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Abstract This research contributes to the ongoing debate on the relationship between agency autonomy and organizational interaction. A comparative design that includes agency managers in Norway and Sweden describing organizational interaction, the measures used and their perceived quality, is applied. Based on observed significant country-related effects, a main conclusion is that strong formal and organizational safeguards of agency autonomy appear to produce positive views on organizational interaction. The unusually strong and clear boundaries that underpin the autonomy of Swedish central government agencies lowers the risks of interacting with others, protecting both turf and mandate.

The author complains about how surveys analyzing her professional activities seldom ask questions about her real professional concerns. Moreover, answers often do not fit the possibilities given in the surveys, thus, surveys often may result in biased or inaccurate information. Adapted from the source document.

Addressing the challenges faced by the Political Science Society, the editor notes that lack of funding has been identified as perhaps the greatest. She discusses challenges, opportunities, and responsibilities of the organization. Adapted from the source document.

First, the state of Swedish Political Sciences is commented, after a recent evaluation of the Office of Higher Education. Recommendations included deeper research activity together with more effective teaching. Difficulty of how to handle an increased student mass with decreased resources for research & education is discussed. Solutions could include online courses & conferences, increased collaboration & identity between institutions, & increased role for the Federation of Political Science & its publication. An increased quality of the work of graduate students is also important. References. Adapted from the source document.

A decreased financing for research education in political sciences is being debated in the Swedish Parliament in 2005. This means that instead of 5-6 Ph.D. students per year, fewer will be accepted, & only every two year. Two reasons: too many previously accepted students & insufficient external financing are given. Working conditions for graduate students are variable between different institutions, the first years usually financed by grants, & only later by more stable fellowships. The need for establishing a national standard for graduate student financing is stressed. A. Barral

The results of ten years' studies on women equality are briefly discussed. The difficulties to establish a high level academic career for women are emphasized. Mainly economical reasons, such as limitations to obtain intermediate grants after the postdoc phase, are blamed for this situation. A. Barral

The relationship between political scientists & the mass media is analyzed. While a journalist may require a political scientist for an expert opinion, but he/she only needs the scientist to promote a ready-made point of view. Scientists should be wary of being used as actors in a prearranged production. A nuanced & principled, scientific attitude is recommended. A. Barral

This research concludes that the Swedish institution of Management by Objectives and Results (MBOR) has changed as a result of a top-down reform. The aim of the reform, which was to reduce the number of requests for performance information that the government makes to the central government agencies, has been successfully implemented. In analysing the national government's requests for performance information from 182 central government agencies (N=1752), this study confirms earlier claims of MBOR de-escalation. De-escalation is explained by stakeholder learning and the new policy that re-interprets performance management in terms that fit the ideals of New Public Governance. This research concludes that the size of an agency's budget has a positive effect on the total number of requests and the government's interest in quantitative performance indicators. Agency tasks that are relatively easy to measure and count have a significant positive effect on the number of government requests. Task is more important than budget size when governments decide what mix of indicators to request from a specific agency. In this respect, the Swedish government adjusts its requests for information to the agencies' tasks. The results from this study contribute to the ongoing debate on the application of performance management in a post-New Public Management setting.

A central claim of the NPM doctrine is that public sector organizations will deliver better quality and improve efficiency if managers are given more autonomy in managerial and operational decisions. At the same time the idea is to keep managers under close control, which has led to the introduction of result-control instruments. This balancing strategy is referred to as the paradox of autonomization. There is, however, still scarce knowledge on whether and how the proposed balancing techniques work. Using a unique database on Swedish government agencies this article aims to mitigate this deficiency (N=1752). A balancing strategy is mainly confirmed, since higher managerial and structural autonomy are balanced with more external results control by government. We show that governments' attempts at more managerial approaches to public service provision in reality add new ex post controls without reducing the old ones. However, policy and financial autonomy are not balanced by increased results control—these dimensions diminish when controlling for budget size. This study is an answer to a general call for more objective measures for evaluating bureaucratic autonomy

This research concludes that the Swedish institution of Management by Objectives and Results (MBOR) has changed as a result of a top-down reform. The aim of the reform,which was to reduce the number of requests for performance information that thegovernment makes to the central government agencies, has been successfully implemented. In analysing the national government's requests for performance information from 182 central government agencies (N=1752), this study confirms earlier claims of MBOR de-escalation. De-escalation is explained by stakeholder learning andthe new policy that re-interprets performance management in terms that fit the ideals of New Public Governance. This research concludes that the size of an agency's budget hasa positive effect on the total number of requests and the government's interest inquantitative performance indicators. Agency tasks that are relatively easy to measure andcount have a significant positive effect on the number of government requests. Task ismore important than budget size when governments decide what mix of indicators torequest from a specific agency. In this respect, the Swedish government adjusts its requests for information to the agencies' tasks. The results from this study contribute to the ongoing debate on the application of performance management in a post-New Public Management setting.