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This article discusses the relationship between industrial concentration and the presence of black-owned firms. Strong evidence is found that more monopolistic industries have a smaller black presence. This demonstrates that the monopolistic industries in which black workers are known to face the worst discrimination are also the industries in which blacks face the highest structural entry barriers as entrepreneurs. Indeed, entry barriers may cause the monopolistic conditions which allow discrimination while simultaneously frustrating the entry of black entrepreneurs.

Abstract
We present the first demonstration of the influence of a quality rivalry on location choices under spatial price discrimination. The rivalry is shown to generate the socially efficient quality but to push locations inefficiently close together, a result not found under Hotelling pricing. We apply this new equilibrium to the anti-trust policy issue of collusion showing that introducing the quality rivalry reduces the likelihood of collusion.

ObjectiveWe test whether increasing gender earning differences are associated with the surprising decline in the share of women working in information science (IS).MethodsWe use representative data to estimate the gender earnings differential from 1995 to 2015 for full‐time, private‐sector IS workers in the United States. We decompose the differential within and across years. Time trends isolate the pattern of the unexplained gender differential.ResultsNone of our decompositions or projections reveal increased gender earnings differentials over the sample period. If anything, the unexplained differentials modestly decline.ConclusionDespite contentions that the financial treatment of women explains their departure from IS and engineering, we find no evidence of a trend toward larger earnings differentials. Thus, our data argue that the declining share of women in IS likely has its roots elsewhere.

This paper focuses on the German labor market for older workers. It does so in comparison with other countries and with a unique focus on the role of employer incentives for retaining and hiring older workers. It argues that while employment of older German workers has improved due to changes in government policy, the labor market for older workers remains characterized by far less mobility and opportunity. While we recognize the potential explanations of reduced productivity and age discrimination, we review evidence pointing to the importance of life-cycle contracts (Hutchens, J Lab Econ, 4, 439 - 457, 1986; Lazear, J Polit Economy, 87, 1261 - 1284, 1979). These contracts can be efficient but typically imply that older workers will have difficulty being re-hired into career jobs after separation. We suggest that attempts to reduce or eliminate such life-cycle contracts are likely to be counter-productive but suggest how other countries, particularly Japan, have dealt with this issue.

AbstractThis paper focuses on the German labor market for older workers. It does so in comparison with other countries and with a unique focus on the role of employer incentives for retaining and hiring older workers. It argues that while employment of older German workers has improved due to changes in government policy, the labor market for older workers remains characterized by far less mobility and opportunity. While we recognize the potential explanations of reduced productivity and age discrimination, we review evidence pointing to the importance of life-cycle contracts (Hutchens, J Lab Econ, 4, 439–457, 1986; Lazear, J Polit Economy, 87, 1261–1284, 1979). These contracts can be efficient but typically imply that older workers will have difficulty being re-hired into career jobs after separation. We suggest that attempts to reduce or eliminate such life-cycle contracts are likely to be counter-productive but suggest how other countries, particularly Japan, have dealt with this issue.

Using panel survey data, we show cross‐sectional evidence of an elevated risk of workplace injury for those paid piece rates and bonuses. While consistent with Adam Smith's behavioural conjecture, this could simply reflect sorting across workers or firms. In response we successively control for a risk proxy, for worker fixed effects and for worker with employer match fixed effects. No previous examination has controlled for such fixed effects or examined US survey data. The estimates indicate that injury risk increases substantially when blue‐collar (manual) workers become paid by piece rates and bonuses.