Retirement in non-cooperative and cooperative families
In: Working paper series Center for Economic Studies ; Ifo Institute ; 476
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In: Working paper series Center for Economic Studies ; Ifo Institute ; 476
In: Working paper series 463
In 1988, an early retirement program (AFP) was introduced in Norway for the 66-year-old. Since then, AFP has gradually been extended and by now it covers workers aged 62-66. In this paper we employ a multinominal logit model to study the transition between states in the labour market. The model is estimated on a large panel data set covering the period 1988-2 to 1999-4. The estimated model tracks the development quite well, as also outside sample predictions do. The model is used to assess the future labour market impact of abolishing AFP. We find that by bolishing AFP may increase the labour force participation among older men (55-67) in 2005 from 72 percent in the baseline projection to 83 percent. For females the corresponding increase is from 62 to 67 percent.
In: Søkelys på arbeidslivet, Band 42, Heft 1, S. 1-3
ISSN: 1504-7989
In: Søkelys på arbeidslivet, Band 41, Heft 1, S. 1-19
ISSN: 1504-7989
In: CESifo Working Paper No. 7723
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In: Journal of labor economics: JOLE, Band 35, Heft 1, S. 265-297
ISSN: 1537-5307
In: Journal of population economics: international research on the economics of population, household, and human resources, Band 37, Heft 4
ISSN: 1432-1475
AbstractWe evaluate the 2011 comprehensive reform of Norwegian early retirement institutions using a parsimonious random utility choice model. Conditional on employment at age 60, we estimate a three-state conditional logit model to explain the realized labor market state at age 63 among the alternatives of employment, retirement, and disability program participation. The reform radically changed work incentives and/or pension access age for some (but not all) workers, such that the influence of economic incentives can be identified based on reform-generated variation only. We find that improved work incentives caused employment rates to rise considerably at the expense of early retirement and exit through disability insurance. Improved liquidity through a lower age to access own pension funds on actuarially neutral terms caused a small increase in employment and a large drop in disability program participation. Properly designed pension reforms thus need to take the interplay between old-age pension and disability insurance programs into account.
In: IZA Discussion Paper No. 8812
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In: IZA Discussion Paper No. 16256
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