Technological change and network effects in growth regimes: exploring the microfoundations of economic growth
In: Routledge advances in heterodox economics 17
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In: Routledge advances in heterodox economics 17
In: Routledge advances in heterodox economics, 17
In: Review of social economy: the journal for the Association for Social Economics, Band 69, Heft 4, S. 528-531
ISSN: 1470-1162
In: Forum for social economics, Band 50, Heft 2, S. 153-156
ISSN: 1874-6381
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In: TATuP - Zeitschrift für Technikfolgenabschätzung in Theorie und Praxis / Journal for Technology Assessment in Theory and Practice, Band 26, Heft 3, S. 23-29
Mit der zunehmenden Digitalisierung und Vernetzung ökonomischer Systeme haben plattformbasierte Interaktionsbeziehungen stark an Bedeutung gewonnen. Hier werden zwei oder mehr Nutzungsgruppen durch eine dritte Seite, die Plattform, zusammengebracht. Die Interaktion wird in solchen zweiseitigen Märkten von den Plattformbetreibern kontrolliert. Kreditkartensysteme, Softwaremärkte oder werbefinanzierte Online-Communities stellen typische Beispiele dar. Da die Analyse von zweiseitigen Märkten mit Gleichgewichtsmodellen aufgrund der algebraischen Struktur des Problems in der Regel nicht praktikabel ist, präsentieren wir im vorliegenden Beitrag ein agentenbasiertes Modell, welches in einem kürzlich erschienenen Artikel ausführlicher diskutiert wird. Anhand von illustrativen Beispielen verdeutlichen wir die Implikationen eines agentenbasierten Ansatzes für die Innovationsökonomik im Allgemeinen und das Studium von Technologieentwicklung im Besonderen.
In: Structural change and economic dynamics, Band 37, S. 90-106
ISSN: 1873-6017
In: Sectors Matter!, S. 115-163
In: Dynamic games and applications: DGA, Band 12, Heft 2, S. 689-700
ISSN: 2153-0793
AbstractWe calculate the frequency of games with a unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium in the ensemble ofn-player,m-strategy normal-form games. To obtain the ensemble, we generate payoff matrices at random. Games with a unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium converge to the Nash equilibrium. We then consider a wider class of games that converge under a best-response dynamic, in which each player chooses their optimal pure strategy successively. We show that the frequency of convergent games with a given number of pure Nash equilibria goes to zero as the number of players or the number of strategies goes to infinity. In the 2-player case, we show that for large games with at least 10 strategies, convergent games with multiple pure strategy Nash equilibria are more likely than games with a unique Nash equilibrium. Our novel approach uses ann-partite graph to describe games.
In: Journal of evolutionary economics, Band 32, Heft 1, S. 35-86
ISSN: 1432-1386
AbstractWe investigate structural change in the PR China during a period of particularly rapid growth 1998-2014. For this, we utilize sectoral data from the World Input-Output Database and firm-level data from the Chinese Industrial Enterprise Database. Starting with correlation laws known from the literature (Fabricant's laws), we investigate which empirical regularities hold at the sectoral level and show that many of these correlations cannot be recovered at the firm level. For a more detailed analysis, we propose a multi-level framework, which is validated empirically. For this, we perform a robust regression, since various input variables at the firm-level as well as the residuals of exploratory OLS regressions are found to be heavy-tailed. We conclude that Fabricant's laws and other regularities are primarily characteristics of the sectoral level which rely on aspects like infrastructure, technology level, innovation capabilities, and the knowledge base of the relevant labor force. We illustrate our analysis by showing the development of some of the larger sectors in detail and offer some policy implications in the context of development economics, evolutionary economics, and industrial organization.
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