigated. This study found that minorities exhibit greater information acquisition bias than equal and majority factions, especially when the minorities expected a group interaction. Group decision rule did not have any significant effect. The absence of effects of group decision rule and the relationship between coalition formation and cognitive processes are discussed.

This work explored the hypothesis that need for closure is associated with the adoption of conservative ideology. Two different studies on eastern and western European samples (Polish and Flemish) supported the hypothesis that need for closure—as measured by Webster and Kruglanski's (1994) Need for Closure Scale—is related to conservative beliefs. However, in the second study, a negative relationship between need for closure and economic conservatism in the Polish sample was noted, whereas a positive relationship occurred in the Flemish sample. These results may be accounted for by the Need for Simple Structure factor of Neuberg, Judice, and West (1997) and by specific rather than non‐specific epistemic processes.